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PREFACE
The Bulletin on Narcotics is a United Nations journal that has been in publi-
cation since 1949. It is printed in all six official languages of the United 
 Nations—Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. 
The Bulletin provides information on developments in drug control at the 
local, national, regional and international levels that can be of benefit to the 
international community. 
The present issue of the Bulletin (Vol. LXI, 2017), whose guest editor is 
 Jorrit Kamminga, Senior Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations Clingendael and Strategic Policy Adviser for Afghanistan, Oxfam 
Novib, is focused on alternative development. It includes five articles that 
provide important insights and experiences about the current state and 
future directions of this development-driven drug-control strategy.
iv
EDITORIAL POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR PUBLICATION 
Individuals and organizations are invited by the Editor to contribute articles to the 
Bulletin dealing with policies, approaches, measures and developments (theoretical 
and/or practical) relating to various aspects of the international drug control effort. 
Of particular interest are the results of research, studies and practical experience that 
would provide useful information for policymakers, practitioners and experts, as 
well as the public at large. 
 All manuscripts submitted for publication in the Bulletin should constitute orig-
inal and scholarly work that has not been published elsewhere and is not being sub-
mitted simultaneously for publication elsewhere. The work should be of relatively 
high professional calibre in order to meet the requirements of a United Nations 
technical publication. Contributors are kindly asked to exercise discretion in the 
content of manuscripts so as to exclude any critical judgment of a particular national 
or regional situation. 
 The preferred mode of transmission of manuscripts is the Word format (.doc). 
Each manuscript submitted should consist of an original hard copy and an elec-
tronic version in any of the six official languages of the United Nations—Arabic, 
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. Excel should be used for charts and 
tables. The manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of approximately 200 
words, a complete set of references numbered in the order of their appearance in the 
text and a list of key words. The manuscript should not exceed 6,000 words. Tables 
should be self-explanatory and should supplement, not duplicate, information 
 provided in the text. 
 Manuscripts, together with brief curricula vitae of their authors, should be 
addressed to the Editor, Bulletin on Narcotics, either by mail (Research and Trend 
Analysis Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna International 
Centre, P.O. Box 500, 1400 Vienna, Austria), or by email (research@unodc.org). A 
transmittal letter should designate one author as correspondent and include his or 
her complete address, telephone number and email address. Unpublished manu-
scripts will be returned to the authors; however, the United Nations cannot be held 
responsible for loss. 
 Views expressed in signed articles published in the Bulletin are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Secretariat. The 
designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do 
not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat 
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or its authorities, or 
concerning the delimitation of any frontiers or boundaries. 
v Material published in the Bulletin is the property of the United Nations and 
enjoys copyright protection in accordance with the provisions of Protocol 2 annexed 
to the Universal Copyright Convention concerning the application of that Conven-
tion to the works of certain international organizations. 
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Introduction
We are pleased to introduce this special issue of the Bulletin on Narcotics, 
which is devoted to the theme of alternative development. In addition to 
this introduction, it consists of five academic articles that provide impor-
tant  insights and experiences regarding the current state and future direc-
tions of this development-driven strategy. The articles were selected 
following an open call for submission announced in December 2015. Some 
of the articles offer a programmatic perspective, distilling lessons learned 
and best  practices from projects and programmes implemented in various 
countries and contexts. Others present a more general analytical perspec-
tive, examining some of the principles and conceptual underpinnings of 
alternative  development.
 This special issue is part of a broader process that the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has undertaken to develop a the-
matic field of research on alternative development. In its publication World 
Drug Report 2015, UNODC included a thematic chapter on alternative 
development,1 the aim of which was to review the evidence accumulated 
through the implementation of projects and programmes in countries with 
large amounts of illicit drug cultivation and analyse the application of the 
alternative development approach in different contexts. The World Drug 
Report 2015 demonstrated that alternative development is in a constant state 
of flux and is now far more than what Alimi’s article in this issue describes 
as projects grounded on “monocausal schemes of context analysis” and “a 
one-size-fits-all basis”. 
1 World Drug Report 2015 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.15.XI.6), chap. II.
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 The World Drug Report 2015 documented how alternative development 
interventions have evolved over the years, reaching a multidimensional 
approach beyond the single focus on reducing illicit drug cultivation, while 
recognizing that adequate funding and political support bring the long-term 
socioeconomic and environmental development needed to sustain the reduc-
tion of income from illicit crops. The success of alternative development is 
increasingly a result of the piloting of new and often more sophisticated 
approaches by governments and other actors involved in its implementation. 
 This special issue of the Bulletin on Narcotics intends to elaborate on that 
thematic chapter of the World Drug Report 2015 by showing in more detail 
the evolving debate around alternative development and the new ways in 
which it is implemented in practice.
Sustained efforts to exchange best practices and lessons learned
Especially in recent years, there has been a sustained effort at both the 
national and the international level to evaluate programmes and to exchange 
best practices and lessons learned during international workshops and expert 
group meetings.2 In 2002, the International Conference on the Role of 
Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Cooperation, 
held in Feldafing, Germany, provided an important impetus to this process. 
More recently, the International Conferences on Alternative Development, 
held in 2012 and 2015, have provided a practical technical platform dedi-
cated to discussing different scenarios and resolving some of the conceptual 
challenges that are addressed in this issue. Even more recently, the discus-
sions taking place at the special session of the General Assembly on the 
world drug problem in 2016 resulted in operational recommendations on 
alternative development.3 The table below summarizes the main alternative 
development-related events since 2002.
2 See UNODC, “Alternative Development Index”, World Drug Report 2015. Available at 
www.unodc.org/wdr2015.
3 Outcome document of the thirtieth special session of the General Assembly, entitled “Our 
joint commitment to effectively addressing and countering the world drug problem” (General 
Assembly resolution S-30/1, annex).
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Selected international alternative development-related events since 2002
Event Place Date
International Conference on the Role of 
Alternative Development in Drug Control 
and Development Cooperation
Feldafing, 
Germany
7-12 January 2002
International workshop on development in a 
drugs environment: beyond alternative 
development?
Berlin 29 May-1 June 2006
Open-ended intergovernmental expert 
working group meeting on international 
cooperation on the eradication of illicit drug 
crops and on alternative development
Vienna 2-4 July 2008
Global Partnership on Alternative 
 Development regional seminar: Sustaining 
Opium Reduction in South-East Asia: Sharing 
Experiences on Alternative Development 
and Beyond
Chiang Mai, 
Thailand
15-17 December 2008
International Seminar Workshop on 
 Sustainable Alternative Development
Chiang Rai and 
Chiang Mai, 
Thailand
6-12 November 2011
High-level International Conference on 
Alternative Development
Lima 14-16 November 2012
Fourth German Federal Ministry for 
 Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ)/Transnational Institute (TNI) South-East 
Asia Informal Drug Policy Dialogue, on the 
future of alternative development in 
South-East Asia
Bangkok 18-19 December 2012
Joint UNODC/BMZ expert group meeting on 
outreach to new stakeholders in the field of 
alternative development
Berlin 11-12 November 2013
Second expert meeting in the framework of 
the Russian Federation presidency of the 
Group of Eight, on alternative development 
for drug producing regions
Moscow 25 March 2014
Joint BMZ/Open Society Foundations (OSF) 
Conference on exploring the land-drugs 
nexus
New York 19-21 October 2014
Expert group consultation meeting on the 
alternative development chapter of the 
World Drug Report
Berlin 18 November 2014
Joint UNODC/BMZ/German Agency for 
International Cooperation (GIZ) expert group 
meeting on alternative development in the 
framework of the preparations for the 
special session of the General Assembly in 
2016 and the post-Millennium Development 
Goals debate
Berlin 19-20 November 2014
Second high-level International Conference 
on Alternative Development 
Bangkok 19-24 November 2015
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Joint UNODC/BMZ/GIZ/Mae Fah Luang 
Foundation expert group meeting on taking 
development seriously: alternative 
 development in the process of the special 
session of the General Assembly in 2016
Bangkok 25-27 November 2015
Group of Seven Rome-Lyon group expert 
meeting on alternative development in the 
framework of the security-development nexus
Berlin 25 June 2015
High-level panel discussion on alternative 
development and the Sustainable 
 Development Goals 
New York 20 April 2016
Alternative development: new approaches 
and key elements for the post-special session 
of the General Assembly framework
New York 20 April 2016
Round table on alternative development; 
regional, interregional and international 
cooperation on development-oriented 
balanced drug control policy; addressing 
socioeconomic issues
New York 21 April 2016
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control 
 Commission expert group meeting on 
comprehensive and sustainable alternative 
development 
Lima 18-19 May 2016
High-level panel discussion at the sixtieth 
session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
on human security and the rule of law: 
alternative development’s contribution to 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
 Development
Vienna 14 March 2017
 One of the most important results of these endeavours has been the 
United Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative Development, adopted by 
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 2013 and by the General 
Assembly in December 2013.4 The Guiding Principles represent a step for-
ward, as they are based on a broad participatory process and are grounded 
in decades of experience and learning. They also represent a more balanced 
conceptualization of alternative development, synthesizing ideas and work-
ing towards a conceptual consensus through expert discussions and assess-
ments. As Alimi points out in this issue, the fact that the Guiding Principles 
were adopted by the General Assembly is important, as it endows them with 
greater political legitimacy.
 The section on alternative development in the outcome document of the 
special session of the General Assembly has further pushed the multidimen-
sional approach of alternative development, recognizing the value of imple-
menting “strategies aimed at alleviating poverty and strengthening the rule 
of law, accountable, effective and inclusive institutions and public services 
4 United Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative Development (General Assembly resolu-
tion 68/196, annex).
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and institutional frameworks” to address illicit drug cultivation and produc-
tion.5 The Assembly also strengthened an evidence-based approach to alter-
native development by recognizing the importance of research to “better 
understand factors contributing to illicit crop cultivation” and to support 
programmes through impact assessments.6
 These policy documents set the standards for, and guide broad national 
policies on, alternative development. A research agenda such as the one pro-
duced by the World Drug Report 2015 can guide operational strategies by 
identifying successful approaches to, for example, increasing food security, 
strengthening cooperatives, developing sustainable value chains, promoting 
agro-industry, marketing alternative products or increasing access to land.
The limited size and scope of alternative development
Despite the evidence demonstrating successes in alternative development,7 
the combined efforts of alternative development around the world still 
amount to only a very small percentage of overall development assistance. 
Between 2002 and 2013, alternative development-related disbursements of 
countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) accounted for $245 million per year, the equivalent 
of just 0.2 per cent of global development assistance. By 2013, alternative 
development assistance had fallen back to 0.1 per cent of overall develop-
ment assistance.8 Since the adoption of the 2009 Political Declaration and 
Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and 
 Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem, commitments of 
OECD countries have declined by 71 per cent.9 This seems to suggest that 
the political impetus behind more technical exchanges of best practices and 
lessons learned is not matched by a financial stimulus.
 While the World Drug Report 2015 clearly showed the global downward 
trend in international support, that abstraction becomes a more concrete 
reality when alternative development projects are implemented in the local 
contexts of countries and regions. It is useful, therefore, to look more closely 
at the example of a single country. The two figures below depict the situation 
for Afghanistan, showing both the global commitments and global disburse-
ments related to alternative development between 2001 and 2015.
5 General Assembly resolution S-30/1, annex, para. 7 (a).
6 Ibid., para. 7 (g).
7 See World Drug Report 2015, chap. II.
8 World Drug Report 2015, p. 84.
9 Ibid., p. 118.
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Figure I.  Global commitments related to alternative development in 
 Afghanistan made by donor countries of the Organization  
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001-2015
Note: Data extracted on 3 May 2017.
Figure II.  Global disbursements related to alternative development in 
 Afghanistan made by donor countries of the Organization  
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001-2015
Note: Data extracted on 3 May 2017.
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 Apart from the downward trend after 2007 (for commitments) and 2009 
(for disbursements), two other interesting developments can be seen from the 
figures. Firstly, it took at least until 2005 before the international community 
started providing substantial funding for alternative development in Afghanistan, 
four years after the Bonn Conference of 2001, which marked the starting point 
of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Secondly, there seems to have been a 
considerable delay between the first serious commitments (2005) and the first 
substantial increase in disbursements (2008). That delay is even more remark-
able when one considers that the Afghan Government had launched its first 
National Drug Control Strategy in May 2003.
 The overall downward trend of assistance for alternative development 
in recent years runs parallel to a broader pattern of international disengage-
ment from Afghanistan, marked particularly by a security transition process 
(2011-2014) and the end of the International Security Assistance Force 
mission in 2014. It is difficult, however, to equate this disengagement with 
donor fatigue. At the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan in October 2016, 
international donors pledged $15.2 billion to assist Afghanistan until 
2020.10 Nevertheless, it is not clear how much of those funds will be spent 
on alternative development programmes. Some ongoing projects will con-
tinue for the next few years, including the alternative development compo-
nents of the Kandahar Food Zone programme, a five-year, $45.4 million 
project of the United States Agency for International Development 
 (USAID) that will continue until the end of August 2018, and the USAID-
run Regional Agricultural Development Program, consisting of regional 
five-year projects with a total budget of more than $300 million, focusing 
on increasing the food and economic security of farmers through strength-
ened value chains.11
 While the rapid decrease in financial commitments to alternative devel-
opment does not bode well for future disbursements, Afghanistan, having 
received unprecedented levels of international support in a rather short 
time, has fared relatively well compared with other countries. But even in 
 Afghanistan, support for alternative development has been slight in 
 comparison with other types of counter-narcotics-related assistance. The 
average funds committed by international donors to agricultural alternative 
development in Afghanistan was $64 million per year in the period 1998-
2008 and $85 million per year in the period 2009-2013.12 Although these 
amounts may not include a considerable sum of either unregistered 
 spending on alternative development or funding coming from non-OECD 
10 BBC News, “Afghanistan aid: donors promise $15.2bn in Brussels”, 5 October 2016. 
 Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37560704.
11 United States, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report 
to the United States Congress (30 October 2016), pp. 139-141.
12 World Drug Report 2015, p. 86.
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countries, they are still far less than the total annual spending on counter-
narcotics programmes, which, for the United States alone, was roughly 
$566 million per year  between 2002 and 2016.13
Towards realistic expectations
Alternative development project cycles are often short, while the challenges 
underpinning illicit drug economies require long-term solutions. What single 
alternative development projects can achieve is contingent on the size and 
scope of the investment. Most of the evidence collected for the World Drug 
Report 2015 documents the benefits of local interventions for rural communi-
ties, but it also shows how national large-scale development investments 
 ultimately address illicit cultivation in a more structural way (in Thailand, for 
example). In looking for ways to make alternative development interventions 
more effective and more impactful, it is important to consider alternative devel-
opment as part of a broader package of development and good governance 
initiatives that can decrease dependence on illicit crop cultivation over time.
 When it comes to measuring progress, it is clear from both policy docu-
ments and project implementation on the ground that the impact of alterna-
tive development is no longer evaluated merely in terms of drug-control 
indicators.14 But the inclusion of other important indicators, such as those 
related to human development or human security, brings new challenges to 
alternative development, not only in project design and implementation, but 
also in monitoring and evaluation. As alternative development constitutes 
only one of the national strategies applied within a broader policy frame-
work, which contains elements ranging from eradication, conflict resolution 
and strengthening of the rule of law to overall socioeconomic development, 
it may be very hard to isolate the exact contribution of alternative  development 
to or its direct impact on, for example, the quality of life of rural  communities 
in a certain area.
Linking drugs and development policies
The research undertaken for the World Drug Report 2016 explored the 
 linkages between the drug problem, drug policies and sustainable develop-
ment.15 The conclusion drawn is that a dual track is needed: specialized drug 
13 As of 31 December 2016, the total spending of the United States on counter-narcotics 
efforts in Afghanistan was $8.5 billion since 2002, which amounts to about $566 million a year. 
The total figure is taken from Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly 
Report to the United States Congress (30 January 2017), p. 186.
14 World Drug Report 2015, chap. II, sect. G, pp. 109-114.
15 World Drug Report 2016 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.16.XI.6).
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interventions in synergy with general development investments. This dual 
track has been well embraced in the alternative development approach. 
 Incorporating alternative development into broader development, including 
in rural areas, has clear benefits, but the more it becomes embedded in  wider 
approaches and strategies, the more it can lose the specificity of  development 
efforts needed in areas with (or at risk of having) illicit drug cultivation. The 
World Drug Report 2016 presents examples of drug and development policies 
that had unforeseen counterproductive effects on each other because they 
were designed and implemented in isolation.
 What alternative development offers to development strategies is a set of 
specialized thematic and operational development interventions in symbio-
sis with the aim of addressing multiple challenges not only related to depend-
ence on illicit crops, but also associated with the illicit economy, such as 
violence, insecurity and the presence of criminal organizations or illegal 
armed groups. The common denominator of those problems is that building 
trust with the local communities is often essential before any development-
driven intervention can be sustainable.
 In her article for this Bulletin, Alimi explores the concept of alternative 
development as a viable policy entry point for bringing sustainable develop-
ment options to areas affected by illicit drug cultivation. Her article 
 particularly highlights the divide between what she calls drug policy actors 
and development-policy actors. She points out that while the concept of 
alternative development intrinsically calls for close cooperation, for various 
reasons, the gap between those two communities has never been bridged. As 
a result, there seems to have been no constructive debate on how alternative 
development can be most successful as a complementary instrument within 
broader development efforts. The tide may be turning, however, as Alimi 
also points out that recent developments, particularly the discussions  leading 
to the  special session of the General Assembly in 2016 and the adoption of 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, could help to better connect 
drug and development policies in a common policy setting.
 Often criticized, and sometimes even delegitimized, the concept of alter-
native development is at a crossroads for Alimi. The recent efforts observed 
may have critical implications that would mean strengthening the evidence 
base and setting out clearly the ambitions and limitations of alternative 
development as an element of a broader development approach. Such future 
directions of alternative development, however, require a global, multi-
stakeholder reflection on how a development approach to drugs could be the 
way forward. That entails a shared understanding of root causes, driving 
factors and possible solutions to illicit drug cultivation on the part of all 
agencies working on sustainable development in contexts where illicit drug 
cultivation, production or trade plays a role. Together, they need to work 
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towards the same overarching goal, which is to contribute to an enabling 
environment in which economic and social development can create condi-
tions for decreasing, in the long term, the dependence on illicit drug crops 
in a sustainable way. According to Alimi, ambitions seem to be renewed to 
establish a common normative foundation that would allow the better inte-
gration of alternative development into a sustainable development approach 
to solving the world drug problem.
The practical implementation of the principle of shared responsibility
At the heart of the broad patterns of collaboration needed for alternative 
development to contribute effectively to this enabling environment lies the 
principle of shared responsibility to help address some of the driving factors 
of illicit economies, including lack of production-related infrastructure, 
basic social services, agricultural expertise and markets. 
 In this Bulletin, Kamminga and Zorro-Sánchez approach the principle of 
shared responsibility from two perspectives: firstly, as an ethical approach to 
challenges related to the world drug problem; and secondly, as a more prac-
tical commitment that a large variety of actors need to display as part of their 
social responsibility. While the former perspective explains why shared 
responsibility is so important, the latter creates more understanding about 
what it actually means in practice. The article analyses what the principle of 
shared responsibility could look like in terms of practical forms of collabora-
tion that could help to create the above-mentioned enabling environment for 
reducing dependence on illicit drug crops.
 Kamminga and Zorro-Sánchez particularly stress the need for specific 
commitments from a large number of partnerships between different actors 
and at different levels. It is especially in such partnerships—for example, 
between producer organizations and the private sector—that shared respon-
sibility becomes embodied in practical and meaningful arrangements such 
as those linking local farmers’ associations with international companies and 
markets. If this practical translation of the principle of shared responsibility 
does not occur, the gap between the international level, where, at forums 
such as the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the General Assembly, the 
principle is continuously stressed as the basis of all international coopera-
tion, and the national level, where alternative development interventions 
take place, will not be narrowed.
 For the moment, however, the embodiment of shared responsibility in 
practical arrangements remains very limited. A clear example is access to 
national and international markets. As Kamminga and Zorro-Sánchez 
explain, neither free trade nor preferential trade has so far succeeded in 
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strengthening the marketing of alternative development products. They 
argue that a broad-based dialogue should be started with the private sector, 
with governments and with international institutions such as the World 
Trade Organization that have influence on access to markets and the regula-
tion of international trading schemes. As long as alternative development 
products are rarely marketed at the international level, it will remain difficult 
to establish an international movement around alternative development 
 similar to those for fair trade and organic production.
Linking alternative development and land
The Bulletin article by Grimmelmann, Espinoza, Arnold and Arning subse-
quently addresses the link between illicit drug-crop cultivation and land 
rights. Building in part on a previous desk study16 with case studies from 
Afghanistan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colombia, Myanmar and Peru, 
the article further explores access to and ownership of land as key determin-
ing factors when it comes to small-scale farmers’ livelihoods and their deci-
sions to grow certain crops or to invest in their lands. It shows how the 
successful contribution of alternative development interventions may not 
only depend on the project-related components, but rather also on more 
structural enabling conditions.
 While further research is required, the authors argue that, to be  successful 
and sustainable, alternative development programmes need to adequately 
address land issues and integrate or connect to land policies and the promo-
tion of access to land via land-use planning, land registration and a function-
ing cadastral system. This is also in line with the Guiding Principles on 
Alternative Development, which recommend that countries “take into 
account land rights and other related land management resources when 
designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating alternative  development 
programmes, including those of indigenous peoples and local communities, 
in accordance with national legal frameworks.”17 The authors conclude that 
alternative development could benefit from existing guidelines related to 
land governance and titling of land, such as the Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of 
National Food Security of the Food and  Agriculture Organization.18
16 Nike Affeld, “The nexus between drug crop cultivation and access to land: insights from 
case studies from Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Myanmar and Peru” (Eschborn, German 
Agency for International Cooperation, September 2014).
17 General Assembly resolution 68/196, annex, appendix, para. 18 (kk).
18 Food and Agriculture Organization and Committee on World Food Security, Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of 
National Food Security (Rome, 2012). 
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Country case studies: Afghanistan and Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
After those three thematic articles, the Bulletin concludes with two country-
specific articles. Firstly, García-Yi explores the case of Afghanistan. On the 
basis of field research, she evaluates farmer and community characteristics 
that promote resilience to opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. A par-
ticularly noteworthy aspect of that research is that it evaluates large-scale 
field survey data from different regions of Afghanistan using quantitative 
techniques. The analytical results of the article provide additional evidence 
that mostly supports previous qualitative and narrative findings on the deter-
minants of illicit crop cultivation, many of which have been criticized for 
having a limited scope (e.g., because of the small number of interviews and 
the focus on only a few regions).
 In this regard, the results constitute an important addition to the body 
of independent evidence needed for sound decision-making. García-Yi’s 
article explores the tensions between the often short-term investments asso-
ciated with alternative development and the necessary long-term support 
that is required for the permanent transition from illicit drug cultivation to 
more diverse livelihoods. In that light, true resilience to opium poppy culti-
vation in Afghanistan can occur only if farmers are able to withstand strains 
and shocks without recurring to illicit cultivation. For the moment, many 
farming communities involved in alternative development projects are still 
“living on the edge”, which means a relatively small push can send them 
back to illicit crop cultivation.
 Another important aspect of García-Yi’s analysis is that she frames alter-
native development activities as resilience-based interventions that are suit-
able for contexts of protracted crisis. This entails integrating farmer livelihood 
strategies, vulnerabilities and uncertainty with broad-based rural develop-
ment to obtain sustainable reductions of opium poppy cultivation. The key 
element of these strategies is building confidence and ensuring farmers that 
they can sustain themselves even despite the recurrence of external shocks. 
But it is equally clear from her analysis that alternative development alone 
cannot create this enabling environment in which farmers become resilient. 
The evidence of her research also suggests that improvements in public 
 services and governability are needed to turn poppy communities, over time, 
into non-poppy communities, and to keep communities poppy-free for 
longer periods of time.
 Grisaffi, Farthing and Ledebur explore the case of the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia. They argue that the country’s “coca yes, cocaine no” policy 
provides valuable insight into the benefits of a sustainable livelihoods 
approach to supply reduction without prior forced eradication of drug crops. 
While acknowledging that the policy has inevitable limitations, its focus on 
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the social welfare, human rights and economic stability of coca-farming 
families has proved effective and sustainable in diversifying the economy and 
fostering political and economic stability. In this case, key success factors 
have been strong social organizations and the direct, meaningful participa-
tion of communities and grass-roots organizations such as the coca growers’ 
unions in finding more effective and sustainable approaches to drug control.
 The community coca-control strategy builds on factors that are unique 
to the Plurinational State of Bolivia, including the strong agricultural unions 
present in coca-growing regions and the nation’s long history of traditional 
coca use. Still, key elements of the programme, such as grass-roots control, 
lack of conditionalities for assistance and a focus on human development, 
provide valuable lessons that could be implemented elsewhere. More 
broadly, the authors argue that farmers can reduce their reliance on planting 
coca and other crops used for illicit purposes only if their economic security 
is treated as a priority.
 What both country cases have in common is that they confirm that there 
is still only limited knowledge about the key drivers of illicit drug cultivation 
within the broader context of socioeconomic development, governance and 
conflict. Much more research, project evaluation and learning is needed, not 
only to find ways to improve the effectiveness of alternative development 
projects but also to make sure that such interventions do no harm. As García-
Yi explains in her article, the latter aspect has been mostly overlooked so far 
but is related to an imperfect understanding of causalities. If alternative 
development interventions wrongly attribute causes and motivations to the 
growing of coca or opium poppy, they might even contribute to more illicit 
cultivation. Similarly, short-term or quick-fix solutions might ultimately 
increase farmers’ vulnerabilities and might also result in prolonging or even 
expanding illicit cultivation. Lastly, while alternative development interven-
tions need to be designed with a solid understanding of local conditions, they 
also need to be flexible so that they can adapt easily to changing contexts.
Conclusion
The country case studies presented in this special issue show that there are 
opportunities to improve alternative development and come up with more 
impactful and sustainable solutions, but they also highlight how complex 
the local contexts can be in areas where alternative development is imple-
mented. That demanding reality means that there can be no single blue-
print for successful and sustainable alternative development interventions. 
Nevertheless, there may be common elements that can be found in many 
alternative development projects, including, for example, community par-
ticipation, producer associations or cooperatives, value-chain development 
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and agro-industry. The World Drug Report 2015 grouped such common stra-
tegic elements into six categories: (a) economic and infrastructural compo-
nents; (b) political components; (c) organizational components; (d) social 
components; (e) environmental components; and (f) a focus on women.19
 But the way these common elements come together to produce success-
ful and sustainable outcomes will often differ from community to commu-
nity, from region to region, and from country to country. This calls for 
targeted, in-depth research in areas where alternative development is 
planned, but it also emphasizes the value of exchanging best practices and 
lessons learned. A “technical research agenda” for alternative development 
requires much more research to be carried out and much more interaction 
among practitioners and experts from diverse backgrounds, including 
 development, drug policy, governance, human rights, security, trade and 
the environment. This is the only way to bridge both the knowledge gap and 
the conceptual divide that continue to prevent alternative development 
 interventions from realizing their full potential.
 This thematic Bulletin on Narcotics aims to provide a small but substantial 
contribution to the evolving debate on alternative development and related 
discussions such as those focused on shared responsibility, land governance 
or the Sustainable Development Goals. Within the broader framework of the 
international workshops and expert group meetings taking place on alterna-
tive development, it intends to stimulate further academic research and 
informed discussions on how alternative development can be most effective, 
how it can be better integrated within broader development and governance 
efforts, and how it can be linked more strongly to the 2030 Agenda for 
 Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals.
19 World Drug Report 2015, chapt. II, sect. F., pp. 97-109.
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ABSTRACT
The concept of alternative development suffers from its blurry, composite 
nature. Understood in different ways, the concept has also been reappropriated in 
various ways and has faced strong resistance, which has hampered its evolution into 
something more than an isolated instrument of drug-policy interventions, poorly 
connected to the development cooperation sphere and with a mixed record of results. 
The difficult balancing between short-term reduction of illicit cultivation and the 
longer time needed for sustained development efforts has limited the ability of alter-
native development to constitute a conceptual entry point to tie drug policy to a 
development rationale. Recent dynamics, however, suggest that the concept of alter-
native development has gained political momentum as a central component of “sus-
tainable development-oriented and balanced drug control policies” [1]. Nevertheless, 
despite renewed interest in the drug issue in the development cooperation sphere, 
alternative development remains scarce in policy discussions. Applying concepts of 
policy transfer and agenda-setting, the present article examines the trajectory of the 
alternative development concept to better understand why, although in theory con-
necting drug and development policies, it struggles to be internationally accepted 
and integrated into a broad development approach to drugs.
Keywords: alternative development definition, policy entrepreneurs,  transnational 
knowledge, drug policy change, sustainable development 
INTRODUCTION 
“Alternative development” originated as a hybrid operational policy option 
midway between drug control and development policies. Despite 40 years of 
programme implementation and the establishment of a commonly agreed 
definition by the General Assembly in 1998 [2], alternative development has 
never been an obvious policy concept and has suffered from its blurry, com-
posite nature. As an object of diverse forms of policy understanding, the con-
cept has been reappropriated in various ways and its translation into practice 
has faced strong resistance. For most beneficiaries, as well as  experts, alterna-
tive development became a deceptive label whose “development” part tended 
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to be neglected [3-5]. Limited in size and scope, alternative  development has 
rapidly come to constitute a specialized tool of drug policy intervention that 
is poorly connected to development policy frameworks and funding. Pro-
gramme implementation has been traditionally concentrated in six countries 
where coca and opium poppy are produced (Afghanistan,  Bolivia (Plurina-
tional State of), Colombia, Myanmar, Peru and Thailand), with the largest 
share of financial support provided by the United States of  America. 
 In Commission on Narcotic Drugs resolutions on alternative develop-
ment adopted in the 2000s, the Millennium Development Goals were often 
only something to be “recalled”. More broadly, alternative development has 
never been fully understood as a relevant policy category by development 
cooperation actors, let alone integrated into their priorities or agendas [6]. 
For many, the difficult balancing between short-term objectives of illicit cul-
tivation reduction and the longer-term approaches based on sustained devel-
opment efforts has called into question the relevance and even the legitimacy 
of alternative development policies. The constant changing of labels, the 
variability of programme components, and the lack of research and impact 
assessments has cast further doubt on the credibility of the approach.
 In recent years, alternative development has gained political traction. In 
the follow-up to the 2008 Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards 
an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem, the 
concept has been increasingly debated and reconnected to its development 
component. The adoption of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Alter-
native Development by the General Assembly in 2013 demonstrated renewed 
thinking and interest. The concept of alternative development has evolved 
from a strict focus on crop-substitution projects to a broader, more holistic 
policy concept dealing with the root causes of illicit drug-crop cultivation and, 
when properly designed and implemented, a potential driver of sustainable 
development. In the midst of the international debate on more effective drug 
policies that led to the special session of the General Assembly on the world 
drug problem, held in April 2016, a hybrid community of actors actively con-
tributed to the enrichment of the concept and its consolidation in a broader 
development-oriented rationale. Interested stakeholders support the proposi-
tion that alternative development implementation “can contribute and create 
conditions conducive to achieving all the Sustainable Development Goals” [7, 
para. 37]. For the period 2010-2013, 23 countries report having implemented 
alternative development at the national level, while new donors have made 
considerable investments in alternative development and national funding has 
been emerging [8]. The vision translated into the outcome document of the 
special session of the General Assembly in 2016 thus incorporates a clearer 
focus on the socioeconomic dimensions of the illicit cultivation of narcotic 
plants and makes alternative development a central component of “sustaina-
ble  development-oriented and balanced drug control policies” [1, para.7].
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 Now, despite apparent normative rebalancing and broad political 
endorsement of alternative development in the drug policy community, the 
idea struggles to go beyond that policy community and to attract further 
support and resources. A link still seems to be missing. As the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development was being shaped, development cooperation 
actors recognized the need to tackle drug-related problems to achieve the 
goals set. Nevertheless, a development-oriented approach to the world drug 
problem is merely being sketched, and the concept of alternative develop-
ment has remained relatively absent from the debate. There has been little 
consideration of alternative development as a potential instrument of 
 development-based approaches to organized crime, let alone a clear vision of 
how alternative development interventions could be integrated into a broad 
sustainable development rationale [9-12].
 In other words, facing the same problem—the nexus between drugs and 
development—actors from the drug and the development communities 
seem to be viewing it from different policy perspectives. How can this policy 
configuration be explained? Where does the concept of alternative develop-
ment stand today, and what are the implications of the recent efforts to 
mainstream alternative development into broad development policy frame-
works? This article1 first examines the trajectory of the concept in an attempt 
to understand why alternative development, although conceived in theory to 
connect drug and development policies, struggles to be used as an interna-
tionally accepted policy category that is well integrated into a broad develop-
ment approach to drugs. It argues that the way the concept of alternative 
development has emerged and has been appropriated by various actors has 
been part of a dynamic of conceptual fragmentation and missed opportuni-
ties that (a) has had critical implications for policy coherence on drugs and 
development and (b) may explain why alternative development remained a 
mere specialized instrument of drug control interventions, loosely attached 
to the creation of a broader development approach to the drug problem.
 Applying concepts of policy transfer and agenda-setting [13-15], this 
article further explores the recent dynamic and, in particular, the mobiliza-
tion of a heterogeneous group of experts and practitioners to revive and 
perpetuate interest in alternative development. With the special session of 
the General Assembly in 2016 providing a window of opportunity and the 
1 This article is based on interviews with representatives of international organizations and 
national governments specialized in alternative development, drug policy and development coop-
eration, and other relevant actors (growers of illicit plants, experts, etc.), as well as participation 
as an observer in international meetings on alternative development, drugs and development, and 
related agendas between 2012 and 2015. For confidentiality reasons, all interview sources have 
been kept anonymous. The author is particularly grateful to all interviewees who agreed to provide 
information. The author also expresses her great appreciation to the reviewers for their first-rate 
comments and suggestions, which helped improve the manuscript. Special thanks go to WMA, 
WHR and DMA. 
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2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development affording an enabling environ-
ment for greater international policy coherence, early signs show that the 
concept of alternative development is at a crossroads. Interested stakehold-
ers seem engaged in a process of “assimilation of ideas” [14], thanks to 
which the concept is being reinvigorated and balanced. As will be underlined 
below, what seems to be at stake is the diffusion of alternative development 
as a viable policy entry point for bringing sustainable development options 
to areas affected by illicit drug-crop cultivation. The discussion will then 
turn to the implications of such new ties for the nature of alternative devel-
opment and the possible scope of its portfolio.
Different perspectives: the uneven trajectory of the concept of 
 alternative development 
The emergence of policy concepts often follows turbulent paths. In the case 
of alternative development, the idea of providing producers of narcotic 
plants with alternatives so that they can exit the illicit economy of drug trade 
struggled to be “normalized”2 [14]. Certainly, alternative development is 
regarded as an “accepted category for policy development” [14, p. 216] used 
in drug-policy reference documents and put into practice in technical instru-
ments deployed in areas where illicit drugs are produced. However, its crum-
bling into many distinct denominations suggests that the question of how to 
define the concept still has not been settled.
 Alternative development terminology has been used for 40 years to 
refer to drug-control projects based on the theoretical premise that the 
reduction of illicit drug-crop cultivation is conditional upon the improve-
ment of the socioeconomic environment of production areas. The 1988 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
 Substances already foresaw “economically viable alternatives to illicit cul-
tivation” as a form of cooperation “to increase the effectiveness of eradica-
tion efforts” (art. 14, para. 3(a)). But not until 1998 was alternative 
development formalized “as a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit 
cultivation of plants containing narcotic drugs … through specifically 
designed rural development measures in the context of sustained national 
economic growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking 
2 Analysing the trajectory of the fragile-State concept, Olivier Nay proposes three normative 
processes affecting the production of transnational knowledge and the way concepts become 
internationally accepted policy categories used in most policy doctrines of a given sector: 
“normalization”—a process in which a rough idea is accepted as a transnational “norm” based 
on expert knowledge, detailed definition and statistical exercises; “fragmentation”—a concept is 
subject to various interpretations while being spread among a heterogeneous number of actors; 
and “assimilation”—a process of adaptation and enrichment of the overarching concept that 
stabilizes it and prevents it from profound critical dissent over time and installs it as a relatively 
stable policy category [14, p. 212].
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action against drugs, recognizing the particular sociocultural characteris-
tics of the target communities and groups, within the framework of a 
 comprehensive and permanent solution to the problem of illicit drugs”. In 
this definition, alternative development seems confusedly intertwined with 
counter- narcotics and sustainable development efforts. Yet this definition 
does not provide an explicit framework for defining the role of “target 
communities”, the components of a “permanent solution” to drugs or the 
development efforts and process timelines or forms needed to succeed. 
Suffice it to say that it provides enough leeway to encompass a wide array 
of understandings and interpretations. As reported in the World Drug 
Report 2015, alternative development is a concept in “constant flux”, whose 
essence one still struggles to determine: “process”, “method”, “policy”, 
“activities”, “component of multidimensional development activities”, 
“specifically designed measures” [8, annex]: the nature of alternative 
development remains  multifaceted and highly dependent on how policy 
actors choose to use it. It has been conducted under other labels, such as 
“alternative livelihoods” in Afghanistan,3 or more recently “extended” into 
broader policies, such as “territorial consolidation” in Colombia or “suffi-
cient economy” in Thailand. In other words, the alternative development 
concept is applied in different guises at the national level, which makes it 
more difficult to share models or lessons learned between countries.
 The fragmented landscape of alternative development is closely related 
to the trajectory of the concept. Introduced in international drug-policy 
documents in the late 1980s, the conceptualization of alternative develop-
ment follows an irregular path of operational bricolage. In the face of increas-
ing relocation of illicit-crop cultivation areas, a consensus was forged among 
governments at the United Nations level, particularly among donors involved 
in the international fight against drugs, to use a strategy “based on massive 
rural development as a means to achieve eventually the level of development 
necessary to put an end to illicit drug production” [16, p. 13]. In theory, the 
concept was founded on the premise that the agricultural alternatives pro-
vided to growers of illicit plants would eventually generate sufficient income 
to facilitate their abandonment of illicit activities and allow them to live 
decent lives. In practice, however, the heterogeneous interpretations of that 
assumption had a great impact on the construction at the international level 
of the concept of alternative development that has come to be commonly 
accepted. 
3 In theory, alternative livelihood programmes seek to mainstream counter-narcotics objectives 
into national development strategies and address the factors of illicit drug crop cultivation,  whereas 
alternative development ones have been considered to lack strategic coherence and reduced to 
isolated area-based projects. Research shows, however, the similarities in terms of implementation 
and results hidden behind the distinct labels of “alternative development” and “alternative 
 livelihood” [5].
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 From the early 1970s to the 2000s, parallel alternative development ini-
tiatives were deployed around the world as part of a global strategy to reduce 
the supply of illicit drugs, encompassing exploratory “crop substitution” and 
“integrated rural development” interventions, mainly in illicit coca- and 
opium poppy-producing areas in South-East Asia and Latin America. A rel-
atively small number of actors took part in such initiatives. But discrepancies 
in policy objectives and instruments, as well as different levels of commit-
ment and resource mobilization among actors, led to multiple appropria-
tions of the “alternative development” idea and to great disequilibrium in 
the way the concept was further forged.
 Through the United States Agency for International Development 
 (USAID), the United States encouraged the adoption of alternative devel-
opment initiatives early on in Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and Peru,4 and 
later used those experiences in Colombia, in the early 2000s.5 In the frame-
work of those programmes, the United States Government intended to pro-
vide technical, legal and policy assistance, training and support personnel 
and to carry out market research and outreach to the private sector 6 to sup-
port a transition from a “drug-led economy to one with a stable, legitimate, 
and diversified economic base” [17, p.12; 18, p. 3]. However, although the 
goal of alternative development programmes was to gradually replace coca 
with other economically viable crops, the political objectives of the United 
States counter-narcotics policy at the time—to achieve quick and visible 
results in terms of supply reduction—often overshadowed development 
measures that took longer to implement and to succeed.
 As underlined in various United States policy documents from that 
period, “successful” alternative development efforts needed “host govern-
ment control and security in project areas; effective interdiction operations; 
careful coordination of eradication, interdiction”; and extended economic 
assistance packages. For instance, in 1991, as the USAID Alternative Devel-
opment Strategy in the Plurinational State of Bolivia was being developed, 
4 The Government of the United States has funded “alternative development” projects in the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia since 1975 and in Peru since 1981. In the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, efforts were first concentrated in the Chapare region and four alternative development 
projects were funded by USAID between 1983 and 2002. The United States even supported a 
programme of the Bolivian Government that paid farmers not to grow coca. In Peru, the first 
USAID-funded alternative development project (1981-1994) was designed to increase and diver-
sify agricultural production through “agricultural assistance for alternative legal crops and 
 improvements in roads and health and community services”. Severe lack of security and other 
problems were identified as having drastically limited programme achievements [17].
5 The Government targeted poppy-growing areas of Colombia in 2000 and expanded programmes 
to include coca-growing areas in 2001, but started activities in 2002 as part of Plan Colombia.
6 The term “alternative development” has been used to refer to the activities since the early 
1970s that “help growers of illicit crops find legal means of earning a living” and “entails a broad 
range of development initiatives to generate legal employment alternatives, alleviate poverty, and 
spur investment and economic growth. Such efforts often involve substituting licit crops for illicit 
ones” [17, p.1]. 
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the Andean Trade Preference Act gave duty-free treatment to products from 
all countries of the region with the objective of supporting legitimate eco-
nomic activities to reduce dependence on the illicit drug economy—an 
objective that was renewed a decade later with the signature of the Andean 
Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. Micro-level alternative devel-
opment interventions were coupled with broader economic support designed 
to ensure better access for Andean exports to the United States market [19], 
but since the arrangements involved all forms of produce from the region, it 
is difficult to measure the share of alternative products and the benefits to 
communities under those [8, 20, 21].
 In this context, alternative development constitutes both an instrument 
to encourage the abandonment of illicit cultivation where development sup-
port has tended to be subsumed under “counter-narcotics assistance”, and 
a form of compensation for the damage and financial losses caused by the 
enforcement of a zero-tolerance approach to illicit drug-crop cultivation. 
The provision of viable economic alternatives to illicit cultivation is under-
stood as a subcomponent of a supply-reduction policy mix responding to the 
political basis of the United States counter-narcotics policy at the time; this 
conceptualization of alternative development led to “overlapping agendas” 
[22] that had not been well balanced. Being externally driven, alternative 
development initiatives were implemented amid fundamental confusion 
between policy ends and means: the eradication of illicit-crop cultivation in 
the short term and the transition to sustainable development. The role of 
eradication (forced or voluntary) and the conditionality of development 
assistance upon eradication efforts crystallizes that duality [23-25]. Because 
of the historical balance of power in the drug-policy arena, that view domi-
nated international discussions of alternative development for a long time. 
As underlined during interviews with some of the actors most fully engaged 
in alternative development today, “the United States had the interest, the 
resources and the influence” to act on this agenda on an international scale 
and developed a vision that “tended to overshadow alternative interpreta-
tions of alternative development”.
 In different places, at different times, alternative development has been 
interpreted and implemented in different ways. It was the balance between 
development and security efforts that laid the foundations for divergences. 
Thailand, for instance, declared poppy-free in 2002, is today known for its 
holistic approach to the concept of alternative development. Yet its contem-
porary interpretation emerged from a rather complex process of balancing. 
From the first Royal Project of 1969, launched by King Bhumibol Adulyadej 
in the hill-tribe village of DoiPui, the Thai “people-centred” interpretation 
of alternative development has been developed over 40 years following the 
acknowledged failures of early government-led repressive eradication meas-
ures and the assessment that isolated crop-substitution programmes would 
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not be sufficient to enable farmers to effectively and sustainably transition to 
licit agricultural activities [26]. Gradually, market access, postponed eradi-
cation (six to eight years after development activities were initiated) and 
integration into the social mainstream became central. The critical political 
role played by the King and the continuity of donor support, as illustrated by 
the Thai-German Highland Development Programme (1981-1998), con-
tributed to making the Thai model an ideal type of development-focused 
alternative development [20, p. 30].
 Outside the experiences of Thailand and the United States, the develop-
ment of an integrated path for the alternative development concept came 
late, as part of the broader dynamics of agenda cycles: on the one hand, the 
consolidation of the European agenda on drugs that slowly emerged in the 
mid-1980s once the HIV/AIDS epidemic had surged on the continent [27, 
28], and on the other, the promotion of the principle of shared responsibility 
by countries of the Latin American region. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
the paths of the drug-policy discussions in Germany, the European Union 
and the Organization of American States converged towards the recognition 
that the concept of alternative development needed to be pushed into posi-
tion midway between drug and development policies. In this interpretation, 
alternative development is one of the many components of what develop-
ment assistance could bring to drug control, along with demand-side 
responses and health interventions. On the basis of the German experiences, 
notably in projects implemented in Peru and Thailand, alternative develop-
ment is considered one of “the most important instruments” and “opportu-
nities” for development cooperation in the field of drug control, as well as a 
viable option to contribute equally “to the control of drugs but also to 
 sustainable human development as a whole” [29, p.9; 30]. In the Latin 
American region, alternative development is envisioned as an “important 
component for generating … sustainable economic options that will make it 
possible to overcome the factors that give rise to the [drug] phenomenon” 
[31, para. 22; 32], in the framework of a regional strategy stressing the prin-
ciples of national sovereignty and shared responsibility. Cross-cutting and 
context-tailored development interventions such as conflict resolution, 
infrastructure support, social services provision, targeted-group participa-
tion and institutional strengthening are considered necessary to shift com-
munities away from the illicit economy and towards sustainable development.
 By trial and error, the alternative development concept has taken multi-
ple paths of conceptualization, interpretation and implementation that can-
not be dissociated from the experimentations on the ground. Around the 
globe, alternative development has been highly dependent on engaged 
actors’ political agendas and available financial resources. The first efforts to 
normalize alternative development in the early international drug-policy 
instruments strongly echoed these experimental adjustments. For instance, 
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a 1993 United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) 
technical information paper defined the term “alternative development” as 
an “instrument for drug control”, recasting under a catch-all terminology 
two decades of crop eradication and integrated rural development experi-
ence” [16, p.2]. Furthermore, the project approach adopted over time and 
the asymmetrical power relationships organizing the drug-policy arena pre-
cipitated the imposition of a dominant vision of alternative development 
rather than the constitution of a “discipline” per se. 
 Despite the 1998 definition, multiple appropriation schemes over-
strained the initial idea, leading to a highly fragmented conceptualization 
landscape: “at least four views are found: that alternative development is a 
multifaceted strategic (or systemic) approach to a problem, that alternative 
development is one leg of a stool alongside eradication, interdiction, policing 
and education, that alternative development is a series of discrete projects 
(or pilot projects), and that alternative development is equivalent to crop 
substitution” [33, pp. 5-8]. The process of alternative development concep-
tualization turns out to be a pragmatic reformulation of strategic drug-policy 
lines, with political considerations often taking precedence over shared 
 policies. This uneven process of emergence eventually fostered a patchwork 
concept that is difficult to homogenize and is vulnerable to criticism.
 As discussed in the next section, the difficulty of constituting a knowl-
edge basis for alternative development and the confused use of counter-
narcotics and development efforts called into question the credibility of the 
concept. These elements contributed to the triggering of new conceptual 
struggles and to limiting the influence of non-drug-policy actors whose 
human and financial resources and expertise could have been significant in 
tipping the balance.
Same script, lost act: the missed opportunity to bring development in
For an idea to become an internationally accepted policy category integrated 
into a sector agenda, there must be something that makes it take hold and 
grow.7 In norm-cycle and policymaking theory, actors mobilize resources 
(human, financial, knowledge) to promote their ideas as the best solution to 
7 In policy agenda theory, Kingdon (1984) describes the policy terrain as affected by “multiple 
streams”: the problem stream—when a problem erupts or is identified; the policy stream—when 
a policy is generated to contribute to solving the identified problems; and the political stream—the 
events or forces that affect the way problems are managed. In this scheme, windows of oppor-
tunity open because of changes in the political stream (shift in power distribution or mood), or 
because a new problem has been recognized or defined as such by the actors involved. Policy 
actors play a critical role in that they can produce the necessary conditions for a policy window 
to open, and seize the opportunity to hook their interests and solutions to that particular problem 
or context.
24 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LXI, 2017
an identified problem and engage in “organizational platforms” specifically 
constructed to that end or use existing ones with other agendas [34]. In the 
latter case, it is assumed that actors make good use of their knowledge, 
resources and leverage capacities to promote a specific position in return for 
anticipated future gains (material benefits, achieving specific objectives, etc.) 
and to persuade other policy actors to adopt that position.
 In the context of alternative development, one could have expected that 
the idea of providing alternative agricultural options to farmers cultivating 
illicit crops would constitute a conceptual entry point to tie drug policy to a 
broad development approach, and thus to the resources specific to 
 development-policy actors. Yet, in addition to its fragmented conceptualiza-
tion trajectory, alternative development has rapidly evolved into an isolated 
instrument of policy intervention involving a small community of practition-
ers and limited financial means, poorly connected to the development coop-
eration sphere. As this section will emphasize, despite the theoretical 
possibilities of tighter linkages between drug and development policies, the 
conditions had not been met for the idea of alternative development to take 
hold as a shared policy of the drug- and development-policy communities. 
Critical elements were missing: first, a solid knowledge basis objectified 
through systematic statistical data, indicators and impact-evaluation sys-
tems. The fragility of the base prevented the emerging alternative develop-
ment policy label from being turned into a “cognitive reality” [14, p. 217] on 
which a common understanding of what needed to be done could be built. 
Second, and correlatively, the organization of a dedicated policy forum to 
develop the foundations of such a policy with all interested and relevant 
actors has been a laborious endeavour.
 Alternative development emerged as a policy instrument to be used in a 
specific and localized problem stream, but with the difficulty of combining 
agendas. It was assumed that drug-policy actors would reach out to external 
actors who had the necessary resources to support development efforts, but 
that process remained incomplete and did not bear fruit. For the implemen-
tation of new alternative development “solutions”, it was supposed that the 
larger development community, especially donors, would be vitally engaged,8 
and would provide greater financial resources, expertise, tools and capacity 
to expand development efforts in various areas, supposedly including drug-
production areas.
8 For example, in its 1991 “Alternative development strategy” for the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, USAID dedicated a section to the role of other donors, noting that the role of the donor 
community is vital to the successful implementation of the alternative development strategy of the 
Government of that country,. and stating that the United States Government mission in the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia will actively seek support … among the main multilateral and  bilateral 
donors”[18, p.6]. 
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 From 1979 to the early 1990s, the United States participated in the so-
called donors club of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee, primarily in an 
attempt to persuade donors to support the United States counter-narcotics 
policy and coordinate the control of illicit drug supply. Slowly the issue 
gained some ground; it was first brought up by the United States delegations 
in meetings of experts and subsequently appeared on the agendas of specific 
ad hoc consultations and high-level Development Assistance Committee 
meetings. The United States made the case that illicit drugs had an alarm-
ingly fast-growing impact on the OECD economies and that the problem 
was expanding in areas of development cooperation notably in Latin 
 America. During those discussions, it was advocated that narcotic-crop- 
producing populations typically belonged to the poorest of the poor of the 
developing world, who, as such, were deserving of economic assistance. The 
cash superiority of narcotic-crop production was considered illusory, and 
farmers would readily shift if realistic alternatives were offered [6].
 Instead of fostering a shared policy scenario, the discourse on alternative 
development in the donors forum ultimately became a mere rhetorical 
façade. Moreover, it seems to have been utilized at times to justify unconven-
tional uses of development assistance. It is debatable whether the activities 
of “narcotics control” or “alternative development” financed with aid money 
met the criteria for official development assistance9 and represented only 
developmental expenditures.10 On the recipient-country side, the condition-
ality of development assistance upon the elimination of illicit cultivation was 
unsatisfactory and perceived as inappropriate. Some countries were reported 
to have tried to turn this argument on its head, demanding that donors pay 
for the financial losses the country faced when abandoning illicit crop 
 production [16, p. 13].
 The utilization of an alternative development script in a development 
assistance forum was counterproductive and revived conceptual struggles 
around alternative development among the development community at 
9 At the end of the cold war, the definition of official development assistance was reconcep-
tualized to be global, focusing on aid requirements that maximized security as well as economic 
development and welfare, while also addressing humanitarian cases . It was agreed that aid should 
be used to address problems that could not be solved without joint efforts by developed and 
developing countries, such as combating narcotics. Crop substitution, support for judicial systems, 
law enforcement and health improvement were then included in the new official development 
assistance framework. However, the direct involvement of military or paramilitary forces was 
excluded. This amendment provided an incentive for donors to direct their support to the drug 
agenda [35, 36].
10 In informal conversations, a former representative of the United States to the Development 
Assistance Committee reported that projects financed with official development assistance con-
tained explicit references to interdiction activities, which cast further doubt on the claim that the 
expenditures were principally development-oriented. Some expenditures, our interlocutor said, 
should not have been reported as official development assistance.
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large. Until the 1990s, no agreement was forged. Concerns arose over the 
“dangerous” association of development assistance with enforcement activi-
ties such as repression. The drug issue did not enjoy the same level of prior-
ity among all members of the donor community, and donors’ receptivity to 
the alternative development solution was fairly limited, especially among 
those who considered the reduction of demand in the major consuming 
countries the key solution to the world drug problem [36]. Structural factors 
of international cooperation also played an important role. Not only was the 
scope of alternative development limited to areas where a number of organ-
izations were already involved in drug programmes, but the size of the alter-
native development projects represented too small a share of international 
cooperation to hope to be able to drag the development cooperation machine 
in, and to justify the involvement of the Development Assistance Committee 
or any other development cooperation organization in terms of mandate, 
comparative advantage and division of international labour. 
 What could explain such difficulty in finding common ground? One 
explanatory element could be that over the relevant period, attempts by the 
United States to stir the development community to take an enhanced role 
in countering drugs with aid money were not backed by evidence that the 
advocated solution would be technically feasible, viable in practice and 
coherent in terms of policy design. At the implementation level, the main 
actors in alternative development evaluated the impact of their efforts in 
terms of reaching the eradication objectives: evaluations and impact assess-
ments used the reduction of illicit-crop cultivation surfaces as the main 
 metric, providing little visibility to any development achievements [37, 38]. 
As research and even some governmental evaluations show, eradication and 
policing efforts often outpaced development assistance and little considera-
tion was given to development experts [17, 33, 39-43].
 As later documented by experts, alternative development projects were 
mainly externally designed, donor-driven [44] and coordinated by national 
drug control agencies or external assistance regional bureaux whose local 
staff had limited knowledge of development support or drug-trade dynamics 
[33]. Often conceived on a one-size-fits-all basis, alternative development 
projects tended to be grounded on monocausal schemes of context analysis 
where the places of intervention were reduced to production areas, and 
funded on the assumption that drug-crop producers constituted homogene-
ous groups [45, 46]. Analysts and civil society organizations have further 
demonstrated how some projects bearing the “alternative development” 
label were involved to some extent in a dynamic of “instrumentalization” or 
even “securitization” of development assistance to fulfil law enforcement 
objectives rather than to reach the goal of a sustainable exit of producers of 
illicit plants from the drug economy [47-51].
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 The lack of a diversified set of data and indicators meant that there was 
only a partial image of the reality of alternative development achievements, 
but also of the socioeconomic conditions needed to achieve sustainable 
development. It meant further that external actors who might be able to 
enrich and support the concept with additional resources were not provided 
with the necessary basis for envisioning their potential role. A knowledge gap 
and a “metric trap” [52] restricted the way external actors could engage in 
policy discussions. Reciprocally, this partial knowledge contributed further 
to tipping the conceptual balance of alternative development towards its 
drug-policy components, making it less credible to development actors in 
terms of mandate and intervention rationale.
 In addition, a specific organizational platform dedicated to discussing a 
drugs-and-development policy scenario and to resolving the conceptual 
struggles seems to have been difficult to put in place. Certainly, the emer-
gence of global discussions on “human security” and “poverty reduction” 
provided a favourable context for the development of a landmark UNDCP 
publication entitled Drugs and Development in 1994. At the time, UNODC 
defended the idea that the links between drug control and human develop-
ment “are self-evident” and that “overlapping interests [exist] on the prob-
lem side”. Common solutions and tools were explored, such as educational 
services, income generation and institutional capacity-building or improve-
ments in infrastructure. However, conceptual misunderstandings were 
already being identified as possible reasons for the “untapped potential for a 
greater operational interplay between drug control and development bodies” 
[53, pp. 14-17].
 If indeed the links of drug control with human development are self-
evident and overlapping interests exist, there is a possibility of importing a 
broader development perspective into all aspects of drug control (involving 
also rule of law, health, etc.). The absence of a specific organizational plat-
form to discuss a drugs-and-development policy scenario and to resolve 
conceptual struggles may have slowed down the evolution of the alternative 
development concept towards an agreed interpretation, and in turn its pro-
motion as an entry point for a development-oriented drug policy.
 Whether because of lack of political will or policy risks, tentative calls for 
greater inter-agency cooperation did not meet with a positive response. 
Although the primary objective of alternative development programmes 
consists in reducing drug production, the theoretical potential of the idea of 
alternative development to be transformed into a conceptual entry point to 
merge drug- and development-policy approaches turns out to be a mirage. 
In an important thematic evaluation report, UNODC hinted that a lack of 
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leadership weighed on the issue in the past.11 The alternative development 
niche thus provided limited space for bringing together two policy commu-
nities that differed in size, goals and vision. Besides, platforms such as the 
Development Assistance Committee were characterized by divergent strate-
gic considerations regarding both the role of alternative development and 
the priority donors could give to the drug-production problem, and by lim-
ited structural capacity to engage in a new policy agenda. These factors 
finally contributed to reducing development actors’ receptivity and limited 
the chance for a window of opportunity for a common policy scenario to 
really open up. The misalignment of the policy and problem streams in the 
area of international cooperation finally contributed to a dynamic of missed 
opportunities to “bring development in” .
Shared interests, different casts: embracing the renewed opportunities 
of the 2016 special session of the General Assembly and the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development
Unresolved conceptual struggles, variations in implementation and limited 
policy overlap constrained the use of alternative development-based rheto-
ric to fully serve as an entry point for a common approach to drugs and 
development. Certainly some alternative development programmes have 
been successful, and some beneficiaries, such as the San Martín region of 
Peru, [54] have even been promoted as models of improved socioeconomic 
conditions in a drug-affected environment. Yet alternative development 
experiences and assessments of them are mixed. In fact, the unstable 
 balancing of drug control and socioeconomic support objectives has 
 triggered resistance from both actual and potential stakeholders, with some 
disputing the conceptual and operational validity of alternative  development 
and others sometimes adopting extreme positions regarding the legitimacy 
of that approach. For example, in 2016 some producers of illicit crops gath-
ered at the Global Forum of Producers of Prohibited Plants, with the 
 support of civil society organizations, and expressed  serious concerns over 
alternative development programmes. 
 Although recognizing that proper sequencing of illicit crop-control 
activities may help producers in their transition to licit sources of income, 
participants in that Forum deplored the pre-eminence of eradication over 
11 “Under UNODC leadership alternative development could evolve from its current position 
as a marginally supported and little honored social safety net into a progressive economic devel-
opment program with measurable, positive, cost-effective results. This revitalization is dependent 
on the willingness of UNODC administrators, staff and the donor community to focus on alter-
native development as a holistic process, not a series of detached string of “pilot projects”. 
UNODC needs a systematic and strategic approach to alternative development, a comprehensive 
and coherent implementation plan, and a commitment to procedural excellence that will guarantee 
UNODC to realize alternative development’s full potential” [33, p.iii]. 
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sustainable alternatives [55] and denounced the negative impacts of so-
called alternative development in such conditions (violation of human 
rights, soil and water contamination, forced displacement, debt, food inse-
curity). Most participants interviewed during that Forum remain strongly 
opposed to alternative development—some even believe it to have ruined 
the lives of their families. At the policy level, some stakeholders interviewed 
may recognize that “ill-designed programmes happened to do more harm 
than good in some areas” and that alternative development, as it has been 
implemented so far, has “had little to do with development”. There are thus 
still profound misunderstandings and diverging perceptions on what alter-
native development is or should be, which may result in extreme disagree-
ment over its legitimacy.
 Despite long-running tensions around the alternative development 
concept, recent dynamics suggest that its conceptual framework is being 
reinvigorated. This section focuses on how traditional views on alternative 
development are being challenged and discusses the implications of such 
dynamics for the contemporary alternative development portfolio. One may 
note that an enabling political environment has accelerated a process by 
which stakeholders are working towards greater convergence of ideas on 
alternative development. The calls for a global debate on drug policy, which 
led to the special session of the General Assembly in 2016,12 seems to have 
precipitated the opening of a new window of opportunity for alternative 
development stakeholders to capture diverging views and to mobilize 
greater resources to devise and promote common solutions for the future 
drug-policy agenda. In addition, the parallel discussions on a new global 
agenda for sustainable development provided policy leeway to allow for 
new perspectives on the world drug problem and the policy rationale to 
deal with it. In that context, there seems to be a renewed ambition to place 
alternative development on a solid, common, normative foundation that 
could allow it to become more than a tool of a drug control policy mix and 
to be better integrated into a sustainable development approach to the 
world drug  problem.
 Since the turn of the millennium, a heterogeneous group of practitioners 
and experts has engaged in new reflections, attempting to fill the existing 
knowledge and metric gaps relating to alternative development. Central 
12 Despite expansive century-long drug control efforts, the lasting world drug problem has 
created a climate of political frustration over the past few years. In 2012, in response to pressing 
calls by the Governments of Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico echoing discussions held at the 
Sixth Summit of the Americas, the General Assembly, in its resolution 67/193, decided to modify 
its evaluation calendar and to convene early in 2016, in addition to the initially planned 2019 
date, a special session on the world drug problem (to evaluate progress towards the goals set in 
the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated 
and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem, and to adjust the relevant policy 
approach and actions to be taken. 
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actors in the international drug-policy arena took positions, at first without a 
clear coalition being formed, to reinvigorate the concept on the basis of best 
practices and lessons learned. However, one can observe that there are more 
complex motivations for the desire to achieve a normative recasting of alter-
native development. In the follow-up to the 1998 Action Plan on Interna-
tional Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative 
Development, alternative development implementers and policy analysts 
engaged in simultaneous processes of reviewing what worked and what did 
not work with alternative development projects.13 At the initiative of the 
 German Foundation for International Development, the German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation and UNDCP, the International Conference on the 
Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and Development Coop-
eration was held in Feldafing, Germany, in 2002, on the basis of the shared 
concerns that “the results of alternative development could be improved” and 
that increased dialogue would help to “lay the foundation for updating the 
existing concept of alternative development and [to form] strategic alliances”14 
[61, pp. 2-4]. That Conference, which has been described by practitioners as 
one of the key international events on alternative development [8, annex], 
marked the beginning of a series of activities in which policy actors worked to 
forge common knowledge on alternative development.
 The review of progress achieved towards the objectives set in the 1998 
Plan of Action and the renewal of international commitments in 2009 con-
stituted an enabling environment for actors to identify lessons from past 
programmes and policies, and to develop new expertise on alternative devel-
opment. Between those two dates, milestone regional evaluations were also 
undertaken [62, 63], along with international expert discussions and unprec-
edented international analysis on alternative development. The International 
Narcotics Control Board, for example, often presented as a strict guardian 
of drug-control conventions, took up the question of whether the current 
perception of alternative development was adequate to meet new challenges. 
In its annual report for 2005, advocating against the obsolete distinction 
between supply and demand when analysing the drug problem, the Board 
encouraged broadening the focus of alternative development and recogniz-
ing its limitations, notably the project-by-project approach and the absence 
of such programmes in cannabis-production areas, including in the poorest 
13 In particular, technical personnel of UNODC field offices, of USAID regional and country 
offices (notably in Afghanistan, Colombia and Peru) and GIZ, and representatives of Thai foun-
dations and governmental agencies and of the Peruvian National Commission for Development 
and Life without Drugs. See for example, evaluations and audit reports [33, 56-60]. 
14 The conference gathered experts from development agencies from the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, and representatives of the World Bank, United Nations 
agencies, the European Commission, the Organization of the American States and non- governmental 
organizations. Regional workshops were also organized in that framework. The conference took 
place in a context (post-11 September 2001) in which strong connections between drug trafficking, 
political instability and poverty had a prominent place in public discourse. 
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drug-affected regions of Africa. Whereas it reaffirmed the need for a bal-
anced conceptualization of alternative development,15 it also called for the 
consideration of a “more comprehensive definition” and a closer look at 
“rural, peri-urban and urban communities in terms of the development-
oriented drug control needs” [64, para. 40]. 
 The Board hinted further at regarding alternative development not only 
as a tool of a drug-policy mix, but also as a cross-cutting issue and a point 
of entry to a broader development-oriented approach to the drug problem 
as a whole: “what is needed in areas more seriously affected by drug prob-
lems and in countries dominated by the illicit drug economy are overall 
development approaches that take such problems fully into account. In 
other words, there is a need to follow overall development approaches that 
fully integrate into the mainstream the principles and practices of alterna-
tive development, including coordination with law enforcement agencies, 
whether in a rural or an urban context” [64, para. 41]. From that perspec-
tive, best practices in alternative development were tied to “sound princi-
ples of development” [64, para. 22], and it was recommended that the 
approach be integrated into a comprehensive and sustained development 
policy, including at the level of development cooperation agencies such as 
the World Bank [64, para. 48.b]. A set of basic principles was proposed [64, 
para. 23].16 Although it is difficult to gauge the effective impact of that 
report, it surely played a part in paving the way for a broader dynamic of 
conceptual convergence around alternative development.
 The recent shift in the political stream induced by pressing calls, notably 
from Latin American governments, to debate the implemented policy 
approach to the lasting “world drug problem” accelerated those dynamics. 
Within a short time, important resources, in terms of financing, knowledge 
production and political leadership, have been mobilized. International 
workshops, informal drug-policy dialogues, open-ended intergovernmental 
expert working groups, regional seminars and high-level international 
15 “Alternative development … is a concept related to integrated development that has been 
applied in rural areas of developing countries where [illicitly cultivated] plants … are grown. The 
decision to cultivate illicit crops is the product of many complex interacting factors …. The most 
successful approach … involves a combination of disincentives and incentives. Thus, law enforce-
ment and the threat of penalties and/or forced eradication, combined with the prospect of legiti-
mate alternative livelihood and broad sustainable economic assistance ... may be the solution. … 
A truly comprehensive concept of alternative development would include not only the cultivation 
of alternative crops, but also the development of infrastructure, the provision of viable means of 
transporting legal products to markets and the provision of assistance in the areas of education 
and health care. In addition, alternative development programmes are only possible where 
 adequate security and stability can be ensured ”[64, paras.1 and 9]. 
16 Including the requirements of political will, funding and long-term commitment, the con-
sistency of alternative development with development policies, the consideration of the complexity 
of the role played by illicit crops in growers’ lives, the full participation of crop growers in 
 designing and implementing alternative development strategies, and the focus of law enforcement 
measures in illicit crop-cultivation areas on drug trafficking and criminal organizations. 
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 conferences on alternative development were organized to share experi-
ences, build know-how and formulate technical recommendations.17 These 
efforts facilitated dialogue among heterogeneous stakeholders, promoted 
alternative development at a higher policy level and contributed to the devel-
opment of a common set of fundamental principles so that alternative devel-
opment could be promoted as an internationally acceptable category and be 
integrated into broader policy doctrines, without risking fundamental  dissent 
over the legitimacy of the alternative development option [14].
 Some new actors, presenting themselves as examples of successful alter-
native development, are engaging resources to build up knowledge  networks. 
Activities are organized in which stakeholders’ various interpretations of the 
idea of alternative development are addressed. Side events on alternative 
development programmed during regular sessions of the Commission on 
Narcotics Drugs multiplied,18 while the Commission adopted a series of reso-
lutions between 2009 and 201219 to “promote best practices and lessons 
learned for the sustainability and integrality” of alternative development [65]. 
In this dynamic, Peru and Thailand acted as  experienced dialogue facilita-
tors, volunteering to host high-level International Conferences on Alternative 
Development) that first discussed the need to  formulate  international guid-
ing principles20 on alternative development  implementation and recognized 
the controversial struggles to balance “alternative  development’s dual 
 objectives of… reducing illicit crop cultivation, and …promoting sustainable 
development processes and reducing poverty” [66, para. 17]. Those discus-
sions led to the formulation of the Guiding Principles on Alternative Devel-
opment, which, although criticized [67] and rather in line with a drug supply 
reduction logic, help towards settling the normative struggles around the idea 
of alternative development. Interestingly enough, the dual-objective dilemma 
has not disappeared and alternative development is clearly stated as a 
 complement of law enforcement  measures in crop-control strategies. 
 Nevertheless, the Guiding Principles offer a more balanced conceptualization 
of alternative development, synthesizing conflicting ideas and critiques 
underlined throughout the expert discussions and assessments [33, 66].
17 The World Drug Report 2015 lists in its annex selected international alternative development 
events since 2001, including the International Conference on the Role of Alternative Develop-
ment in Drug Control and Development Cooperation, held in Feldafing, Germany, from 7 to 
12 January 2002, the first International Workshop and Conference on Alternative Development 
and several expert-group meetings, evidencing the will from alternative development stakeholders 
to provide evidence of the work done and the different stages of the reflection.
18 Between 2012 and 2016, the number of side events and exhibits on alternative develop-
ment during the session of the Commission on Narcotics Drugs doubled. 
19 Commission on Narcotics Drugs resolutions 52/6, 53/6, 54/4, 55/4, 57/1 and 58/4. In its 
resolution 68/196, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Alternative Development. 
20 In its resolution 2008/26, the Economic and Social Council encouraged Member States 
to consider developing guiding principles on alternative development.”. 
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 The Guiding Principles emphasize the importance of proper sequenc-
ing of development interventions and the potential of alternative develop-
ment to become “an integral element of an overall development strategy” 
[68, paras. 9 and 16]. The knowledge challenge is addressed, with emphasis 
on the importance of impact evaluation [68, para. 18 (w)] and balanced 
metrics integrating human development and crop-reduction indicators [68, 
para.  17]. Furthermore, despite the fact that significant disagreements, 
such as the issue of conditionality, have not been solved, the Guiding 
 Principles recognize the centrality of multi-stakeholder participation in and 
enhanced ownership of alternative development implementation [68, 
para. 18 (b)], while connecting alternative development interventions more 
closely to macro-level considerations such as strengthening rule of law [68, 
para. 10], environmental protection [68, para. 11] and tailored, market-
driven  approaches [68, para. 18 (gg)]. 
 In addition to working towards greater convergence of ideas, engaged 
stakeholders are investing in transnational policy forums and creating new 
platforms to frame the debate on alternative development and, more broadly, 
to promote it as an option on the international policy agenda. New “incuba-
tors of knowledge” are emerging [14, p. 224], while the traditional agenda-
dominant actor (the United States) is less vocal as a new coalition of 
like-minded actors is forming around a readapted basic concept of alternative 
development. Efforts have been made to enlarge the support base for alterna-
tive development to be considered an “important, viable and sustainable 
option” [68, para. 2]. From that perspective, the choice of developing a policy 
tool such as the Guiding Principles to be adopted by the General Assembly is 
significant, as it confers political legitimacy and credibility. Internationalizing 
the policy discussions internal to the alternative development stakeholder 
community and placing them in a more flexible setting of working groups” 
organized under the Chatham House rule allows for free speech. It may also 
have contributed to the dissipation of resistance on the part of potential “new 
stakeholders,”21 such as representatives of China, Egypt, Guatemala, India, 
Japan, Morocco or the Russian Federation, to  participate in such debates 
along with representatives of civil society  organizations and academia.
 Alternative development expert group participants made sure to convey 
their ideas directly to high-level policymaking arenas22 and ensure that alter-
native development was well positioned on the agenda of the special session 
of the General Assembly. In 2014 four different meetings were organized on 
the theme; countries such as Colombia, Germany, Peru and Thailand took 
21 For example, the Second International Conference on Alternative Development brought 
together over 100 participants from 28 countries and 11 organizations for field visits and over 
240 participants from 44 countries and 18 organizations for the high-level Conference. 
22 Meetings produced outcome documents that were then submitted to the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs for consideration. 
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firm positions to promote the idea of a thematic round table on alternative 
development on the agenda; position papers and high-profile publications 
such as the World Drug Report were drafted with the support of UNODC to 
inform the discussions at the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the spe-
cial session of the Assembly. Throughout that process, greater efforts were 
made to link the alternative development discussion to the broader develop-
ment agenda. Thus, the expert-group meeting held by UNODC and the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) in November 2014 discussed alternative development in the frame-
work of the preparations for the special session of the General Assembly and 
the post-Millennium Development Goals debate. An unprecedented Global 
Partnership on Drug Policies and Development was created by the German 
Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) on behalf of BMZ to improve 
evidence-based development-oriented drug policy approaches and foster 
intergovernmental drug policy dialogue.
 In other words, through various forms of mobilization, dissenting views 
on alternative development had been heard, reviewed and discussed and 
some were finally selected to be incorporated into an enriched and readapted 
alternative development concept that was first embodied in a policy tool—
the Guiding Principles—and then in a political document—the outcome 
document of the thirtieth special session of the General Assembly. The 
 socioeconomic dimensions of illicit cultivation of narcotic plants were more 
clearly brought into focus, while alternative development was politically 
positioned as a central component of “sustainable development-oriented 
and balanced drug control policies” to be “mainstreamed” into multi-level 
development strategies [1, para. 7)]. A heterogeneous group of actors com-
posed of development agencies, experts and State institutions of countries of 
alternative development implementation strengthened their internal 
resources to capture new ideas and enhanced their capacity to demonstrate 
that “another model of alternative development was possible” and could be 
framed in the broader drug policy debate as a “viable and balanced  solution”. 
“Political momentum” had been renewed around a concept envisioned to go 
beyond a strict drug control-policy reading.
 There are thus signs that the special session of the General Assembly 
provided an enabling environment for an “assimilation process”23 to be 
engaged, with stakeholders working towards a renewed normative frame-
work for alternative development. The Guiding Principles and the negoti-
ated commitments adopted by the Assembly at its special session have set 
23 That is to say, a process by which stakeholders “gradually revise, enrich and perpetuate 
hegemonic concepts through the steady incorporation of additional insights and critical perspec-
tives into the prevailing paradigm” [14, p. 215]. The result is an adaptation and enrichment of 
the overarching concept that becomes stabilized around shared principles and values and is 
protected from fundamental critical dissent over time. 
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out more clearly the key components and limitations of the concept, so that 
radically diverging views are absorbed into a shared conceptual  appreciation 
and the term “alternative development” can no longer be dismissed as an 
empty label, as could have been the case in the past. What now seems to be 
at stake is the consolidation and perpetuation of alternative development as 
a credible policy category, defined around shared core principles. Now the 
issue is not to protect alternative development from all criticism, but rather 
to anchor a concept that only with great difficulty was able to be set into a 
shared framework.
 The current tendency is to use the alternative development concept, 
formerly a tool of a drug-control policy mix, as a point of entry to a 
 development-oriented approach to drug policy. Alternative development 
stakeholders are trying different strategies for tying alternative  development 
interventions more closely to a broad sustainable development approach to 
the drug problem and new platforms are created for opportunities to 
emerge. Innovation labs, for example, have been put together at the initia-
tive of the Global Partnership on Drug Policies and Development and the 
London School of Economics Ideas think tank24 to engineer intellectual 
partnerships among State drug-control agency practitioners,  academics 
and development cooperation experts from multilateral and non-govern-
mental organizations with a view to making practical use of the linkages 
between drug and development policies. New thinking is being developed 
on how to extend the alternative development concept to new areas of 
application, such as urban settings, as participants in the round table on 
alternative development at the special session of the General Assembly 
pointed out. The Global Partnership is also engaged in strengthening the 
evidence and scientific basis for a  development-focused international drug 
policy, rethinking the links between illicit crop cultivation and develop-
ment challenges (such as climate change), and the potential of resource 
schemes for such new portfolios. UNODC has also demonstrated its 
capacity to digest emerging ideas. It is playing a leading role in reinvigorat-
ing the more orthodox views on drug policy, and in the World Drug Report 
has repeatedly addressed the linkages between the world drug problem and 
sustainable development.
 However, there is little evidence that this vision of alternative develop-
ment as a potential point of entry to broader development-oriented drug 
policy is shared beyond that group of like-minded actors. And there lies the 
rub. Some interviewees underline that the drug policy community “has not 
24 Two pilot innovation labs took place, in October 2016 and February 2017, in an attempt 
to translate into operational thinking the results of the thirtieth special session of the General. 
Those labs were developed with a view to testing in practice the ideas developed collectively and 
to feeding then into the international drug-policy discourse through various forums.
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been proactive enough in reaching out to the development practitioners” 
and has been “late in contributing to the post-2015 discussion”. In the 
framework of the post-2015 agenda discussions, the drug issue was relatively 
well taken into account in key policy documents serving as a framework for 
the Sustainable Development Goals,.25 but the lack of cross-engagement is 
reflected in the vision on drugs developed in the Goals. The way the issue is 
integrated under Goal 3 (“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for 
all at all ages”), target 3.5 (“Strengthen the prevention and treatment of 
substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alco-
hol”), and indirectly under Goal 16 (“promote peaceful and inclusive socie-
ties for sustainable development”), target 16.4. (“By 2030 significantly 
reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of 
stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime”), reflects an old-
fashioned, dualistic interpretation (security and health, or else supply and 
demand) rather than clear consideration of the multidimensionality of drugs, 
now better recognized in the seven-chapter outcome document of the  special 
session of the General Assembly.26
 Although the special session of the General Assembly and the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development coincided in a timely manner, alterna-
tive development and development policy actors have tended to engage with 
one another on a limited scale. Some interviewees express regret that inter-
nal United Nations tensions rub off on the policy debate, but also that criti-
cism has become too easy regarding alternative development, considering 
that the specificities of interventions in drug-affected areas are not taken into 
due account by its detractors. There have certainly been significant efforts 
from both sides for enhanced exchanges. In addition to the activities organ-
ized in the drug-policy community mentioned above, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), for example, has been engaged on the 
issue, participating in the past two sessions of the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs and contributing to the outcome of the special session of the General 
Assembly [10], while civil society organizations have been well integrated in 
intercommunity working groups. However, the forums and knowledge net-
works in place have not been fully engaged.27 Although there is some  evidence 
25 For example, in the report of the United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 
United Nations Development Agenda entitled “Realizing the future we want for all”, which 
 reorganizes the Millennium Development Goals along four dimensions (inclusive social develop-
ment; inclusive economic development; environmental sustainability; and peace and security), it 
is recognized that drug-related criminality should be at the heart of the agenda.
26 The outcome document firmly breaks with a binary reading of the world drug problem 
(in terms of supply and demand) and details in seven chapters its different facets and their 
 corresponding policy implications.
27 For example, few organizations working on the development side, in particular civil society 
organizations that develop expertise on the issue, have attended alternative development or Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs events. In addition, informal conversations with actors from the 
 alternative development community have underlined that there was not a clear awareness of 
studies on drugs and development conducted outside their community of practice.
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of renewed interest in the drug issue in the development community, few 
demonstrate full adherence to the idea of alternative development as a 
 preferred entry point. 
 What is visible is a broader vision of a development approach to the 
world drug problem timidly but actually being sketched. In addition to a 
long series of high-level international debates28 that placed the drug prob-
lem at the centre of development cooperation concerns, an emerging group 
of actors from the development community—notably representatives of 
UNDP, individuals within policy forums of OECD29, academics [70-72]
and experts from civil society organizations such as the Open Society 
Foundations [73], Christian Aid [74], Health Poverty Action [75] and the 
Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime [76] have been 
exploring the impact of illicit drugs on development, how to “address the 
development dimensions of drug policy” [77] and organized crime phe-
nomena, and how to develop more appropriate metrics. There have been 
various proposals on how to put into practice the linkages between the 
Sustainable Development Goals and drug policy, including by addressing 
the root causes of the illicit drug economy (often linked to poverty and lack 
of opportunities), basing drug policies on context-tailored, people-centred 
and human rights based approaches, and making a commitment to con-
solidate good governance and rule of law for development. Such options 
are aimed at facilitating the “the future definition of more fit for purpose 
and balanced inter-agency coordination structures on drug-related issues 
within the United Nations, and a comprehensive and coherent system-
wide response” [77].
 If both communities of practice are thinking about related scenarios, 
they do not seem to be drafting them on the same page. Rather, one may 
observe intertwined, yet mostly parallel dynamics. Whereas the alternative 
development concept has been reframed in a more balanced way and envi-
sioned as a key component of a broader development approach to drug 
 policy, considerable uncertainty remains, despite clear opportunities, regard-
ing the extent to which it will be anchored in a development agenda on 
drugs. On the one hand, considering the fragmentation of the drug policy 
28 As the future of the post-2015 development framework was starting to be discussed, a 
number of United Nations leaders underlined the importance of considering the drug issue as 
part of a broad development agenda. For example, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that 
the “work to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and fight drugs must go hand in hand” 
[69]. In 2012, the General Assembly held a thematic debate on the topic “Drugs and crime as 
a threat to development”.
29 For example, the Anti-Corruption Task Team of the Network on Governance Network of 
the OECD Development Assistance Committee addressed the drug issue at several of its regular 
meetings from 2013 to 2015. Donors and civil society expert, notably from Christian Aid and 
the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, presented their perspectives on and 
assessments of the issue.
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arena, it remains uncertain that the building of a development-oriented 
agenda on drugs will be the way that is negotiated to move forward. On the 
other hand, it remains questionable whether there will be political will and 
capacities from both communities to develop a common agenda, let alone to 
designate the alternative development concept a preferred entry point to 
that end. Considering the communities’ disparities in terms of mandate, 
resources and scope, and taking into consideration the highly complex and 
specific working environments of both communities of practice, the question 
of what these dynamics imply for future directions in the field of alternative 
development is now open to discussion. 
Conclusions: towards alternative development as an instrument of a 
development approach to the drug problem? 
The present article has aimed to put the conceptual struggles around alter-
native development into perspective and thus to identify opportunities and 
vulnerabilities of alternative development in the post-2015 and post- thirtieth 
special session of the General Assembly era. The concept of alternative 
 development has followed a turbulent and uneven path of emergence, closely 
tied to the way policy actors have interpreted the balance between develop-
ment and security efforts entrenched in the theoretical premises of alterna-
tive development. The operational bricolage that turned the early 
normalization of alternative development into a patchwork concept made it 
more difficult for stakeholders to homogenize it around common knowledge 
and made the concept even more vulnerable to criticism. Despite the theo-
retical  possibilities of and tentative calls for tighter linkages between drug 
and development policies, the alternative development concept long strug-
gled to be accepted as a common ground of drug policy and development 
cooperation  communities. Its fragile knowledge base and the lack of proper 
organizational platforms contributed further to the missing of opportunities 
to “bring development in”.
 Nevertheless, the contemporary policy configuration around alternative 
development demonstrates renewed thinking and efforts. In an enabling 
environment of ambitious policy debates in the special session of the  General 
Assembly and on the Sustainable Development Goals, new leadership has 
emerged on alternative development, investing political and technical 
resources to push a group of heterogeneous stakeholders to express their 
views and their differences. A process of convergence and assimilation of 
ideas has been observable, through which the concept of alternative develop-
ment has been reinvigorated. Although some divergences still exist, the 
 concept has become more balanced through the building of a new normative 
framework of common principles and values that diminish the risks of 
 fundamental dissent over time.
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 The concept of alternative development is now at a crossroads. It has 
become fairly certain that there is political leeway for a broader drug-policy 
landscape. Ambitions have been renewed for the alternative development 
concept to be detached from its image of drug-control bricolage of the past 
and to become, beyond a tool of a drug-control policy mix, a viable policy 
entry point for bringing sustainable development options to drug-affected 
areas. Tipping the balance to the sustainable development components of 
the concept has critical implications that cannot be ignored. First, making 
alternative development an internationally accepted policy category to be 
integrated into a broad development approach to drugs is different from 
transforming the concept into a catch-all option to bring development into 
drug policy. If alternative development is too ambitious, it can result in 
denaturing or dispersing the concept. Considering the highly complex envi-
ronments of application of alternative development, as well as the relatively 
limited scope and funding of the portfolio, claiming that alternative develop-
ment programmes could achieve the same objectives as development coop-
eration would be unrealistic, as past attempts have shown.
 The special session of the General Assembly, despite some limitations, 
had the merit of opening a new cycle for policy improvement and innova-
tion. An opportunity seems to be again within reach, where the concept of 
alternative development is finding a new place, midway between drug- 
control and development policies. Now, to be fit for purpose beyond the 
limitations of an isolated drug-control policy instrument, and instead as a 
component of a broader development approach to drugs, there is a need to 
absorb past errors and draw new operational lines so that agendas no longer 
overlap, but rather converge in a common development-oriented strategy for 
drug-affected areas. Such a strategy could be designed to overflow the 
boundaries of alternative development, and apply comprehensive develop-
ment responses to all areas of drug policy intervention, including drug con-
sumption (for example, human rights-based interventions to improve access 
to treatment and prevention) and drug trafficking (for instance, economic 
opportunities and education). For the moment, such a vision may be pure 
fantasy. Nevertheless, if the concept of alternative development can now be 
embraced as a core component of sustainable development-oriented and 
balanced drug control policies, the following concluding remarks can serve 
as an attempt to open the debate on future directions:
1. Continuing to fill the knowledge gap on alternative development 
would further build up the credibility of the concept. Multidimen-
sional metrics, innovative research and systemic, independent evalu-
ations of alternative development interventions would help to 
determine the extent to which the new concept can be translated 
into practice, and be implemented adequately, coordinating drug-
control objectives with overarching development goals. The Sustain-
able Development Agenda monitoring framework provides a good 
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 opportunity to establish a more balanced indicator system to review 
the success of alternative development interventions and to embed 
them into a more development-oriented rationale. 
2. Creating a specific “organizational platform” for drugs and develop-
ment in the form of an open-ended working group or an independ-
ent expert group bringing together experts and practitioners from 
all branches of the drug and development fields would facilitate 
 dialogue and provide a favourable setting to reconcile dissenting 
views over alternative development and the links between drugs, 
development and alternative development. Leading multilateral 
organizations specialized in drugs and in development could play 
central roles (inter alia, by providing institutional settings, operating 
as policy forums, coordinating the implementation of shared ideas 
or remaining active).
3. Developing and strengthening intellectual partnership across the 
drug and development communities, including among multilateral 
organizations, development aid and drug-control agencies and any 
other interested experts, seems critical for fostering greater knowl-
edge and developing an evidence-based common policy setting. The 
deteriorating situations on the ground and the political engagement 
to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals should constitute 
 significant incentives to that end. Enhanced exchanges could also 
help to bring about more policy coherence and rationalize funding 
mechanisms and scarce resources. 
4. Considering a possible clarification or update of the definition of 
alternative development could complement the dynamics engaged so 
far. Although it would take time and risk bringing remaining diver-
gences out into the open, such a process would normalize the concept 
as it has been reframed in the past few years. It would also provide the 
alternative development community with a common reference that 
could be mobilized and resonate within the development community. 
Certainly, the realities of implementation might differ on the ground, 
but the focus and core values of alternative development could be 
formally restated so that it is affirmed as a possible entry point to 
bring sustainable development options to drug-affected areas. It 
would be an imperative for the “new” alternative development to be 
implemented according to agreed principles and values, and to align 
dissenting views over time. The opening 2019 review process could 
provide an opportunity to that end.
5. Being clear and realistic about the potential of alternative develop-
ment also remains key. Alternative development cannot be a substi-
tute for a possible development agenda on drugs. Put more bluntly, 
“alternative development” cannot be “development” if it ignores the 
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complexity of sustainable development policies. All experience and 
expertise is valuable and can be complemented, whereas substituting 
one agenda for another would be counterproductive. At the end of 
the day, alternative development is not only about conceptions and 
definitions: it is mainly development-related programming in chal-
lenging environments, which means that where there is overlap, there 
should also be enough capacity, expertise and resources from both 
communities to back the implementation of projects and pro-
grammes. From that perspective, alternative development could be 
envisioned as one element or a sequence of a broader development 
strategy on drugs (with specific methodology, evaluation tools, pro-
ject guidance and budget lines), providing the basis for sustainable 
development efforts. Although that would make it necessary to build 
a broader development approach to drugs than the one sketched so 
far, it would not imply that alternative development could be broad-
ened limitlessly. It would, however, open new expertise and policy-
articulation options, as well as innovative mechanisms of financing, 
including opportunities to tap into the development cooperation 
portfolio. Furthermore, it would not diminish the importance or 
quality of alternative development but instead serve to provide an 
evidence-based starting point and to put an end to the conceptual 
struggles to which alternative development has long been subject.
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ABSTRACT
Focusing on the links between ethics and the problem of illicit drugs, Zorro-
Sánchez and Kamminga explore the concept of shared responsibility in the context of 
alternative development. They address the notion of shared responsibility from two 
perspectives: firstly, as an ethical response to the challenge created by the world drug 
problem and, secondly, as the commitment that a wide range of national and interna-
tional actors in different spheres must make as part of their social responsibility, on the 
basis of the application of ethics-based criteria. The authors then bring together both 
perspectives and highlight how the exercise of that responsibility should today lead to 
the forging of partnerships between different actors at various levels. For alternative 
development to be effective, those actors should undertake specific joint commitments 
which go beyond the chain of production of the crops that replace illicit crops. They 
should also address the human development of those who have become involved in 
illicit crop cultivation and who depend directly or indirectly on the genuine and effec-
tive exercise of shared responsibility.
Keywords: alternative development, ethics, human development, shared 
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Introduction
The aim of the present article is twofold: first, to show that alternative devel-
opment, as a process designed to provide opportunities to some of the poor-
est and most vulnerable groups and communities affected by the world drug 
problem, involves an ethical commitment that entails the social responsibility 
of all other public and private national and international actors that are or 
should be present in the territories where illicit crops are grown; and second, 
to set out several ways of ensuring the exercise of that shared responsibility.
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 To that end, the article contains three sections: the first sets out the links 
between social responsibility, as an ethical concept, and alternative develop-
ment; the second examines the main statements made by international 
 bodies regarding the exercise by social actors of shared responsibility in 
addressing the illicit drug problem; and the third reaffirms the need for an 
ethical commitment by such actors in relation to alternative development, 
on the basis of the shared responsibility expressed, for example, through 
public-private partnerships that generate genuine commitments by various 
actors both within and outside the production chain. The article concludes 
by making a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening the 
 exercise of shared responsibility.
Ethics, shared responsibility and alternative development
Social responsibility: an ethical expression of human behaviour
Ethics, as a guide for human actions, requires that every natural or legal 
person be accountable to others for any action or failure to act that could 
affect those other persons positively or negatively. That is the essence of 
social responsibility—often understood in a superficial manner as engage-
ment in philanthropic activities—which is all the greater the more disadvan-
tageous the situation of the persons affected and the greater the power and 
authority of the persons or entities that perform or fail to perform the actions 
concerned. When decisions are taken or actions are carried out by a number 
of actors, each actor is expected to assume its share of the responsibility, in 
accordance with its role and the extent of the impact of its involvement. In 
such cases, it is a question of the joint or shared responsibility of all those 
actors.
 The concept of social responsibility, understood as the commitment of 
every person to his or her fellow human beings, has deep and long- established 
roots in Western ethical thinking, which is anchored in the beliefs of the 
ancient Greek philosophers and in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. However, 
it was only towards the middle of the nineteenth century that the idea that 
human beings have a responsibility towards others began to be systemati-
cally associated with other concepts which, despite being consistent with 
that idea, have different bases [1].
 Those new approaches to the ethical rules that should guide the behav-
iour of all human beings towards one another gradually shaped various 
 conceptions of what, in contemporary language, has been termed “social 
responsibility.” The common denominator of those conceptions is behaviour 
that seeks not only to contribute to the improved well-being of other human 
beings but also, in terms of the theory of human development, to provide 
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them with opportunities for self-improvement. The exercise of that respon-
sibility tends to extend not only to individuals but also to organizations as 
legal persons. However, far from a consensus having been reached with 
regard to the nature, necessity, extent and management of social responsibil-
ity, a fierce debate on the subject has arisen, such as when attempts are made 
to apply that concept to capitalist companies whose primary objective is to 
maximize their profitability. A further element of the debate is the refusal of 
influential authors to accept that social responsibility goes beyond strict 
compliance with market laws.1
 If it is accepted that any human decision involves a degree of freedom; 
if it is recognized that the market often fails; and if the deplorable situation 
in which much of humanity lives is considered, it is clear, as shown by 
Amartya Sen [2, 3] and Martha Nussbaum [4], that the exercise of social 
responsibility makes it necessary to transcend the above-mentioned laws. 
Social responsibility, regardless of the manner in which such responsibility 
is defined, is something that also applies to individuals, non-profit organiza-
tions and even States.
 It follows that the social responsibility of the various actors stems directly 
from ethics: an actor is socially responsible to the extent that its values, atti-
tudes and behaviour contribute to its own improvement as well as the 
improvement of the lives and prospects of those with whom it is connected. 
To put that concept into practice, following a proposal by the European 
Commission [5], it is accepted that social responsibility entails (a) prevent-
ing, mitigating and reversing any negative impacts of actions, and (b) pro-
moting and maximizing their positive impacts.
 The debate regarding the extent of the responsibility of social actors has 
spread to the geopolitical sphere. Since the middle of the twentieth century, 
authors and leaders have highlighted the need for such responsibility to 
extend to people who, while residing outside the jurisdiction of a particular 
State, sometimes find themselves in dire circumstances that cannot resolve 
themselves or be resolved by the States of which they are a part. Instead, 
these can be resolved with the cooperation of other States that are equipped 
with sufficient resources, or by private actors of such States. Therefore, 
shared responsibility tends to be accepted as extending beyond national 
borders to address situations that ultimately affect human groups irrespec-
tive of their geographical location or their connection with a particular 
State, which, for example, would be the case with regard to persons addicted 
to substance use.
1 Among whom the most explicit on the subject of social responsibility is probably Milton 
Friedman [6].
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 That stance has not been unanimous, for theoretical and practical rea-
sons. From a theoretical perspective, it is contested by authors from both 
individualistic and different perspectives. For example, Milton Friedman 
believes that, from an individualistic perspective, each person is responsible 
for resolving his or her own problems within the framework of a State, whose 
responsibility is limited to protecting the life, physical safety and property of 
its inhabitants. On the other hand, John Rawls argues in his Theory of Justice 
[7] that that theory should apply at the national level but not the interna-
tional level, at which the value of solidarity should apply. In practice, shared 
responsibility has been called into question either because some States have 
tried to use cooperation as a means of interfering in the domestic affairs of 
other States, or because some aid recipients have a tendency to transfer 
 personal responsibility to aid workers; both behaviours are contrary to the 
ethical values that should guide the exercise of social responsibility at the 
international level.
 In his work on justice [3], Sen, critiquing Rawls, argues that support for the 
improvement of the conditions of the human development of the inhabitants of 
the various States is not simply a matter of solidarity that places different 
societies on unequal levels. It is instead a matter of justice that places all 
human beings on the same level by virtue of their inherent dignity, and that 
requires the commitment of societies and the Governments of States that 
consider themselves developed. In those terms, they are jointly responsible, 
together with other national, international and transnational actors, for pro-
viding opportunities to facilitate capacity-building among the population of 
countries with fewer resources. In today’s global world, there is truth in 
Edgar Morin’s view that the community of destiny of humankind in the face 
of common matters of life and death requires a policy of humanity to which 
humankind should subscribe in the future [8, p. 47]. Accordingly, shared 
responsibility at the international level is an inevitable corollary of the ethics-
based concept of social responsibility.
Social responsibility in the context of alternative development
Like all human activities, the process that has become known as “combating 
illicit drug supply”2 has ethical implications that are, in the context in ques-
tion, particularly significant. That process is not only destroying the lives of 
2 The phrase should be reformulated to reflect the shift from a destructive position, such as 
the one that has previously prevailed, to a constructive position, according to which the objective 
is not to combat drugs per se but, rather, to provide persons who have, for one reason or another, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, become involved in the trafficking or consumption of narcotic sub-
stances with tools that offer them opportunities to break that cycle and prevent it from becoming 
a source of individual alienation and social unrest. For that reason, references in the present 
article that looks toward the future will not use the phrases “combating drugs” or “combating 
illicit crops”, but rather to the quest for a world free of drug addiction or simply to alternative 
development, as appropriate.
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many individuals, but is also jeopardizing the future of certain communities 
and even, in some cases, seriously obstructing the development of societies. 
This raises the question of the extent to which the teleological purpose of 
achieving elimination of the scourge of addictive drugs from society justifies 
the use of certain highly repressive measures. One example is crop spraying, 
which has adverse effects on health, the environment and the licit economy 
of farming communities,3 and the brunt of which is often borne by highly 
disadvantaged sectors of society.
 The shared responsibility for decisions taken and actions carried out to 
address the world drug problem is particularly relevant given the multitude 
of actors involved. They include international actors such as the United 
Nations and, in particular, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND); transnational actors including cer-
tain non-governmental organizations; national actors including States 
affected by the production and consumption of illicit drugs and, within those 
States, the specific agencies responsible for managing and implementing the 
counter-narcotics strategy; the governors of regions within those States; the 
local authorities of the areas affected by the production and consumption of 
illicit drugs; the growers and distributors of the inputs needed to produce 
those drugs; the producers and consumers of the drugs; and, of course, the 
communities affected by those activities.
 The present article does not seek to address the fundamental question of 
the conflict between the ultimate purpose of combating drugs and the injus-
tice of certain actions that affect some of the most disadvantaged groups in 
society, a question currently being studied in other spheres.4 Rather, it seeks 
to draw attention to the responsibility that all actors bear in relation to the 
decisions they take within the context of drug control policies and the need 
for them to assume that responsibility in an effective and coordinated man-
ner. In other words, it is important that all actors recognize that they are 
jointly responsible for such decisions and, depending on individual roles, for 
the consequences of those decisions, guided by ethics-based criteria (i.e., 
criteria that lead to a better society).
 One of the tools that has been used to tackle the increased production 
and distribution of illegal drugs at its source is the strategy of alternative 
development, which, according to the United Nations, is “a process to 
3 See, for example, the 2015 report of the World Health Organization, published on 19 March 
2015 by the International Agency for Research on Cancer, regarding the harmful effects of 
glyphosate [9], which is used to fumigate coca crops in countries including Colombia.
4 Various public and private bodies, such as the Organization of American States and the 
Global Commission on Drug Policy, are examining this issue and questioning the appropriateness 
and effectiveness of the policies that have been guiding the fight against illicit drugs.
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 prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural devel-
opment measures” [10]. From an ethical perspective, its purpose cannot 
simply be to eradicate or replace the production of drugs, but must be to 
promote the human development of the affected population. That means 
not only providing that population with the opportunity and the capacity to 
obtain the resources it needs in order to enjoy a decent standard of living 
under conditions of freedom, but also restoring a culture of lawfulness from 
which it has often found itself excluded for reasons beyond its control. This 
focus is included, for example, among the main objectives of the Forest 
 Warden Families Programme in Colombia. Consequently, alternative 
 development programmes cannot be evaluated solely on the basis of their 
short-term effectiveness in combating drugs, but must also be evaluated in 
terms of the extent of their contribution to resolving a human problem that 
would be unfair to tackle by force alone. In that regard, the tendency to 
measure the impact of alternative development programmes using human 
development indicators is perfectly justified [11, p. 111].
 In producing countries, most of the above-mentioned crops are grown 
by small-scale farmers for whom they often represent the only means of 
making a living in their region of origin. That is why the alternative 
 development strategy goes beyond the simple substitution of certain plants 
for others: the most important element is to provide those farmers with 
decent livelihoods that do not involve the cultivation of crops used for the 
 production of narcotic drugs.
 Accordingly, it must be recognized that the farmers concerned are the 
weakest link in the drug production and distribution chain. Owing to their 
circumstances of particular vulnerability, they can abandon such cultivation 
only if there are programmes in place that allow them to substitute the cul-
tivation of the crops in question with other income-generating activities in a 
sustainable manner. That fact was once again reiterated at the second High-
level International Conference on Alternative Development, held in  Bangkok 
as part of the preparation for the special session of the General Assembly on 
the world drug problem held in 2016, with the participation of high-level 
authorities. At the Conference, it was noted that farmers who engage in 
illicit crop cultivation or drug trafficking frequently do so because of poverty 
and the need to meet their basic needs. It is often the lack of opportunities 
to earn a legal and sustainable income that forces them to cultivate illicit 
drugs [12]. However, it is important to highlight that poverty is not the only 
motivation of the farmers involved [13, p. 42].
 At the Conference in Thailand, the Executive Director of UNODC, 
Yury Fedotov, delivered a video message that reaffirmed the immense poten-
tial of alternative development and how it can dramatically improve the lives 
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of people. The Deputy Executive Director of UNODC stressed that the 
 Sustainable Development Goals are an ideal platform for alternative devel-
opment to be effective in areas including poverty reduction, sustainable 
 agriculture, the protection of the environment and the promotion of  peaceful 
and inclusive communities. Lastly, the need was highlighted for the  strategy 
to become an adequately funded and sustainably implemented  pillar of 
international counter-narcotics policy that would encompass not only the 
highest political levels but also individuals in the community.5
 It is important to note that, unlike other components of what has hith-
erto been known as the “fight against drugs”, including the fumigation of 
illicit crops, alternative development does not give rise to objections of an 
ethical nature; on the contrary, there is consensus that it is one of the few 
strategies which, under certain economic, technical and management condi-
tions, do not harm efforts to create a world in which narcotic drugs are not 
a burden on individual and social development.
 Given that drug use remains one of the most pressing concerns at the 
global level, there is no doubt that all of the social actors directly or indirectly 
involved in the search for solutions to the production, distribution and con-
sumption of drugs at the various levels—transnational, international, national 
and local—must acknowledge and decisively assume their responsibility in 
relation to the alternative development strategy. In addition, it must be 
stressed that the issue of small-scale farmers who become involved in illicit 
crop cultivation out of necessity or as a result of the almost overwhelming 
pressure placed on them by drug traffickers or illegal armed groups is first 
and foremost a human problem whose solution requires the actors at all 
levels, from the local to the global, to assume that responsibility.
 That acknowledgement of responsibility further requires, as a corollary, 
that all individuals and organizations involved in making decisions that are 
 liable to have an impact on the development processes of the regions affected 
by illicit cultivation coordinate their efforts in supporting that development. 
Therefore, the concept of shared social responsibility or shared responsibility, 
as referred to above, comes to the fore as a prerequisite for the success of alter-
native development programmes. In other words, all of those individuals and 
organizations are jointly responsible, within their respective areas of compe-
tence, to the individuals whose future largely depends on those programmes. 
5 In that regard, it should be noted that at a meeting held in Vienna in March 2016, prior 
to the special session of the General Assembly on the world drug problem, the representatives 
of the Governments of Colombia, Germany and Thailand, together with UNODC, emphasized 
that where alternative development programmes are created in collaboration with beneficiary 
communities, meet their needs and are implemented within the framework of broader strategies 
for development and strengthened State presence, they tend to deliver results that are sustainable 
over time and have a positive impact on social cohesion, the promotion of lawfulness and 
 integration with national territories and economies [14]. 
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Accordingly, those who fail to acknowledge and assume, to the extent possible, 
their responsibilities in that area, which is so important for a large proportion 
of the world’s population, are behaving in an ethically reprehensible way.
International statements on shared responsibility in the context of 
alternative development at the global level
The concept of shared responsibility has evolved in parallel with interna-
tional efforts to control illicit drugs since the end of the nineteenth century 
[15, pp. 1-4]. At its core, the world drug problem has increasingly been seen 
as a problem of global governance; a true challenge that cannot be solved 
by individual States. However, until the mid-1990s, the principle of shared 
responsibility was based at least partly on a division of the world, currently 
perceived as decontextualized, into producing and consuming countries 
[15, pp. 1-4], in which the greater part of the burden of responsibility often 
fell on the producing countries, which were seen as “to blame” for the 
increase in illicit drugs globally.
 For the reasons set out in the first section of the present article, alternative 
development programmes are a potentially vital tool for tackling the problem 
in those countries. In practice, however, such programmes continue to be 
implemented in a limited number of countries, generally the traditional pro-
ducers of illegal drugs,6 and the lack of resources allocated to the programmes 
severely limits their potential. In that regard, it is worrying, to say the very 
least, that while large sums are spent on destroying illicit crops using methods 
such as fumigation, which sometimes also destroy the future of entire com-
munities, restrictions are placed on contributions to processes that, like alter-
native development, can pave the way for the individual and social development 
of the inhabitants of the regions affected by illicit cultivation. Suffice it to note, 
for example, that as shown by the World Drug Report 2015, overall disburse-
ments of alternative development funds from States members of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) accounted for just 
0.1 per cent of global development assistance [11, p. 118].7
6 Those countries are Afghanistan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colombia, Indonesia, the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Morocco, Myanmar, Peru, the Philippines and Thailand 
 (according to United Nations reports published between 2011 and 2013).
7 An additional example, which relates to Colombia, shows that of the State’s total expenditure 
on the six strategies, as referred to in its report of 2012, to address the problem of illicit drugs 
[17, p. 12], the strategy of reducing supply through various forms of interdiction accounted for 
64.2 per cent, followed by legal and institutional strengthening (25.7 per cent), while alternative 
development accounted for barely 5.5 per cent. The latter percentage reflects a decrease in the 
historical average, which had been 7.1 per cent from 2003 to 2008. Moreover, the total sum of 
investments in alternative development made by Colombia and through international cooperation 
from 2003 to 2009 not only fluctuated widely but also represented an average of just 2.3 per 
cent of the annual investment budget (figures provided by the Social Action initiative of the 
Government of Colombia, quoted by Zorro-Sánchez [1]).
Shared responsibility in alternative development: an  ethical challenge 57
 The necessity, urgency and complexity of the goal of countering the 
world drug problem, as well as the importance of the alternative development 
strategy as part of that goal, require the commitment of multiple actors that 
are dedicated to the strategy at different levels and, consequently, must work 
together to achieve that goal. It should be recalled that the challenge posed by 
the strategy relates not only to its effectiveness in limiting the supply of illicit 
drugs but also to its effectiveness in creating opportunities in a sustainable 
manner and building capacities in communities that have in many cases been 
perennially excluded from human development processes.
 In recent years, there has been growing recognition by both States and the 
United Nations of the importance of the concept of shared responsibility, 
which has gradually become one of the fundamental features of statements 
regarding international cooperation in various fields, including alternative 
development as one of the core strategies to address the world drug problem. 
 In the context of the United Nations in particular, States have increas-
ingly used the concept of a common and shared responsibility to tackle the 
world drug problem. In March 2011, at the fifty-fourth session of the 
 Commission on Narcotic Drugs, a round table was organized that was 
devoted to the “revitalization of the principle of common and shared respon-
sibility as the centrepiece of international cooperation to confront the 
 challenges posed by the world drug problem…” [16]. Participants  emphasized 
the need for countries to share experiences and good practices so as to 
embody the principle of shared responsibility [18, para. 36].
 In March 2012, the same topic was selected as the theme of a round 
table, with a view to highlighting the need to further improve understanding 
of the principle, its implications and the modalities for its application and 
operation, as well as the way in which States should use it in their interna-
tional cooperation programmes to address the world drug problem [19, pp. 
37 and 38]. At that session, participants highlighted that an operational defi-
nition of the principle of common and shared responsibility was lacking, as 
was a definition of the extent of each country’s responsibilities and commit-
ments in the fight against illicit drugs, and concluded that the concept of 
common and shared responsibility required further clarification [19, p. 38].
 At the fifty-sixth session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, in March 
2013, a resolution dedicated to the issue of strengthening shared responsibil-
ity was drafted by Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and Thailand [20]. 
The resolution not only highlighted the fact that shared responsibility should 
guide the individual and joint actions of all States, but also advocated “firm 
political will, on the basis of equal responsibilities and with international 
cooperation and coordination between all relevant actors at all levels” [20]). 
As highlighted in the annual report of the International Narcotics Control 
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Board for 2012, the principle of shared responsibility can be seen as a joint 
undertaking involving various actors, including government institutions, the 
private sector, local communities and individuals [15, p. 1].
 Lastly, the special session of the General Assembly on the world drug 
problem held in 2016 addressed the issue of shared responsibility and estab-
lished it as one of the key features of the fight against drugs. Promoting 
shared responsibility between governments and society is an essential task in 
tackling the structural causes of the production, trafficking and consump-
tion of drugs, thereby countering violence and social damage [21].
Constraints on support for alternative development at the 
 international level
While the rhetoric surrounding shared responsibility seems to be used pri-
marily within the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and other international 
forums, there are a number of constraints when it comes to applying the 
principle in local, national and international practice.
 The first constraint, inherent to international legislation, lies in the fact 
that shared responsibility is restricted by respect for the sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity of States and the principle of non-intervention in their 
domestic affairs. International treaties and resolutions generally refer to their 
non-mandatory nature and instead merely seek to guide international com-
mitments and conduct. However, they do not have sufficient power to 
impose rules and regulations.
 The second constraint is that calls to support alternative development 
tend to take the form of general recommendations and fail to provide spe-
cific guidelines on how to support the strategy. Despite efforts to rally sup-
port for the relevant programmes and the existence, since 2013, of the 
United Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative Development [22], it is 
ultimately for States to decide whether and how to support other countries 
in the implementation of such programmes.
 The third constraint is that there are relatively few countries that sup-
port alternative development. Although 18 countries have an alternative 
development strategy or an action plan,8 support is often limited to a much 
smaller group of donor countries that have traditionally provided assistance 
for such cooperation. In Colombia, for example, support for alternative 
8 Those countries are: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Canada, China, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Finland, Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the United States of America (as reported by the United Nations between 2011 
and 2013).
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development has come mainly from the United States of America, the 
 European Union, and a few European States, including Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands and Sweden [23, pp. 266-271].
 Partly as a result of the above, a fourth constraint is the absence of an 
international coalition or movement for alternative development. Unlike 
other global governance challenges such as arms trafficking, the proliferation 
of minefields in areas of armed conflict and the “responsibility to protect” the 
civilian population from crimes against humanity, there is no identifiable 
global commitment to alternative development. There are some events related 
to fair trade and symposiums among professionals, experts and academics in 
national and international settings,9 but there are no structural commitments 
involving third countries, transnational companies or  international consum-
ers, which are essential actors in the successful  marketing of products  resulting 
from alternative development processes.
 Lastly, a fifth constraint is that there is very little connectivity between 
alternative development projects and international markets. Previous 
research conducted by Kamminga at the University of Valencia [23, pp. 387 
and 388] sought to gather evidence regarding the international marketing 
channels for alternative development products in three regions of  Colombia. 
Any such evidence could be considered indications of the embracing of the 
principle of shared responsibility. However, apart from a very limited 
 number of projects receiving international support, the research revealed 
that very few products of alternative development projects were reaching 
 international markets (ibid., pp. 387 and 388).
 In corroboration of those findings, the World Drug Report 2015 showed 
that preferential trade agreements aimed at supporting producing countries 
did not provide any direct support to alternative development projects [11, 
p. 117]. In addition, in its discussion of some examples of good practices in 
the exercise of shared responsibility, the International Narcotics Control 
Board refers only to “… many examples of concerted and collaborative 
efforts … in programmes to develop alternative livelihoods”, but does not 
explain precisely what those efforts entail [15, para. 33].10
9 Annex II of the World Drug Report 2015 contains a list of selected international events related 
to alternative development that have taken place since 2001.
10 However, there has been some recent progress that demonstrates that the exercise of shared 
responsibility in that area is perfectly feasible. There are three examples: firstly, partnerships 
promoted by a well-known Swedish furniture chain with organizations in Thailand to promote 
alternative products [14]; secondly, the participation of six alternative development organizations 
in the Macrorrueda 60 business fair in Colombia, which demonstrated that it was possible to 
establish a constructive dialogue at various levels between the public and private sectors, both 
national and international [24]; and thirdly, collaboration between an Austrian chocolate maker 
and the Montebravo producers’ association in Chocó department, Colombia [25].
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 Considered together, the constraints lead to two initial conclusions. 
Firstly, there appears to be a significant gap between the international level, 
where emphasis has systematically been placed, at different times and in 
 different bodies, on shared responsibility, and the local and national levels, 
where alternative development programmes are implemented and where 
that shared responsibility appears to be very limited in size and scope. 
 Secondly, the constraints in question also show that it is not enough to work 
towards shared responsibility solely at the State level. The solution to the 
drug problem as a global challenge must include a wide range of non-State 
actors at the local, national and international levels.
Towards the exercise of shared responsibility in alternative 
 development processes
In the light of the above, it is not surprising that the World Drug Report 2015 
concluded that there was a disconnect between international rhetoric and 
financial support for alternative development [11, p. 118], nor is it surpris-
ing that the report revealed that disbursements of alternative development 
resources from States members of OECD had declined by 71 per cent since 
2009 [11, p. 118].
 The reasons for that decline may be partly related to the financial crisis 
or to the possibility that some countries do not record such resources sepa-
rately but, rather, include them within broader categories of development 
assistance. However, it is clear that there is a real gap between rhetoric and 
international support which, irrespective of its exact size, extends in general 
to all areas of development cooperation11 and validates concerns regarding 
the commitment of various actors to assuming their shared responsibility 
with respect to alternative development. In order to bridge that gap, a new 
approach is required to ensure that shared responsibility in the area of alter-
native development is more than just empty rhetoric. It should rather be an 
active network, which drives the actions of multiple local, regional, national, 
international and global public and private actors that understand the cur-
rent realities of their respective areas of activity and are willing to take on the 
challenges that those realities pose.
 There is no doubt that producing States should continue to play a key 
role in alternative development projects, whether that role takes the form of 
funding programmes, providing technical assistance or facilitating the pro-
cesses required for the success of those projects (such as the recognition of 
land rights or access to markets). However, other countries and bodies must 
11 As evidenced, for example, by the successive reports produced by the United Nations 
Development Programme on the progress made in achieving the Millennium Development Goals.
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also assume their role in exercising the shared responsibility that rests with 
them. Nevertheless, the support of those countries and bodies seems to be 
gradually decreasing, a trend that is liable to force countries in which alter-
native development projects are being conducted to supplement the 
resources allocated to those projects with their own funds [11, p. 86]. To 
date, only a small number of other countries, including Canada, Germany, 
the Netherlands and the United States, have played a significant role in 
 bilateral programmes to support alternative development (ibid., p. 85).
 As it is unlikely that, for example, all 53 member States of the Commis-
sion on Narcotic Drugs will suddenly start to provide direct support to 
alternative development projects in other States, it should be asked what 
they and other countries could do at the bilateral or multilateral level to give 
definite form to the exercise of their responsibility. In that regard, it is 
entirely feasible for them to take a dual approach involving the promotion 
of action in support of alternative development taken by the companies 
most closely linked to their economic processes, and assistance in creating 
an environment that facilitates the opening up of their markets to alterna-
tive development products. However, that often depends on their willing-
ness to negotiate trade agreements at the multilateral level. In any case, 
those States could also play a direct role as buyers of goods produced 
through alternative development processes, or as promoters of the produc-
tion or marketing of those goods by companies or non-governmental 
 organizations based in their territories.
 In that respect, it should be noted that non-governmental organizations 
have been called on not only to become involved in the marketing of alterna-
tive development products but also, inter alia, to help raise awareness about 
the relevance of the projects concerned, a task that only a few such organiza-
tions have undertaken to date. It should be highlighted, for example, that 
while various local, national and international non-governmental organiza-
tions are committed to promoting organic or fair trade products, their efforts 
do not extend to alternative development products. There are only a few 
exceptions, in the form of high-quality products generated by a handful of 
projects around the world, such as the organic coffee produced by the Ecol-
sierra network (Red Ecolsierra) in Santa Marta, Colombia, or the fair trade 
products of the Mae Fah Luang Foundation in Thailand.
 The same is true of national and multinational companies. Although the 
United Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative Development emphasize 
the crucial role of the private sector and the creation of public-private part-
nerships aimed at making alternative development successful and  sustainable 
[22], the actual number of companies committed to providing that support 
through the purchase of raw materials or finished products is very low. 
 Public-private partnerships have been established in some drug-producing 
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regions, such as the partnership promoted by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) in Colombia with Starbucks and 
 several national companies [26, p. 33], and the partnership promoted by 
UNODC in Colombia and Peru between the Austrian chocolate maker 
 Zotter and associations of local producers [25]. Often, however, those part-
nerships are not directly related to alternative development projects, or 
remain limited in scope and duration.
Public-private partnerships as a means of exercising shared responsibility12
The proper exercise of shared responsibility requires levels of coordination 
between the parties that enable the smooth implementation of their activi-
ties. While that coordination may be formal or informal, in most cases only 
formal coordination (established clearly in agreements that may have 
 various modalities) offers a degree of security sufficient to satisfactorily 
link the responsibility of the different actors. Those agreements should go 
beyond the implementation of short-term actions that establish the 
 specific commitments of the parties in relation to a particular project or 
 infrastructure [27] [28, p. 4]. They should rather take the form of partner-
ships, which often give rise to broad-based coalitions that comprise not 
only public entities but also community leaders, national or international 
entrepreneurs, private consultants, academics and non-governmental 
organizations [29, p. 12].
 Public-private partnerships strengthen the capacity of actors to make a 
positive impact on the society in which they operate. For example, Devlin 
and Moguillansky [30, p. 66] argue that in many cases, the information that 
is available to private companies regarding the market, even if incomplete, 
enables them to identify opportunities and obstacles in order to successfully 
establish strategies aimed at improving the economic conditions of certain 
groups—for example, those who seek economic activities that are alterna-
tives to illicit crop cultivation. In contrast, government entities approach the 
issue with a long-term goal, strategic guidelines and various kinds of 
resources in relation to the actions concerned. When both sectors work 
together, their potential to identify and overcome constraints is thereby 
increased. One such example is the promotion of economic growth and the 
transformation of the living conditions of the population connected to alter-
native development programmes.
 In the specialized literature, there is broad recognition of the classifica-
tion by the World Bank of the roles that the public sector could play in 
12 Lucía Torres Alvarado, a master’s student at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Development 
Studies (CIDER) of the University of the Andes in Bogota contributed to the present analysis 
through her literature review.
Shared responsibility in alternative development: an  ethical challenge 63
 creating an enabling environment for corporate social responsibility: man-
dating, facilitating, partnering and endorsing. Fox, Ward and Howard [31] 
explain the respective roles as follows:
• Mandating: establishing minimum standards for business perfor-
mance through legislation
• Facilitating: offering private-sector companies different types of 
incentives in order to engage them in the issue
• Partnering: acting as a partner of the private sector and civil society 
and harnessing the complementary skills of each
• Endorsing: recognizing the good practices of organizations and sup-
porting socially responsible initiatives through the example set by 
those organizations 
 Those roles are not incompatible and it is possible that, in relation to a 
specific issue, a combination of them may be reflected in various actions.
 For its part, General Assembly resolution 66/288, entitled “The future 
we want”, highlights the potential role that the private sector can play as a 
partner in addressing complex issues directly related to sustainable devel-
opment, such as those which arise in alternative development processes 
and consequently require the involvement of various social actors. In that 
regard, it should be noted that in countries such as Colombia, where those 
processes are of paramount importance, the foundations of the National 
Development Plan 2014-2018 provide that in order to achieve the 
 established goals, the Government will work hand in hand with the  business 
sector and local  governments to develop public strategies and public- 
private partnerships [32, p. 63].13
 Contemporary globalization has made both local and regional develop-
ment processes and the relationships between the actors who work together 
to promote them increasingly complex. From that perspective, efforts to 
contribute to development become increasingly difficult and ineffective if 
they depend on the actions of a single actor, regardless of the form that those 
actions take. For that reason, the exercise of social responsibility increasingly 
requires the seeking of partnerships with other relevant actors.
13 Although management problems largely thwarted the business capitalization initiative 
launched in the 1990s in the context of the alternative development strategy of the Government 
of Colombia of the time, the initiative’s conception in fact represented an attempted partnership 
between the public sector, private enterprise and illicit crop growers, and the experience it pro-
vided could be drawn upon in the future. The business capitalization initiative, implemented 
through the Agricultural Production and Marketing Business Incubator, sought to capitalize 
 alternative development projects and enterprises through the establishment of public limited 
companies that would bring together rural farming organizations and private-sector enterprises 
interested in the proposed programmes [33, p. 9].
64 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LXI, 2017
 The scope of that responsibility may be very broad if, for example, it binds 
all the actors involved in a value chain—in this case, the value chains of alter-
natives to illicit crop cultivation—from the input stage to the final marketing 
of the products concerned. Authors such as Scott (2014) suggest that it is 
appropriate to build matrices that make it possible to identify the actors 
involved in each case, define their responsibilities within the chain and estab-
lish partnerships as a means of fostering the exercise of those responsibilities.
The international context as an enabling environment for the exercise 
of shared responsibility
Although the world drug problem is frequently discussed in bilateral or 
 multilateral forums, the alternative development strategy is seldom part of 
those discussions. Beyond the sharing of good practices and lessons learned, 
which almost always are of a technical nature and relate to specific projects, 
there is little discussion of what international actors do and could do to 
 support alternative development as part of their shared responsibility.
 For example, in many of the resolutions, declarations and action plans of 
the United Nations, reference is made to international financial institutions 
and regional development banks as important actors in supporting or financ-
ing alternative development. However, it appears that bodies such as the 
World Bank are not structurally committed to alternative development. This 
is a missed opportunity as the World Bank is an institution that, like the 
Inter-American Development Bank, could help alternative development to 
transcend the relatively small-scale projects that struggle to make an impact 
despite the size and reach of the illicit economy and of legal competing 
industries. In addition, with a view to strengthening producer associations, 
those bodies could provide resources for production and marketing infra-
structure that could improve productivity, quality and, as a result, market 
potential. An example would be the funds required for the often lengthy and 
expensive processes of certifying organic or fair trade products.
 However, international support should go beyond financial and technical 
assistance for alternative development. Given the importance of international 
markets, international actors, which are often an extension of States, can 
 create an international trading scheme in which the products concerned can 
be promoted successfully. Regardless of whether recent attempts to promote 
a global brand for alternative development products are feasible or desirable 
[23, pp. 300 and 301], it is clear that the vast majority of those products fail 
to reach profitable markets at the national, international or global level.
 Although at first sight the trend towards free trade agreements, such as 
those concluded between the European Union and Latin American coun-
tries, would appear to foster the creation of an enabling environment for 
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alternative development products, the poor conditions in which many of 
those projects are carried out tend to confound that expectation. Many 
alternative development projects are producing low volumes of relatively 
expensive, low-quality, non-uniform products at irregular intervals. That 
means that they struggle to compete on national and world markets, not 
only with illicit alternatives, but also with the legal competition.
 Given the adverse conditions in many regions in which alternative devel-
opment projects are being implemented [11, pp. 90-93], it is necessary to 
lend those projects ongoing support in terms of both production and mar-
keting. In addition, preferential trade agreements are needed in order to 
carve out a space for them on international markets in a more structural way. 
Previous trade agreements such as the Andean Trade Preference Act and its 
successor, the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act, as well 
as the Generalized Scheme of Preferences of the European Union, have 
facilitated free access to agricultural products but have not specifically 
sought to promote alternative development projects [11, pp. 116 and 117].
 To date, neither free trade nor preferential trade has succeeded in 
strengthening the marketing of alternative development products. In that 
regard, if the international community is to take the principle of shared 
responsibility for supporting alternative development seriously, a debate 
should be initiated in which bodies such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and others that have a direct or indirect influence on the regulation 
of international trading schemes also participate, with a view to identifying 
the best mechanisms to support alternative development products at the 
international level. If preferential treatment were impossible,14 an improve-
ment in the standards for the production and marketing of alternative prod-
ucts would be even more necessary. From the perspective of that group of 
bodies, it should not be forgotten that alternative development is also a source 
of growth—potential or real—of the trade flows and economic activity both 
of the countries that produce the goods concerned and of those that buy 
them.
 The process of incorporating alternative development more fully into 
the international trading scheme can be regarded as part of the process of 
positioning it within the broader sphere of the development efforts of every 
14 As also explained in the World Drug Report 2015, to which Kamminga contributed as 
 researcher and writer, preferential treatment may be difficult to establish. For example, the Gen-
eralised Scheme of Preferences of the European Union was changed in 2005 after a WTO legal 
case that was started in 2002. WTO ruled that tariff advantages under the Special Arrangements 
to Combat Drug Production and Trafficking were inconsistent with article I.1 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, on general most-favoured-nation treatment. This meant that the 
European Union could not grant preferential treatment to illicit drug-producing countries, unless 
it granted the same treatment to other Generalised Scheme of Preferences beneficiaries with 
similar “development, financial and trade needs” [34].
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country. The best way to achieve that objective seems to be to place it within 
the context of the recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals. In that 
respect, a study has been undertaken to explore how the issue could fit the 
logic of the Goals [35]; [11, p. 116], but more research is needed to explore 
how that could be achieved. It should be highlighted that the necessary 
incorporation of support for alternative development programmes within 
broader national development strategies may further complicate the exercise 
of the shared responsibility that the various social actors must assume in 
relation to such programmes as their specific roles and responsibilities 
related to alternative development may become more obscured. 
 It is equally important to reiterate that there can be no confusion between 
the instruments designed to promote alternative development—financial 
and otherwise—and the ultimate goal of alternative development, namely to 
increase the individual and social opportunities enabling persons who, for 
one reason or another, have become involved in the cultivation of plants that 
can be used in the manufacture of narcotic drugs, to abandon that activity in 
a sustainable way.
Conclusions
The challenge of addressing illicit crop cultivation has many interrelated 
facets. Firstly, such crops are often grown by communities that face condi-
tions of extreme poverty, instability or external pressure and that lack other 
opportunities to overcome those conditions. That is why it is necessary to 
ensure, before any eradication of illicit crops takes place, that those commu-
nities will have sustainable alternative livelihoods. Achieving that requires 
the determination and assessment of the social, technical and economic fea-
sibility of such alternatives. But it also requires the provision of essential 
basic services to enable those who have voluntarily or involuntarily been 
involved in illicit crop cultivation to establish a dignified existence under 
conditions that befit the modern world. It also necessitates an approach that 
reintroduces farmers into the governance framework, and above all the 
 culture of lawfulness from which they have been excluded.
 In that regard, it should be recalled that a significant proportion of that 
population has been living within an institutional system defined by actors 
that operate outside the framework of the law and tend to impose their deci-
sions by force. Ensuring that that population not only understands the need 
to comply with the law but also is able to do so is one of the great challenges 
of alternative development. That understanding and that ability require the 
presence of the State, which in most cases has been absent from the regions 
most affected by illicit crop cultivation. Therefore, alternative development 
programmes cannot simply be the responsibility of a specialized body. It 
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must be the responsibility of a group of entities that, through the shared 
exercise of their responsibilities, are able to contribute to opening up paths 
towards social, political and economic development, and inclusion by 
 working hand in hand with the population concerned.
 Given that the problem of narcotic drugs is seen as a critical issue at the 
international level, responsibility for solving that problem must also be 
assumed at that level. However, that does not mean that a group of countries 
has the right to dictate rules with which all those affected in one way or 
another by the production or use of narcotic drugs must comply. What it 
does mean is that there is a need to implement, with the participation of the 
population concerned, structures and processes of shared responsibility in 
which every global, national and local social actor assumes part of the finan-
cial and other costs of addressing the problem—insofar as each of those 
actors has contributed to the problem in one way or another and to a greater 
or lesser extent.
 Moreover, it is vital that alternative development programmes be 
designed with the future in mind. Past experiences and the lessons learned 
from those experiences should be taken into account in order to guide 
 forward-looking actions, but those actions should not be held back by the 
failures of the past, which are clearly attributable to the absence of the 
 conscious, organized and efficient exercise of shared responsibility by the 
individual actors called on to promote such development. In other words, 
the true potential of alternative development has yet to materialize owing to 
the lack of genuine and active shared responsibility.
 The actions in question should be the focus of specific partnerships 
established on the basis of a systematic programme and a long-term com-
mitment to promote alternative development. Within such partnerships, all 
actors, including small-scale farmers; local and national authorities; enter-
prises; members of the international community; non-governmental organi-
zations with a local, national or global reach; and other institutions could 
contribute, to the extent possible, their efforts, capacities—including techni-
cal expertise—and financial resources.
 The responsibility of national and international public actors is not 
 limited to issuing guidelines or adopting standards with a global or national 
reach to promote alternative development and thus replace illicit crops. 
Their responsibility commits them to ensuring that the standards they issue 
are flexible enough to be applied in a versatile manner by the persons who 
are located in the area concerned. Those experiencing the problem as farm-
ers, neighbours or authorities with jurisdiction over that area should be fully 
familiar with the characteristics of those standards and are also expected to 
assume responsibility for the cost of implementing the solutions adopted.
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 However, that flexibility cannot be achieved and such persons cannot be 
called upon to assume their full share of responsibility until they have become 
part of the group that has participated in the discussion and adoption of the 
measures concerned. In other words, farmers and, in general, members of 
local communities must be part of the partnerships and not seen as the 
“object” of those partnerships. Moreover, it is on the basis of partnerships 
established in that manner that commitments of financial and other support 
that link the various actors should be formalized.
 Furthermore, in the case of alternative development, almost all of the 
solutions that may be proposed require the commitment of other private 
actors. They play a role either in promoting the productive development of 
small farms that have already eradicated or are in the process of eradicating 
illicit crops, or in facilitating access to input and product markets. The role of 
promoter may go beyond the mere provision of advice or financial resources. 
With the informed agreement of the farmers, that role may, for example, 
develop into a partnership between entrepreneurs and small-scale producers.
 Partnerships should be forged between various groups, each composed 
of actors from diverse backgrounds and areas of expertise. These include 
government entities at the national, regional and local levels; farming 
 communities willing to eradicate illicit crops; centres for generating knowl-
edge and technologies applicable to alternative development processes; 
 international cooperation agencies; other non-governmental organizations 
interested in supporting alternative development processes and multilateral 
agencies that can create an enabling environment for the access of products 
to international markets.
 Multilateral bodies and national Governments have a dual role: to shape 
the regulations applicable to alternative development processes, each within its 
area of competence, and to participate directly in the implementation of the 
programmes and projects defined within the framework of the partnership. 
Although the composition of partnerships would vary, community members 
committed to substituting illicit crops through alternative development pro-
grammes and projects should always have a major role in those partnerships.
 Moreover, all of those actors are called on to play an important role in 
the creation of an enabling environment for alternative development, ensur-
ing, for example, land rights, respect for the rights of indigenous groups and 
other minorities, human security, and the existence of political and financial 
institutions that are stable and inclusive15 at the local level. Thus, shared 
responsibility also extends to other areas that determine the impact of alter-
native development programmes.
15 In the sense of institutions that serve citizens, as proposed by Acemo ˇglu and Robinson [36].
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 The sphere of activity of each of those actors is different, and they are 
therefore ranked on different hierarchical scales. That does not mean, how-
ever, that those hierarchies have to be replicated in every partnership. It is 
proposed that partnerships should have a non-hierarchical structure, a net-
work organized according to the specific characteristics of each programme, 
on the basis of which the actions of the various actors are coordinated.
 In today’s world, that coordination does not require a physical presence, 
and as a result, networks between the actors in a partnership are becoming 
increasingly important. In addition, those networks do not necessarily con-
nect locations that are close to one another; some of the persons or entities 
that form part of the various groups of actors may be located in remote 
places, far from not only members of other groups but even members of 
their own group. It is important, therefore, to geographically locate every 
member of the partnership; to understand that every member is a compo-
nent of the alternative development support network; and to establish the 
channels that connect them with the other members, and the type of flows 
that each is expected to generate and receive in order to develop the partner-
ship. In other words, it is a question of translating the partnership into a 
network and “spatializing” it in order to understand and guide in a more 
appropriate manner the processes that take place within it.
 Beyond technical exchanges at various levels, creating an international 
movement around alternative development has proven to be difficult. 
 Nevertheless, the multifaceted network of local, national and international 
 partnerships that is needed for alternative development to become increas-
ingly effective will by itself create more linkages, more cooperation and a 
stronger sense of working towards common objectives among the various 
actors involved. As such, shared responsibility—if properly embodied in prac-
tical arrangements—will contribute to creating and strengthening an interna-
tional movement around alternative development, especially if backed by the 
visibility and marketing power of the international private sector.
 Alternative development cannot be regarded as a religion with almost 
immutable dogmas and practices. Far from being subject to rigid rules, the 
partnerships that are necessary for its success should be designed as practi-
cal, flexible and effective tools that are geared towards a future that trans-
forms the tenets of human development into reality for those who have 
experienced the uncertainty of poverty, lawlessness and insecurity. The 
alternative development strategy requires the commitment of multiple 
actors and, for that reason, must be implemented on the basis of the prin-
ciple of shared responsibility that is clearly established for each of those 
actors and expressly assumed by them. Today, that responsibility is part of 
the ethical commitment of every individual, every organization and every 
State to others.
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ABSTRACT
Illicit drug crops are mostly cultivated in rural areas affected by poverty, landless-
ness, insecure land rights and conflicts over natural resources. Land is one of the key 
factors of production in areas where the illicit drug economy is present. Whether or not 
the rural population has secure access to land influences its decision regarding which 
crops to cultivate: insecure land tenure makes farmers more vulnerable to the cultivation 
of illicit crops that can provide short-term income. Secure land rights and access to land 
can serve as incentives for long-term investments in arable land and facilitate access to 
credit. The present article examines the land-drugs nexus, analysing alternative develop-
ment experiences and field research findings from Afghanistan, Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of), Colombia, Myanmar and Peru. The article concludes that alternative devel-
opment programmes can benefit from land governance and titling of land. In that 
regard, the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security of the Committee on 
World Food Security of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
can provide important guidance.
1 The content of the present article exclusively represents the opinions of the authors, not 
those of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) or any other third 
party. It is based on a previous GIZ desk study by Nike Arning (formerly Nike Affeld), com-
missioned by GIZ on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) of Germany, entitled “The nexus between drug crop cultivation and access to land: 
 insights from case studies from Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Myanmar and Peru”.
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Introduction
Poverty, weak infrastructure, fragile institutions, lack of rule of law, weak govern-
ance and lack of access to markets are some of the main drivers of illicit drug 
crop cultivation. Rural populations living in drug crop cultivation areas often 
lack resources, access to public services and, most importantly, access to alter-
native sources of income. Afghanistan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colom-
bia, Myanmar and Peru together comprise a large share of the total global land 
area under opium poppy and coca cultivation. All five countries are character-
ized by insecure land rights and an unequal distribution of land, especially in 
drug crop cultivation areas, where land rights are often insufficiently formal-
ized.2 In many drug crop cultivation areas, the land area available to small farm-
ers is often not large enough to sustain their households. In eastern Afghanistan, 
for instance, opium poppy cultivation was found to be prevalent especially in 
those areas where farmers had access only to small areas of land.3 Mansfield 
finds that “the correlation between the size of land holdings and the proportion 
of land dedicated to drug crops is evident. Where household access to land is 
acute, both coca and opium [poppy] have been found to be extensively grown”.4
 In some cases, land conflicts coincide with violence, displacement and 
the resilience of the illegal economy.5 For example, the high level of land 
inequality in Colombia (with a land-related Gini coefficient of 0.87 in 20116) 
can partially be explained by drug trafficking and violence;7 in some cases, 
the presence of illegal armed groups hinders small farmers’ access to land 
and leads to forced displacement, which intensifies land abandonment.8 
2 Nike Affeld, “The nexus between drug crop cultivation and access to land: insights from 
case studies from Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Myanmar and Peru” (Eschborn, Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2013), p. 31. 
3 David Mansfield, Diversity and Dilemma: Understanding Rural Livelihoods and Addressing the 
Causes of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Laghman, Eastern Afghanistan: A Report for 
the Project for Alternative Livelihoods (PAL) in Eastern Afghanistan, PAL Internal Document No. 2 
(Jajalabad, Afghanistan (December 2004), p. 61. 
4 David Mansfield, “Alternative development: the modern thrust of supply-side policy”, in 
Bulletin of Narcotics, vol. LI, Nos. 1 and 2 (1999), p. 26. 
5 Francisco E. Thoumi, Debates y Paradigmas de las Políticas de Drogas en el Mundo y los Desafíos 
para Colombia (Bogotá, Academia Colombiana de Ciencias Económicas, 2015), p. 436; Ricardo 
Vargas Meza, “Drugs and the peace process in Colombia”, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource 
Centre (NOREF) Policy Brief (November 2012), p. 3. 
6 Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, Atlas de la Distribución de la Propiedad Rural en 
 Colombia (Bogotá, 2012). 
7 UNODC and Acción Social, “Estructura económica de las unidades productoras agropec-
uarias en zonas de influencia de cultivos de coca: regiones de estudio—Pacífico, Meta-Guaviare, 
Putumayo-Caquetá y Orinoquía” (Bogotá, 2011), p. 57ff. 
8 Ibid.
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 While local contexts may differ substantially in terms of infrastructure, 
rule of law and governance, land is one of the basic factors of production in 
areas with agriculture-based illicit drug crop cultivation. Whether or not the 
rural population has secure access to land influences its decision regarding 
which crops to cultivate: as the World Drug Report 2015 indicates, in many 
drug crop cultivation areas, farmers of illicit crops tend to have smaller land 
holdings than those who only cultivate licit crops.9 Where access to land is 
scarce and food insecurity prevails, many farmers cultivate illicit crops as a 
cash crop that can provide short-term income. Conversely, secure land 
rights and access to land can serve as incentives for long-term investments 
in arable land and facilitate access to credit.10 As such, the land-drugs nexus 
has important implications for alternative development projects that intend 
to address the root causes of illicit cultivation in rural areas. In that context, 
land governance plays a fundamental role. The facilitation of responsible 
governance of land tenure can serve as an important pillar of alternative 
development initiatives and contribute to their sustainability. In that regard, 
the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
 Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security11 of the Commit-
tee on World Food Security of the Food and Agriculture  Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) can provide important guidance to current and 
future alternative development interventions.
 Research on the correlation between access to land or security of land 
rights and drug crop cultivation is scarce. Therefore, as a first step towards 
closing the research gap, the present article attempts to answer the question 
of how access to land and drug crop cultivation are interrelated. Based on a 
review of recent literature and reports from international organizations, field 
missions and project evaluations, the present article is guided and comple-
mented by information gathered from background discussions with authori-
ties and experts from alternative development projects, international 
governmental entities and non-governmental organizations.
 After providing a brief overview of the international drug policy 
framework on alternative development and the relevant concepts of land 
governance, the present article presents findings from five of the main 
drug crop-producing countries—Afghanistan, Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of), Colombia, Myanmar and Peru—and from experiences drawn from 
alternative development projects.
9 World Drug Report 2015 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.XI.15.7), p. 116. 
10 Ibid.
11 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Committee on World Food 
Security, Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests 
in the Context of National Food Security (Rome, 2012). 
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International drug policy and land governance
Alternative development is an approach to rural development that seeks to 
sustainably reduce illicit drug crop cultivation by tackling its root causes, 
such as poverty and lack of access to licit markets.12 Sustainable use of natu-
ral resources lies at the heart of alternative development.13 However, in the 
past, the international drug policy framework generally has not considered 
the importance of access to land, land rights and land tenure security. In 
most international and regional drug control strategies and alternative devel-
opment policies, land rights have played only a marginal role. Nonetheless, 
land governance can impact significantly on development efforts in rural 
areas characterized by fragile institutions, in particular on alternative devel-
opment projects in which land use is expected to shift from illicit to licit 
purposes. 
International drug policy framework
Relevant foundational documents for alternative development, such as the 
Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug 
Crops and on Alternative Development (General Assembly resolution 
S-20/4 E), make no reference to land rights, access to land or ownership in 
general. That is also true of the Political Declaration and Plan of Action on 
International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to 
Counter the World Drug Problem.14 
 Only in 2011, the first International Conference on Alternative Devel-
opment in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai, Thailand, laid the foundation for 
greater consideration of land issues in international drug policy. Land own-
ership and other resource management issues were considered important in 
establishing legal and sustainable livelihoods, and in creating incentives for 
transitioning to legal agricultural activities. The recognition of existing land 
rights, in particular, was seen as crucial for lessening the dependency on 
illicit drug crop cultivation and, therefore, for the success of alternative 
development projects:
Illicit cultivation mostly takes place in remote and underdeveloped areas 
where communities’ land rights and usage is unclear. Successful [alter-
native development] programmes should therefore also address land 
12 GIZ, “Rethinking the approach of alternative development: principles and standards of 
rural development in drug producing areas“, 2nd ed. (2013).
13 United Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative Development (General Assembly resolu-
tion 68/196, annex); “Rethinking the approach of alternative development”. 
14 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2009, Supplement No. 8 (E/2009/28), 
chap. I, sect. C. 
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rights and tenure in order to improve access to and use of land and 
reduce the vulnerability of communities and their dependency on illicit 
cultivation. Collective and community property needs to be respected. 
Improving access to markets and social and productive infrastructure 
leading to value added systems is also important to create economically 
viable and licit alternatives.15
 At the International Conference on Alternative Development, govern-
mental delegates, in consultation with civil society, formulated what would 
later become the United Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative Devel-
opment when they were adopted by the Commission on Narcotics Drugs in 
2013. The Guiding Principles recognize the protection of land rights as an 
important factor for the success of alternative development programmes:
Effective alternative development strategies and programmes require, as 
appropriate, the strengthening of relevant governmental institutions at 
the national, regional and local levels. Public policies should be sup-
ported to the extent possible by, inter alia, strengthening legal frame-
works, involving local communities and relevant organizations, 
identifying and providing adequate financial support, technical assis-
tance and increased investment, and recognizing and enforcing property 
rights, including access to land.”16 
 In their action and implementation measures, the Guiding Principles 
take land rights and land management issues into account for the planning, 
implementation and evaluation of alternative development programmes 
involving indigenous peoples. 
 Only recently has the importance of access to land been considered 
more prominently: at the second International Conference on Alternative 
Development, held in Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai and Bangkok in 2015, 
and at the thirtieth special session of the General Assembly on the world 
drug problem, held in 2016. The outcome document of the second Interna-
tional Conference on Alternative Development17 highlighted the important 
role the promotion and protection of access to land and land rights play in 
the implementation of alternative development programmes. The General 
Assembly, in its resolution S-30/1, adopted at its special session on the world 
drug problem in 2016, underlined the role of “access and legal titles to land 
15 International Workshop and Conference on Alternative Development in Chiang Rai and 
Chiang Mai, Thailand, 6-11 November 2011 (E/CN.7/2012/CRP.3), para. 41. 
16 Outcome of the International Conference on Alternative Development: International 
 Guiding Principles on Alternative Development” (E/CN.7/2013/8, annex, appendix). 
17 Outcome of the international seminar/workshop on the implementation of the United 
 Nations Guiding Principles on Alternative Development and the Second International Conference 
on Alternative Development (E/CN.7/2016/13).
80 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LXI, 2017
for farmers and local communities, which will also contribute to preventing, 
reducing or eliminating illicit cultivation and other drug-related activities”; 
this document is expected to guide international drug policy in the years 
ahead and therefore can be an important step forward in mainstreaming 
land issues effectively in alternative development.
Concepts of land governance18
Land relations are based on “the rules of the game”, on formal and informal 
institutions19 and, in particular, on property rights. Governance refers to the 
processes by which authority is conferred on different decision makers, such 
as national parliaments, administration at different regional levels, family 
heads, village elders, elected community leaders or international regimes and 
organizations. Governance also refers to the processes by which decision 
makers design these rules (e.g., statutory rules in contract law, land laws, land 
use regulations or informal, often unwritten rules and codes of conduct sum-
marized as customary tenure), and the processes by which those rules are 
enforced (for example, by forest officers or land priests, or by the FAO Volun-
tary Guidelines) and modified. This modification may refer to new regula-
tions on foreign direct investment in land, restricting specific rental contracts 
from the past, such as sharecropping, as well as formulating land reform 
principles (e.g., the “willing seller, willing buyer” approach) and implementa-
tion procedures for recovery measures in post-conflict situations.
 Violence is often linked to land conflicts, for example, as various armed 
groups and government and civilian actors compete for control over land 
and its exploitation.20 Therefore, it is important to have an adequate under-
standing of land tenure issues, at the least to avoid causing additional harm, 
but also in efforts to design effective development programmes. Land policy 
and land regularization as elements of land governance and peacebuilding 
tend to be underrated and have received insufficient attention in develop-
ment cooperation.21 Yet land policy clearly plays a fundamental role both in 
recovering from conflict and in ensuring that further conflict does not arise.22
18 The present chapter builds on earlier work: see GIZ, Land in German Development 
 Cooperation: Guiding Principles, Challenges and Prospects for the Future (Eschborn, Germany, 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2016). 
19 Douglass C. North, “Institutions”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, No. 1. (Winter, 
1991), pp. 97-112.
20 Daniel Mejia and Pascual Restrepo, Bushes and Bullets: Illegal Cocaine Markets and Violence 
in Colombia, Serie Documentos CEDE No. 2013-53 (Bogotá, Universidad de los Andes-Facultad 
de Economía-CEDE, 2013), p.5. 
21 Land in German Development Cooperation, p. 60. 
22 John Bruce and Sally Holt, “Land and conflict prevention”, Conflict Prevention Handbook 
Series, No. 6 (Colchester, United Kingdom, Initiative on Quiet Diplomacy, University of Essex, 
2011). 
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 Bearing in mind the historical development of land tenure systems, not 
only in developing countries, and resulting conflicts about land relations 
(e.g., as a result of large-scale land investments), it becomes evident that 
considerations on governance and its quality are the key to understanding 
the functioning and shortcomings of land tenure today and to formulating 
standards for future land tenure systems. In countries such as Zimbabwe, 
South Africa and some Central American countries, the struggle for access 
to land has left traces of violence and political unrest.23 In such contexts, 
ignoring the rule of law has not only hindered land reform processes and led 
to land expropriation for public purpose (e.g., large dam projects) but also 
led to the denial of customary or secondary resource rights of the rural poor, 
especially women.24 The principles of accountability and giving local inhab-
itants a voice in matters are often neglected when it comes to the conversion 
of land use patterns, for example, as a consequence of deforestation or direct 
investment in large tracts of land.
 The regulatory instruments in most countries are, at best, developed at a 
national, de jure level, while transforming rules and regulations into viable 
practice at a local user level is often still lacking. This is partly due to ineffective, 
sometimes corrupt government agencies that are allocating land, formulating 
land use regulations or addressing local land conflicts. Faced with such chal-
lenges, land governance has become more complex in recent decades, requir-
ing a thorough analysis and policy recommendations that are based on a 
systematic approach and working at multiple levels. To solve land tenure prob-
lems and strengthen sustainable land management, rules and enforcement 
mechanisms are required at different administrative levels, because only multi-
level or multi-layer governance can adequately meet these challenges.
 Experiences over the past two decades have shown that setting or reform-
ing constitutional norms, such as new land legislation (e.g., in parts of Africa, 
and in Cambodia) is only a first step at the national level to provide for effec-
tive governance.25 Local community-based monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms based on statutory and customary norms have to be equally 
aligned and harmonized with the national level.26 Land governance is at the 
core of all “local to global” endeavours to create favourable conditions for 
sustainable land and resource use, to enable organized change and adapta-
tion to newly emerging challenges, and to allow for comprehensive stake-
holder participation.
23 Urmila Bob, “Land-related conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa”, African Journal on Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 10, No. 2 (October, 2010). 
24  Elisa Wiener Bravo, The Concentration of Land Ownership in Latin America: An Approach 
to Current Problems (Rome, International Land Coalition, 2011). 
25 Land in German Development Cooperation, p. 7. 
26 Ibid.
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 Thus, land governance is fundamental for the effective implementation 
of sustainable alternative development projects.27 Drug crop cultivation 
areas are generally located in remote rural areas, characterized by fragile 
institutions and, in many cases, a post-conflict setting. As various decades 
of implementing alternative development have shown, establishing sustain-
able development and livelihoods for the population living in these areas 
cannot be achieved simply by substituting illicit drug crops with licit income 
opportunities: this must be accompanied by the improvement of overall 
 socioeconomic conditions.28
 Land policies are a fundamental component of political strategies to 
achieve sustainable development. To support alternative development, a 
land policy should first set the objectives to be achieved through the imple-
mentation of the policy framework. The primary objectives are securing 
land rights for all, improving livelihoods and socioeconomic development 
and, in general, the sustainable management of land and related resources 
in order to effectively contribute to sustainable development. While each 
country will have a different emphasis, based on its specific context, there 
are three main superordinate guiding principles necessary for a rational 
land policy: (a) efficiency and promotion of economic development; 
(b) equity and social justice; and (c) accountability through clear respon-
sibilities and transparent processes.29
 Land administration systems provide the infrastructure for implement-
ing land policies and strengthen land governance through regulations and 
technical instruments and tools to document and manage land rights. They 
provide the background information for structural change and transforma-
tion processes. Therefore, the establishment of a comprehensive structure 
for efficient land administration has become a central part of development 
cooperation efforts.30
 Some of the advantages that the systematic establishment of a land 
 register provides for individual owners and the community are:31
• Improved certainty in law with respect to land
• Creation of incentives for investments and for the sustainable use of 
land
• Improved access to credit
27 World Drug Report 2015. 
28 Ibid.
29 W. Zimmermann, “Land policy and land governance issues”, presentation at the regional 
symposium “Towards efficient land management for development and economic growth”, held 
in Kuwait on 4 and 5 December 2013. 
30 Land in German Development Cooperation, pp. 14 and 15. 
31 Ibid.
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• Security and efficiency of property transactions
• Minimization of land conflicts and the costs associated with them 
 Some potential advantages for the Government are: 
• An efficient basis for raising a land tax
• A basis for structural adaptation such as land reform, land  redistribution 
and rehabilitation of urban areas
• Control over land transactions
• An efficient basis for planning (land use planning, effective  procedures 
of land allocation and permission for specific land use)
• An effective management of information in the public administration
 On the other hand, some possible concerns regarding the establishment 
of land administrations systems include: 
• High institutional and financial cost of the establishment of the land 
register and especially its maintenance
• The concern that the establishment of a land register may strongly 
change or manipulate indigenous land tenure
• The concern that the establishment of a land register could mean 
that land ownership becomes individualized, and secondary rights 
will be ignored
• The concern that the land register could soon become out-of-date 
because changes are not recorded for various reasons, including but 
not limited to corruption, inaccessibility of land administration 
 services and high transaction costs
 The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of 
Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security set out 
internationally accepted standards and practices for responsible tenure 
governance. They set forth clear expectations to be fulfilled by Govern-
ments with the purpose of increasing land tenure security, urging States 
to do the following: 
• Recognize and respect all legitimate tenure right holders and their 
rights. They should take reasonable measures to identify, record and 
respect legitimate tenure right holders and their rights, whether 
 formally recorded or not; to refrain from infringement of tenure 
rights of others; and to meet the duties associated with tenure rights.
• Safeguard legitimate tenure rights against threats and infringements. 
They should protect tenure right holders against the arbitrary loss of 
their tenure rights, including forced evictions that are inconsistent 
with their existing obligations under national and international law.
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• Promote and facilitate the enjoyment of legitimate tenure rights. 
They should take active measures to promote and facilitate the full 
realization of tenure rights or the making of transactions with the 
rights, such as ensuring that services are accessible to all.
• Provide access to justice to deal with infringements of legitimate 
tenure rights. They should provide effective and accessible means to 
everyone, through judicial authorities or other approaches, to resolve 
disputes over tenure rights; and to provide affordable and prompt 
enforcement of outcomes. States should provide prompt, just 
 compensation where tenure rights are taken for public purposes.
• Prevent tenure disputes, violent conflicts and corruption. They 
should take active measures to prevent tenure disputes from arising 
and from escalating into violent conflicts. They should endeavour to 
prevent corruption in all forms, at all levels, and in all settings.
The nexus between access to land and drug crop cultivation
Taken together, Afghanistan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colombia, 
Myanmar and Peru comprise the principal countries of illicit coca and 
opium poppy cultivation (see table 1). Afghanistan is by far the world’s larg-
est producer of illicit opium poppy. In that country, illicit cultivation has 
experienced rapid growth since 2004. Moreover, 90 per cent of the total 
illicit cultivation takes place in the country’s southern and western regions.32 
After Afghanistan, Myanmar is the country with the second largest opium 
poppy cultivation. Most of the opium poppy of Myanmar is grown in Shan 
State, with the remainder grown in Kachin State.33 
Worldwide, coca bush cultivation is mainly concentrated in Bolivia (Plurina-
tional State of), Colombia and Peru. In 2014, the area under cultivation in 
Colombia increased. Coca bush is currently grown in 23 of 32 departments.34 
Coca cultivation in Peru decreased in 2014. According to UNODC esti-
mates, in 2014 coca was being grown in 13 regions of Peru, with the VRAEM 
geographical area (Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro) accounting 
for 43.9 per cent.35 The Plurinational State of Bolivia is the third largest 
32 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter  Narcotics, 
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Cultivation and Production (Kabul, December 2016).
33 UNODC, Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2015: Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar 
(Bangkok, 2015). 
34 UNODC and Government of Colombia, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2014 (Bogotá, 
July 2015). 
35 UNODC and Government of Peru, Perú: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2014 (Lima, 
July 2015). 
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 producer of coca, which is mainly cultivated in the Yungas de la Paz and the 
Trópico de Cochabamba.36
Table 1.  Area of cultivation of opium poppy (Afghanistan, Myanmar) and 
coca (Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru), in hectares
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Coca bush 
  Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
30 500 30 900 31 000 27 200 25 300 23 000 20 400 20 200
 Colombia 80 953 73 139 61 812 63 762 47 790 48 189 69 132 96 084
 Peru 56 100 59 900 61 200 62 500 60 400 49 800 42 900 40 300
Opium poppy
 Afghanistan 157 000 123 000 123 000 131 000 154 000 209 000 224 000 183 000
 Myanmar 28 500 31 700 38 100 43 600 52 000 57 800 57 600 55 500
 Source: UNODC crop monitoring. 
Little comparable data exist on access to land for different countries. One 
possible measurement to act as a proxy for accessibility of land is to measure 
the effectiveness of land governance and administration. The World Bank 
Group’s Doing Business project,37 which ranks countries according to the 
ease of doing business in them, includes an indicator on the ease of register-
ing property. One of its measures is the quality of land administration index 
(see table 2), which measures the reliability of infrastructure, transparency 
of information, geographic coverage and capability for land dispute resolu-
tion, based on an analysis of each economy’s largest business city. As such, 
this measure serves as an indicator for the general land administration 
 system. The index shows relatively positive results for Peru and Colombia, 
while Myanmar and Afghanistan are at the lower end of the ranking.
Table 2. Quality of land administration index
Country Registering property rank
Quality of the land 
administration index (0-30)
OECD high-income economies - 22.7
Peru 35 17.0
Colombia 54 16.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 143 7.0
36 UNODC and Plurinational State of Bolivia, Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia: Monitoreo de 
Cultivos de Coca 2014 (La Paz, August 2015). 
37 World Bank, Doing Business project data. Available online at www.doingbusiness.org/ 
 (retrieved on 7 April 2016). 
86 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LXI, 2017
Country Registering property rank
Quality of the land 
administration index (0-30)
Myanmar 145 4.0
Afghanistan 184 3.0
 Source: World Bank data from the Doing Business project.
 However, the functioning of the formal land administration system is 
not a sufficient condition for access to land. Even where formal institutions 
are in place, land is often distributed unequally, especially in rural areas in 
many developing countries: “The regulatory quality in most countries is at 
best achieved at a national, de jure level, transforming rules and regulation 
into viable practice at a local user level is often still missing”.38 The 2011 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) national human devel-
opment report for Colombia, for instance, compares Gini coefficients of 
land concentration, showing high levels of concentration in Colombia (0.85) 
and Peru (0.86).39 Illicit drug crops are mainly concentrated in remote rural 
areas, often characterized by fragile State institutions and a low prevalence 
of the rule of law.40 In most cases, the population in these areas is affected 
not only by poverty but also by landlessness or insecure land rights, even 
when land rights are well acknowledged at the national level. This holds true, 
for example, for some of the most relevant drug crop cultivation regions in 
Colombia. Ten Colombian departments that together account for more than 
95 per cent of all coca cultivation in the country exhibit considerably high 
levels of inequality in land property (see table 3).
Table 3.  Gini coefficient of properties in drug crop cultivation regions of 
Colombia, in 2009
Department
Gini coefficient of 
property, 2009
Coca cultivation (as a percentage of 
total national cultivation level in 2009)
Nariño 0.82 25
Putumayo 0.72 20
Norte de Santander 0.73 10
Caquetá 0.64 9
Cauca 0.84 9
Guaviare 0.56 8
38 Land in German Development Cooperation, p. 24. 
39 United Nations Development Programme, Colombia Rural: Razones para la Esperanza—
Resumen Ejecutivo. Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2011 (Bogotá, 2011). The original 
source of the data is Atlas de la Distribución de la Propiedad Rural en Colombia. 
40 World Drug Report 2015. 
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Meta 0.86 7
Antioquia 0.91 3
Chocó 0.85 3
Bolivar 0.76 2
 Source: Author’s compilation based on data from UNODC crop monitoring (Colombia: Coca 
 Cultivation Survey 2014) and the 2011 UNDP human development report for Colombia (Colombia Rural: 
Razones para la Esperanza). A similar table can be found in a joint publication from UNODC and the 
Government of Colombia (“Estructura económica de las unidades productoras agropecuarias en zonas 
de influencia de cultivos de coca”).
 Land is an important production factor in drug crop cultivation areas.41 
In areas where arable land is scarce, people often rely on the illicit cultivation 
of drug crops such as coca bush or opium poppy, serving as cash crops. In 
transitioning to viable alternative income activities, they face challenges such 
as limited market access for licit products due to a lack of roads and infra-
structure, information, and knowledge and capacities needed to effectively 
market alternative produce.42
 Especially in drug crop cultivation areas affected by conflict, land can 
play an important role for the livelihoods of farmers and to a large extent 
determines their vulnerability. A study on conflict processing in the prov-
inces of Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar in Afghanistan describes a preva-
lent risk scenario: “The dependency and vulnerability of farmers with little 
or no land has increased with the extent of the opium poppy economy. 
 Conflict-prone coping strategies applied to outside shocks (eradication, crop 
failure, price fluctuation) become more widespread as a result of  dependency 
and vulnerability.”43
 Secure access to land can influence decisions on the type of crops that 
farmers cultivate. The income of farmers cultivating coca or opium poppy is 
not necessarily higher than the income of other farmers. The Southeast Asia 
Opium Survey 2015, for example, indicates that opium-producing households 
in Shan State of Myanmar had a higher household income than non-opium-
producing households in 2014 but a lower household income in 2015. In this 
regard, prices are a key factor.44 Often the returns per land unit of opium 
41 “Estructura económica de las unidades productoras agropecuarias en zonas de influencia 
de cultivos de coca”.
42 Noam Lupu, “Towards a new articulation of alternative development: lessons from coca 
supply reduction in Bolivia”, Development Policy Review, vol. 22, No. 4 (2004), pp. 405-421. This 
is also substantiated in a very broad range of literature on alternative development and confirmed 
for instance by different socioeconomic analyses of UNODC, inter alia, the Afghanistan Opium 
Survey 2015.
43 Jan Koehler, “Conflict processing and the opium economy in Afghanistan”, PAL Internal 
Document No. 5. (Jalalabad, Afghanistan, Project for Alternative Livelihoods (PAL), June 2005). 
44 Jean Friedmann-Rudovsky, “Bolivian buzz: coca farmers switch to coffee beans”, Time, 
29  February 2012, available at: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2107750,00.
html
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poppy or coca cultivation are higher than for other crops, especially where 
technical knowledge for the cultivation of other cash crops is lacking.45 There-
fore, where legal alternatives on small land plots are not sufficient to provide 
a livelihood, many farmers grow drug crops. What is more, the transition to 
licit crops that have the potential to provide a livelihood not only requires 
financial resources and sufficient land but also a certain transition period. 
While coca leaf can be harvested up to three or even four times a year, coffee, 
for instance, needs several years before it produces the first fruit. Insecurity 
over land rights, limited access to lands or the risk of recurrent conflicts 
therefore often means that farmers refrain from investing in this kind of long-
term licit activities.46 In the context of Afghanistan, Goodhand finds that 
“farmers grow poppy firstly because of its comparative advantages and multi-
functional role in relation to other crops and secondly because it provides 
access to land and credit” and that “poppy in many places has become the 
main way of gaining access to land or to seasonal employment.”47
How lack of access to land is interlinked with the cultivation of illicit 
drug crops
Systematic crop monitoring by UNODC in several drug crop-producing 
countries has provided ample evidence of the relevance of land issues to 
drug crop cultivation.48 This is further documented by several studies and 
evaluation reports on alternative development projects.49 While there are dif-
ferent factors contributing to drug crop cultivation, areas of cultivation are 
typically characterized by poverty and inhabitants often suffer from lack of 
access to land.50 In Afghanistan, for instance, in many areas there is a close 
connection between the cultivation of opium poppy and rural poverty,51 with 
the latter being determined, inter alia, by landlessness and insecure land 
45 Simeon Tegel, “Coca: the plant that feeds Peru”, Independent, 18 October 2013, available 
at www.independent.co.uk. 
46 “Estructura económica de las unidades productoras agropecuarias en zonas de influencia 
de cultivos de coca”, p. 59. 
47 Johnathan Goodhand, “Frontiers and wars: the opium economy in Afghanistan”, Journal 
of Agrarian Change, vol. 5, No. 2 (April 2005), pp. 191-216. 
48 Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2012; Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2015; and “Estructura 
económica de las unidades productoras agropecuarias en zonas de influencia de cultivos de coca”. 
49 For instance, see Mansfield, Diversity and Dilemma: Understanding Rural Livelihoods and 
Addressing the Causes of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Nangarhar and Laghman, Eastern Afghanistan; 
ibid., “Responding to the challenge of diversity in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan”, in 
Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics 
Policy, Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd, eds. (UNODC and World Bank, 2006). 
50 UNDP, Addressing the Development Dimensions of Drug Policy (New York, 2015); Mansfield, 
“Alternative development: the modern thrust of supply-side policy”, p.26 
51 Goodhand, “Frontiers and wars: the opium economy in Afghanistan”. 
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rights.52 In addition to this, land prices, rent levels and borrowing costs are 
increasingly dependent on opium poppy production.53 Research conducted 
in Nangarhar Province has shown that the cultivation of opium poppy is 
spurred not only by factors such as high population density and the limited 
opportunities for income generation outside the agricultural sector, but also 
by the lack of access to irrigated land.54
 In several areas in Afghanistan where opium poppy is grown, accessible 
land parcels are too small for a family to secure a legal income.55 With its 
high per-hectare yields, opium poppy cultivation is the only option for many 
families with few resources—including land resources—to make a living 
from agriculture. Isolated households without access to resources have little 
prospects of achieving alternative livelihoods.56 In 2012, 20 per cent of those 
interviewed for the UNODC Afghanistan opium survey named the high 
income that it is possible to generate on a small plot of land as their main 
reason for cultivating opium poppy in the 2011/12 growing season.57 By the 
time of the 2014 Afghanistan opium survey, that was the fourth most 
 frequent answer, given by 8 per cent of the farmers.58
 The situation in Myanmar is similar. According to the Southeast Asia 
Opium Survey 2012, the lack of access to land was one of the main reasons 
for the continued growing of opium poppy in the country. While villages 
with opium cultivation and those without have many commonalities, there is 
a major difference between them with regard to the availability of land for 
the production of food. In villages without opium poppy fields, households 
had access to larger land plots, which were also better irrigated. Households 
had access to an average of 1.2 hectares more land (corresponding to 62 per 
cent more land than had households in areas where opium poppy was 
grown). Households with limited access to land, meanwhile, were growing 
opium poppy in order to purchase food with the proceeds from their sales.
 The Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2015 shows that in 2014, only 38 per 
cent of households in poppy-growing villages owned permanent paddy land, 
52 Benjamin Schaffner, Opiumwirtschaft und “hawala” in Afghanistan: Struktur, Einbettung und 
Entwicklungsfaktoren (Norderstedt, Germany, GRIN Verlag, 2006).
53 Goodhand, “Frontiers and wars: the opium economy in Afghanistan”. 
54 Mansfield, “Responding to the challenge of diversity in opium poppy cultivation in 
 Afghanistan”, p. 62. 
55 Alec McEwen and Brendan Witty, “Water management, livestock and the opium economy: 
land tenure”, Case Study Series (Kabul, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2006); David 
Mansfield, A State Built on Sand: How Opium Undermined Afghanistan (New York, Oxford Press 
University, 2016), p. 201. 
56 “Water management, livestock and the opium economy: land tenure”.
57 UNODC and Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2012 
(Kabul, May 2013).
58 Ibid., Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production (Kabul, December 2014). 
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compared with 56 per cent of the households in non-poppy-growing vil-
lages. For 2015, these figures converged, with 48 per cent of the households 
owning paddy land in poppy-growing-villages and 53 per cent in non-poppy-
growing villages. The report infers that poppy-growing households tend to 
invest their earnings in livestock and land.59 
 For Colombia, a 2010 UNODC study on the economic structure in four 
of its main drug crop-producing departments found that a large share of the 
rural population did not have formal land titles.60 In those regions, 46 per 
cent of households cultivated land without land titles. From that share, the 
household income of those households involved in the cultivation of illicit 
crops was greater than those of households without illicit crop cultivation. 
The study attributes the occupation of land without titles mainly to the tra-
dition of informality among small holders and the lack of access to formali-
zation procedures.61 Eradication further contributed to the cultivation of 
coca on parcels that were difficult to access and far from the farmers’ homes. 
Especially in Meta-Guaviare, farmers were found to cultivate illicit crops in 
isolated areas, which led to increased deforestation.62 A crucial observation 
of this study is that only 7 per cent of the households had formal access to 
credit. While 8 per cent of the households without coca cultivation could 
access credits, only 4 per cent of the coca-producing households were able 
to do so. Credits are often conditional on having land property as collateral 
for the issuing credit agency. That limits the potential investment that house-
holds without formal access to land can make in either agricultural produc-
tion or the purchase of further land.63
Gender aspects
Lack of access to land often affects women disproportionately in drug crop 
cultivation areas (as well as elsewhere).64 This has important implications 
where access to land determines the ability of small farmers to transition to 
59 Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2015. 
60 In Meta-Guaviare, Putumayo-Caquetá and Orinoquía 50 per cent, 48 per cent and 79 per 
cent of the households, respectively, did not have formal land titles. In Pacífico, 32 per cent of 
the households did not have officially registered land, while most of the population who had 
access to land benefited from communal land titles.
61 “Estructura económica de las unidades productoras agropecuarias en zonas de influencia 
de cultivos de coca”. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid.
64 “Gender and alternative development: experiences gained with participatory project work 
in the coca-cultivating areas of Peru” (Eschborn, Germany, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit, 2000). 
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licit livelihoods.65 A survey of a land titling programme in the Trópico de 
Cochabamba in 2006, for example, found that 47 per cent of land titles were 
held by men, 35 per cent were held by both a man and a woman, and only 
13 per cent were hold exclusively by women.66 Often women can access legal 
land titles only through their husbands or male relatives. This impedes their 
access to formal credit systems and sometimes also to programmes for alter-
native development. Thus, women’s decision-making power and possibilities 
to invest are often severely restricted, and it may even be impossible for them 
to have access to land.67 
 While women, due to prevailing gender roles in many drug crop cultiva-
tion areas, often have less access to land, they tend to have a more integral 
understanding of securing a livelihood with a longer-term perspective.68 
The responsibility for supplying food can motivate households to diversify 
agricultural production and to grow food crops rather than illicit drug 
crops. Engaging women can therefore be particularly conducive to the sus-
tainability of alternative development because in many cases they have 
shown to be more reluctant than men to curtail subsistence production in 
favour of coca).69 
 In Afghanistan, for instance, the few land titles that have been formally 
issued are almost exclusively held by men.70 According to the constitution, 
women have a right to own land. But in reality, women often sign over their 
land rights to the men in their families. It is estimated that fewer than 2 per 
cent of Afghan women own land.71 A study on the role of women in opium 
poppy cultivation found that only 3 of 157 women interviewed in several 
northern and eastern Afghan provinces responded that they were involved in 
making decisions to select the crops their household would cultivate. Those 
three women reporting being involved were widows, employing either a 
sharecropper to cultivate the land or taking decisions in conjunction with a 
son.72 Widows or single women often have access to neither land nor 
65 Lupu, “Towards a new articulation of alternative development: lessons from coca supply 
reduction in Bolivia”. 
66 USAID/Plurinational State of Bolivia, “Generación de información cuantitativa: encuesta 
de medio término—proyecto de titulación de tierras en Bolivia—trópico de Cochabamba” 
 (Cochabamba, 2006). Available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadq036.pdf. 
67 “Gender and alternative development”. 
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 USAID, “USAID country profile: property rights and resource governance–Afghanistan” 
(2010). Available at www.land-links.org. 
71 Ibid.
72 United Nations International Drug Control Programme, “The role of women in opium 
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan”, Strategic Study No. 6. (Islamabad, 2000); National Congress 
of Bolivia, Law No. 1008, on the regime applicable to coca and controlled substances, of 
19  July, 1988.
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 financing, which excludes them from some of the most important resources 
for securing their livelihood in rural areas.73 
 While more research is needed on gender roles in drug crop cultivation, 
the UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015 already offers some important 
insights regarding the diversity of women’s perspectives on opium poppy 
cultivation.74 Women have great potential to generate more licit income. The 
survey states that “it is obvious that additional cash income from the labour 
of women can reduce the economic pressure to cultivate poppy”. This also 
depends on women’s access to arable land. For example, the survey high-
lights cases in which women were not able to cultivate land because they 
were not allowed to access land far from their home. Furthermore, the sur-
vey found that “[a] stronger inclusion of women into the work force and the 
provision of income-generating opportunities for women can reduce the 
dependency of households on illicit crop cultivation and empower women to 
play a stronger role in the decision-making processes of households”. While 
there is still no clear-cut picture of women’s decision-making power over 
land use and in the selection of crops,75 the question of how improved access 
to land for women can contribute to sustainable livelihoods in drug crop 
cultivation areas needs to be addressed.
Fragile institutions
The following examples show that drug crop cultivation is frequently related to 
fragile institutions (e.g., property insecurity and legal ambiguity over land 
access), as well as to issues such as migration or security related to land issues. 
For example, migration to drug crop cultivation areas can be triggered by the 
degradation of soils, as for instance in the Yungas de la Paz region in the Pluri-
national State of Bolivia.76 Such migration might also be caused by conflicts 
related to land or lack of access to land, for instance, when land is illegally appro-
priated by armed groups who, in some cases such as in Colombia, finance them-
selves through trafficking in drugs and even fight over control of drug trafficking.77 
In addition, migration can also cause environmental degradation, pushing the 
frontier of agricultural land further into new areas where, once again, people do 
not have legal access to land. In many cases where farmers cultivate illicit drug 
73 “Gender and alternative development”.
74 UNODC and Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: 
Socio-economic Analysis (Kabul, March 2016). 
75 Ibid.
76 Ana B. Villamil Soler, “Informe de consultoría: descripción y análisis de la situación actual 
del sector de desarrollo integral con coca en Bolivia y el rol del FONADAL en este sector”, 
(La Paz, 2011). 
77 John Otis, “The FARC and Colombia’s illegal drug trade”, 15 December 2014. Available 
at www.wilsoncenter.org/. 
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crops, Governments apply forced eradication strategies.78 This can also lead to 
farmers abandoning their fields and the shifting of illicit cultivation to new grow-
ing areas. The following examples will highlight some of these mechanisms.
 In the past, government coca eradication activities in Andean countries 
have pushed coca farmers deeper into the Amazon, where due to a lack of 
economic alternatives, forest areas were first cleared and then planted with 
new coca cultivation.79 In Peru, for instance, coca cultivation is mainly spread 
on the eastern slopes of the Andes and the Amazon lowlands. In the 1970s and 
1980s, migration flows from the Andes into those forest areas were sparked by 
the agrarian reform law of 1969.80 This migration was subsequently further 
fuelled by the eradication of coca fields in the 1970s and 1980s.81 
 The agricultural reforms led to a number of large-scale landholders to 
give up their haciendas (large plantation holdings).82 Before the land reform, 
some of the large-scale landholders had been growing coca for traditional 
use in limited quantities, licensed by the State company ENACO. When 
those holdings of land were redistributed to the field workers over the course 
of the land reform, some of these workers began to grow coca themselves, for 
sale on the black market, benefiting from the skills they had learned while 
working on the haciendas. The increase in illicit coca cultivation in the 
sparsely populated forest areas of the Amazon basin and the eastern slopes 
of the Andes led to the migration of many Peruvians from the highlands 
looking for work. The high rates of return for coca production further con-
tributed to the increasing displacement of other crops such as corn or coffee, 
while the uncontrolled settlement process led to a dispersion of the illicit 
cultivation of coca.83
 In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, access to land and migration are 
also linked to coca cultivation. In some parts of the Yungas de la Paz region, 
cultivation in the “traditional zone”84 is legal to a certain extent.85 While 
coca cultivation is prohibited in most other parts of the country, in the 
78 “Estructura económica de las unidades productoras agropecuarias en zonas de influencia 
de cultivos de coca”. 
79 Martin Jelsma and Ricardo Vargas, “Drug crops and peace process in Colombia: a proposal 
for peace”, 1 June 2000. Available at www.tni.org. 
80 Fernando Eguren, eds., Reforma agraria y desarrollo rural en la región andina (Lima, Centro 
Peruano de Estudios Sociales, 2006). 
81 Ernesto M. Parra, “Alternative development in Peru: thirty years of success and unsuccess”, 
Perspectivas Rurales. Nueva época, No. 23 (2014), pp. 85-104; World Drug Report 2016 (United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.16.XI.7). 
82 Peru, Nueva reforma agraria: Decreto-Ley No. 17716 (1969). 
83 Information based on anecdotal insights from discussion with an alternative development 
expert from Peru.
84 The traditional zone comprises the municipalities Coroico, Coripata, Chulumani, Cajuata, 
Irupana, Yanacachi, and parts of La Asunta and Apolo.
85 Law No. 1008 of 19 July 1988.
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 “transitional excess production zone” coca cultivation is subject to reduc-
tion strategies under the framework of “rationalization and eradication.”86 
In these areas, coca cultivation is defined as “the result of a process of 
spontaneous or directed settlement, by which the expansion of excess cul-
tivation accompanying the growth of demand for illicit uses was 
supported”.87 In this context, dispersion of coca crops can be a conse-
quence of a lack of access to arable land in the traditional cultivation zone, 
for instance due to degradation of soils by excessive coca cultivation.88 In 
some parts of this area, households have divided their lands in order to 
provide a livelihood for their children when they start their own families. 
This has resulted in land fragmentation and consequently forces families 
to make a living from small properties. Research on alternative develop-
ment projects in the municipality of La Asunta in the Yungas de La Paz has 
shown that many people then migrated to areas that were still fertile in 
order to engage in coca cultivation.89 
 In Colombia, the concentration of land ownership and the displacement 
of farmers by the armed conflict have forced many among the rural popula-
tion to settle elsewhere.90 According to the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, in Colombia the number of internally 
displaced persons was 5.7 million in 2014.91 Depending on the estimate 
used, these people have been displaced from at least 4 million92 up to 6.6 mil-
lion hectares of land.93 About 80 per cent of those displaced by violence 
come from rural areas.94 People within the country have fled, inter alia, from 
violence and conflicts involving insurgent or paramilitary groups. These 
groups often intend to gain control over trafficking routes for coca or its 
derivative products for the drug market, as well as lands and plantations, in 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid.
88 Villamil, “Informe de consultoría: descripción y análisis de la situación actual del sector 
de desarrollo integral con coca en Bolivia”. 
89 Information from several project evaluation reports on the project BOLI79 (Sustainable 
and integrated management of the natural resources in the Tropics of Cochabamba and the 
Yungas of La Paz)”, conducted by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit in 
2011, 2013 and 2015. 
90 Amira Armenta, “The illicit drugs market in the Colombian agrarian context: why the issue 
of illicit cultivation is highly relevant to the peace process”, Drug Policy Briefing Nr. 40  (Amsterdam, 
Transnational Institute, 2013). 
91 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR country opera-
tions profile: Colombia 2015”. Available at www.unhcr.org.
92 USAID, “USAID country profile: property rights and resource governance–Colombia” 
(2010). 
93 ABColombia, “Colombia: the current panorama–victims and land restitution law 1448”, 
29 May 2012. Available at www.abcolombia.org.uk. 
94 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Country opera-
tions profile: Colombia 2015”.
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order to finance their operations.95 This form of land-grabbing has led to the 
further concentration of land ownership, especially in rural areas.96 In 
Colombia, both the land and drug issues are intrinsically linked to the peace 
process and part of the peace agreement between the Colombian Govern-
ment and the FARC. One initiative of the Government therefore aims at the 
formalization of land rights for small-scale farmers in order to provide incen-
tives to abandon coca cultivation.97
 Labour-intensive drug crop cultivation can attract migration as people 
look for work in the coca or opium poppy economy. This pull factor is even 
stronger where migrants have no access or only restricted access to land. 
After an initial engagement as day and seasonal workers, many move on to 
marginal areas looking for new agricultural land. In Afghanistan, for instance, 
seasonal migrants move from areas where no opium poppies are grown to 
areas where the illicit opium industry creates a demand for labour. Members 
of households with little or no access to land have in some cases migrated to 
other provinces when the landowners in their home provinces abandoned 
poppy cultivation.98 The increase in opium poppy cultivation in Balkh Prov-
ince during the 2004/05 growing season, for example, can partially be traced 
back to newly arrived families that had come to Balkh searching for access 
to land and income-generating opportunities, because opium production in 
their home province Nangarhar had markedly fallen.99
 In some regions of Afghanistan, access to land and credit for many of 
the landless population is controlled by informal power-holders via the 
opium value chain. In those areas, for many, access to land can be gained 
only through relationships known as sharecropping, by which the land-
owner, or whoever controls the land, makes the land available to the share-
croppers along with part of the necessary agricultural inputs. In return, the 
sharecroppers receive a share of the harvest. Many sharecroppers sell their 
harvest, or part of it, in advance, at prices that are generally far below the 
market value, in order to buy the necessary production inputs. In some 
cases, it is not landless individuals entering into these sharecropping 
95 Alvaro Bello, “Displaced coca cultivation”, in ITPCM International Commentary: Colombia—
Land and Human Issues, vol. VIII, No. 31 (December 2012), pp. 17-21. 
96 Nazih Richani, “Forced displacement, concentration of land property, and the rentier politi-
cal economy in Colombia”, Journal of International Affairs, 20 April 2015 (online articles). 
 Available at https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/forced-displacement-concentration-land-
property-and-rentier-political-economy; Thoumi, “Debates y paradigmas de las políticas de drogas 
en el mundo y los desafíos para Colombia”, pp. 436ff.
97 Ross Eventon, “Colombia: drugs and the peace agreement”, GDPO Situation Analysis 
(Swansea, United Kingdom, Global Drug Policy Observatory, Swansea University, 2016). 
 Available at www.swansea.ac.uk. 
98 Mansfield, “Responding to the challenge of diversity in opium poppy cultivation in 
 Afghanistan”, p. 104.
99 Ibid.
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 relationships, but landowners, who thereby gain access to additional land. 
The decision as to what to grow on the land is generally made by the lessor 
with the agreement of the sharecropper. Sharecroppers who are willing to 
grow opium poppy are usually given preference when it comes to the alloca-
tion of parcels of land.100
 In Afghanistan, whether or not opium poppy farmers are sharecroppers 
has an impact on the level of the income they derive from opium cultivation. 
Many sharecroppers receive only a small part of the opium harvest, which 
they sell at relatively low prices before the harvest.101 These advances can be 
used to purchase the agricultural inputs needed for opium production but 
also to cover their living costs. The income they receive from the opium 
 harvest is often used to meet the family’s basic needs.102 Landowners, on the 
other hand, who lease their fields to sharecroppers, receive approximately 
two thirds of the harvest and therefore a much higher income. In addition, 
landowners are generally able to store the harvest for a certain period of time 
and sell it after the harvest period, for example, when market prices rebound. 
The sharecroppers, who enter into poor contractual terms, often do not have 
any capital or alternative sources of income.103
 A typology of dependency on opium poppy cultivation in Nangarhar, 
Afghanistan, shows that sharecroppers were highly dependent on the crop, 
while other tenants were less dependent, and landlords were not dependent 
at all.104 In terms of the extent of land cultivated in the summer and winter, 
farmers with small holdings (i.e., less than 7.5 jerib)105 were most dependent 
on opium cultivation, those with between 7.5 and 15 jerib of available land 
were less dependent, and those who cultivated over 15 jerib (3 hectares) of 
land were not dependent on opium poppy cultivation.106
 Large-scale investments in drug crop cultivation areas could have a  critical 
impact on the access to land of small-holder farmers where land rights are 
not secured, as these initiatives are mostly based on financial incentives for 
large agribusiness rather than on financial support for national and local 
100 Camilla I. M. Anderson, “Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?”, American  Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, vol. 95, No. 4 (2013), pp. 917-931. 
101 Mansfield, “Responding to the challenge of diversity in opium poppy cultivation in 
Afghanistan”. 
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid. 
104 David Mansfield, “Pariah or poverty? The opium ban in the province of Nangarhar in the 
2004/05 growing season and its impact on rural livelihood strategies”, PAL Internal Document 
No. 11 (Jalalabad, Afghanistan, PAL Management Unit, June 2005). 
105 An Afghani jerib corresponds to about 0.2 hectares.
106 Mansfield, “Pariah or poverty?...”. 
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public entities.107 This aspect needs further consideration, for instance, in the 
context of opium poppy cultivation in South-East Asia in the case of large-
scale substitution programmes for opium poppy, where mainly private sec-
tor investments in rubber are implemented as an alternative to the production 
of illicit drug crops.108 The impact of increased investment on small-scale 
farmers’ livelihoods, among other places, in Myanmar’s regions bordering 
China, which is the main drug crop cultivation area in Myanmar, still needs 
to be determined.109 In this regard, land governance plays a crucial role.
 During its more than 60 years of internal conflict, Myanmar did not 
have a codified set of land laws. In March 2012, two new laws were passed: 
the Farmland Law and the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management 
Law. The Farmland Law sets forth that land can be exchanged on a market 
of individual land use certificates. The Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands 
Management Law provides the Government with the authority to allocate 
the lands of individual farmers and communities to national and interna-
tional investors. This includes fields used for shifting cultivation in the high-
lands, and fields in the lowlands for which farmers do not hold any title. In 
the highlands, particularly, most farmers practice shifting cultivation, 
although only a few hold formal land titles for that purpose. Traditional and 
communal resource law is dominant in those areas.110 In 2016, a new 
National Land Use Policy was approved to harmonize existing land laws.111 
While research on the impact of the new laws is still lacking, the implemen-
tation of those laws will have important implications for small-scale farmers 
and the impact of investment in rural areas on customary land tenure and 
food security.112
Land governance in the context of alternative development
Households with secure access to agricultural means of production, espe-
cially land, access to legal sales markets, and additional non-agricultural 
107 Juliet Lu, “Tapping into the rubber market: opium replacement and the role of rubber in 
developing Laos”, BICAS Working Paper, No. 10 (Amsterdam, Transnational Institute, May 
2015). Also cf. Paul T. Cohen, “The post-opium scenario and rubber in northern Laos: alterna-
tive Western and Chinese models of development”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 20, 
No. 5 (2009), pp. 424-430. 
108 Tom Kramer and Kevin Woods, “Financing dispossession: China’s opium substitution 
programme in northern Burma”, 20 February 2012. Available at www.tni.org. 
109 Tom Kramer, “The current state of counternarcotics policy and drug reform debates in 
Myanmar” (April 2015). Available at www.brookings.edu. 
110 Transnational Institute, “Access denied: land rights and ethnic conflict in Burma”, Burma 
Policy Briefing, No. 11, 8 May 2013. Available at www.tni.org. 
111 Stephen Mccarthy, “Land tenure security and policy tensions in Myanmar (Burma)”, Asia 
Pacific Issues, No. 127 (Honolulu, East-West Center, October 2016). 
112 Roy Prosterman and Darryl Vhughen, “Land to the tillers of Myanmar”, New York Times, 
13 June 2012. 
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sources of income seem to have the best chance of managing the transition to 
legal livelihoods. In that regard, access to land is a valuable asset for farmers 
for a transition to licit crops and therefore a crucial aspect for alternative 
development. A study on the impact of the opium ban in the Afghan province 
Nangarhar, for instance, shows the effects of the sudden loss of income from 
opium cultivation.113 While farmers with more land were able to draw on their 
already existing licit cultivation, the farmers who were most dependent on 
opium poppy were less able to maintain their livelihoods by shifting to wheat 
cultivation. On the contrary, the coping strategies applied by poorer farmers 
with less access to land rather increase the risk of not being able to abandon 
illicit cultivation in the long term. Some of the negative consequences have 
been the inability to access new loans or pay off debts, severe food shortage 
and the inability to provide for the education of their children.114 Regarding 
the Forest Ranger family programme in Colombia, UNODC states that “the 
promotion of access to rural property forms a fundamental part of the 
 alternative development programmes, as the rooting of the land contributes 
to the farmers remaining removed from illicit crop cultivation and enables 
them to develop productive projects in the long term”.115
 Some alternative development projects, therefore, have relied on land 
registry and titling as a strategic component of strengthening licit agriculture. 
While there are several examples where land titling has been successfully 
integrated into alternative development,116 the cases of Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) and Peru are given, drawing on the insights of  German and  European 
Union development cooperation projects.
 In some alternative development projects in Peru, legal uncertainty regard-
ing land ownership and land use often prevails due to the migratory nature of 
the target population, as for instance in the case of a project in the areas of the 
Alto Huallaga and Ucayalí where only 18 per cent of the target population were 
born in the projects’ districts, while 30 per cent came from other districts in the 
same region and 52 per cent originated in other regions of the country.117 
 Generally, this migratory nature of the population poses obstacles for mid- and 
long-term investments, such as those necessary for growing coffee and cocoa, 
which requires several years before beginning to bear fruit. A project financed 
113 Mansfield, “Pariah or poverty?...”. 
114 Ibid.
115 UNODC and Colombia, Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2013 (Bogotá, June 2014), 
p. 81. 
116 Gerd Addicks, Katharina Hübner-Schmid and Hugo Cabieses, “Estudio de la intervención 
de la Unión Europea en la política sectorial de desarrollo integral y de coca en Bolivia (1998-
2010)” (Eschborn, Germany, German Agency for Technical Cooperation, 2010). 
117 Reports of 2012, 2014 and 2016 by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusam-
menarbeit (GIZ) on UNODC project PER/U87, “Sustainable agricultural development to reduce 
poverty through environmentally sustainable approaches and gender empowerment”, implemented 
in Alto Huallaga (Huánuco region) and Aguaytia (Ucayalí region), Peru.
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within the context of debt conversion agreements with Germany has therefore 
promoted land titling as a prerequisite for sustainable rural development in 
areas where drug crops are grown. In the San Martín region, between 2002 to 
2007, the “Programme for alternative development: Tocache-Uchiza I” (PRO-
DATU I) supported the formalization of around 12,000 property titles, bene-
fiting about 15,000 households, accounting for 87 per cent of the province’s 
families and increasing the value of the lots.118 Furthermore, the project has 
supported the regional and local governments of Tocache in participatory land 
use planning, the promotion of sustainable land use, orderly settlement and 
well-informed decision-making by social, economic and political actors. Using 
all available sources (including a cadastre) and in consultation with a wide 
range of actors, including present and former coca growers, civil society groups, 
political actors and representatives of the private sector, a land use plan was 
developed for the province, defining specific zones for the cultivation of various 
alternative crops and forestry products.119
 Overall, social and economic indicators for San Martín have improved, 
and coca cultivation has almost completely disappeared in the region. 
 Nevertheless, the transition to legal sources of income has been a rather 
 difficult process for many farmers.120 While the land registration programme 
is acknowledged to be one of the main incentives for smallholder farmers to 
switch to alternative crops, the parcels of land in the region were often too 
small to ensure enough income for farmers growing coffee or cacao in the 
short term.121 Most of the coca fields ranged from just 0.25 to 3 hectares, 
while only a few farmers owned fields covering up to 7 hectares.122 This 
aspect of the situation shows that not only formalization of land titles but 
also access to arable land has important implications.
 A key factor for successful implementation of land registry and formali-
zation in local projects is the integration into national or regional processes. 
While in the past only a few farmers in the remote coca cultivation areas 
were able to receive ownership titles through the national land registration 
programme, the “Special land titling and cadastre project” (PETT), today, 
land titling is a fundamental pillar of the Government’s alternative develop-
ment strategy. In this context, it was anticipated that between 2014 and 
118 Gerhard Redecker, “Experiencias del KfW Entwicklungsbank (Banco Alemán de Desarrollo) 
con los proyectos de inversión pública financiados en el Perú”, presentation at the Encuentro de 
los Sistemas Nacionales de Inversión Pública de América Latina y Caribe, Lima, 16 October 2009. 
119 Instituto de Investigaciones de la Amazonía Peruana, “Tocache: hacia el desarrollo sos-
tenible—zonificación ecológica y económica” (Tocache, PRODATU, 2006). 
120 Hugo Cabieses, “El ‘milagro de San Martín’ y los síndrome del ‘desarrollo alternativo’ en 
el Perú”, informe sobre políticas de drogas No. 34, 22 November 2010. Available at www.tni.org.
121 Mirella van Dun, Hugo Cabieses and Pien Metaal, “Between reality and abstraction: guid-
ing principles and developing alternatives for illicit crop producing regions in Peru”, Drug Policy 
Briefing, Nr. 39 (Amsterdam, Transnational Institute, January 2013). 
122 Ibid. 
100 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LXI, 2017
2016, 51,000 land titles were to be delivered to farmers participating in 
alternative development projects of the Peruvian National Commission for 
Development and Life without Drugs (DEVIDA). About 17,000 land titles 
had already been issued between 2011 and 2013.123
 The correlation between formalization of land rights in rural areas 
through PETT and the development of agricultural investments was the sub-
ject of a study conducted for a conference of the World Bank Group on land 
policy challenges.124 According to the study, there is a significant correlation 
between assuring land titles and people’s readiness to invest in the land. This 
correlation is particularly evident for parcels of land that were characterized 
by insecure land rights prior to the registration process. In most cases, the 
observed increase in agricultural investment, however, can only be traced 
back to the greater readiness of landowners to invest, and not to their 
improved access to credit. Greater access to formal loans, however, was 
observed, in particular among wealthy farmers who already had  comparatively 
secure land rights prior to the registration of their land.125 
 On the other hand, another study showed that land registration in Peru 
created better access to loans in particular for those who would have prob-
ably seen their loan applications denied in the absence of a land title, or 
who would not have tried to secure a loan in the first place due to the lack 
of a land title.126 It was observed that within this group there was an increase 
in income (including per hectare income and non-agricultural income) and 
an increase in investment in permanent crops.127 Both studies were in agree-
ment that secure land rights in Peru have had a positive impact on agricul-
tural investment.128
 Similarly, in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, land reform has had an 
important impact on alternative development.129 The 2006 renovation of a 
1996 land reform law provided the foundation for more equal access to 
lands and improved gender equality. By March 2016, 165,000 land titles 
had been issued in the department of La Paz and 265,000 in the department 
123 DEVIDA, Compendio Normativo sobre Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas y Desarrollo Alternativo 
(Lima, 2016). 
124 Ricardo Fort, “Assessing the impact of rural land titling in Peru: the case of the PETT 
program” (Lima, Group of Analysis for Development-GRADE, 2008). 
125 Ibid.
126 Eduardo Zegarra, Javier Escobal and Ursula Aldana, “Titling, credit constraints and rental 
markets in rural Peru: exploring channels and conditioned impacts”, (Washington D.C., Inter-
American Development Bank, 2008). 
127 Ibid.
128 On the impacts of land registration in Peru, also compare with the information of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (www.minagri.gob.pe/portal). 
129 The Programme to Support Community Coca Leaf Control (PACS). Further information 
available at www.controlsocial.bo. 
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of Cochabamba, the two departments where the country’s coca-cultivation 
areas are located.130 
 In recent years, the Plurinational State of Bolivia has successfully 
reduced the area under coca cultivation while maintaining low levels of 
social conflict related to the reduction measures. Regarding the success of 
its alternative development programmes for that country, the European 
Commission has found that social inclusion, in terms of access to basic 
public services and land titling, is strategically relevant.131 Within that devel-
opment cooperation, it is considered that the Programme to Support 
 Community Coca Leaf Control (PACS) has substantially contributed to 
the stabilization of coca cultivation in the Trópico de Cochabamba.132 In the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, a turnaround was accomplished in 2010, 
when the area under cultivation started to decline steadily, continuing to 
decrease until 2015.133 Since 2006, the country’s drug policy has focused 
on economic development and, among other things, specifically on land 
registry and titling as a fundamental pillar of its strategy to reduce coca 
cultivation.134 As described in greater detail in the article authored by 
Grisaffi, Farthing and Ledebur in this issue of the Bulletin on Narcotics, this 
is combined with participation of coca farmers’ federations to ensure the 
adherence of communities to the cato agreement, which permits farmers in 
the Chapare and Yungas de la Paz regions to grow coca on 0.16 hectares 
and 0.25 hectares of land, respectively, for traditional purposes. The policy 
involves biometric registration of the coca farmers and the promotion of 
land titling in the course of the national registration process and the con-
solidation of land laws in the La Paz and Cochabamba coca production 
areas. This allows for satellite surveillance of coca plots, and the registration 
of parcels with the coca grower federations.135
 Various international cooperation projects have supported the registra-
tion of coca production areas in the Plurinational State of Bolivia within 
alternative development initiatives. The European Union first set out on this 
new path of alternative development with the programme to support the 
alternative development strategy in the Chapare (PRAEDAC), implemented 
between 1998 and 2006, and based on strengthening local institutions and 
130 National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA). Further information available at www.
inra.gob.bo. 
131 “Estudio de la intervención de la Unión Europea en la política sectorial de desarrollo 
integral y de coca en Bolivia (1998-2010)”. 
132 Ibid.
133 Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia: Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2014. 
134 Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, “Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Integral con Coca 2006-
2010” (La Paz, 2006). 
135 Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl, “Supply-side harm reduction strategies: Bolivia’s 
 experiment with social control”, International Journal of Drug Policy, vol. 23, No. 6 (2012), 
pp.  488-494. 
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promoting secure land rights.136 With the project’s assistance, 11,600 fami-
lies received land titles.137 The European Union-financed PACS programme, 
implemented between 2007 and 2013, also included land titling as a funda-
mental pillar. PACS promoted the systematization of coca production 
 monitoring through a geo-referenced system, the land registration process, 
supporting biometric registration of coca farmers and monitoring of the 
 registered cultivation areas. The coca fields are usually monitored multiple 
times each year, using satellite and aerial imagery and site visits.138 
 As part of the programme, the information system SYSCOCA gener-
ates thematic maps or lists of producers, and is available to coca farmer 
unions as a basis for their social control-related activities. It allows them 
to determine who owns the coca crops in a certain area, whether the farm-
ers are adhering to the limits on coca production and how the total area 
under cultivation in certain areas changes over time. For the most part, 
this process has been conducted together with the issuing of correspond-
ing land titles.139
Conclusion
While in the past land issues often did not receive enough attention in alter-
native development, the 2013 United Nations Guiding Principles on Alter-
native Development explicitly emphasized the importance of land rights for 
the success and sustainability of alternative development efforts.140 In April 
2016, the importance of this issue was also manifested at the special session 
of the General Assembly on the world drug problem held in 2016, which 
acknowledged the role that land rights play in alternative development. 
 Guidance on the implementation of effective land governance is pro-
vided by international guidelines that promote secure access to land, such as 
the Committee on World Food Security Voluntary Guidelines on the Respon-
sible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of 
National Food Security and the Principles for Responsible Investment in 
Agriculture and Food Systems (the RAI principles).
136 Villamil, “Informe de consultoría: descripción y análisis de la situación actual del sector 
de desarrollo integral con coca en Bolivia”. 
137 Further information available at www.controlsocial.bo. 
138 Kathryn Ledebur and Coletta Youngers, “From conflict to collaboration: an innovative 
approach to reducing coca cultivation in Bolivia”, Stability: International Journal of Security and 
Development, vol. 2, No. 1 (2013), pp. 2-11. 
139 Further information available at www.controlsocial.bo.
140 General Assembly resolution 68/196, annex. 
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 In the light of the political momentum and the guidance provided by 
international guidelines, the findings of this article are not intended to estab-
lish a conceptual approach that is applicable in every context, but, rather, to 
underscore the urgent need for more detailed and practical research. The 
findings show the relevance of land issues in the context of drug crop cultiva-
tion areas and, therefore, their central importance for alternative develop-
ment. The article shows that the rural population’s insufficient access to land 
is conducive to the cultivation of drug crops. Lack of secured access to land 
incentivizes short-term economic activities and impedes access to credit. As 
a consequence, it hinders the sustainable transformation of illicit economies 
into legal economic systems.
 When effectively integrated into alternative development programmes, 
the promotion of access to land and land tenure security can support the 
transition to legal economies. Land rights can facilitate security over means 
of production and livelihoods and enhance access to credit, thereby enabling 
investment in licit agricultural activities. A functioning land administration 
system (e.g., cadastre and land registration) not only increases control over 
illicit drug crop cultivation but is also conducive to alternative development 
measures. Secure access to land may not only provide a necessary condition 
for access to credit in many drug crop cultivation areas but also can serve as 
an incentive for sustainable agriculture and land use. In the context of alter-
native development, land registry can help to build trust and promote long-
term engagement with projects that help to facilitate the transition to legal 
income activities, while at the same time strengthening the relationship 
between the community and local authorities.
 Alternative development programmes need to consider the specific con-
ditions in drug crop cultivating areas including the prevailing livelihood 
 systems of the local population in regard to access to land and land tenure 
security. Where lack of access to land and land tenure insecurity prove to be 
a contributing factor to the illicit cultivation of drug crops, adequate land 
policies need to complement alternative development programmes. In many 
cases, alternative development projects, in turn, have proved to be effective 
in promoting the implementation of land policies via land use planning, land 
registration and a functioning land cadastre system. 
 A key factor for successful implementation of land registry and formali-
zation in local projects is the integration into national or regional processes, 
as shown in the examples of the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Peru. This 
requires close coordination between the different actors responsible for the 
implementation of land policy and alternative development programmes. 
Local institutional capacities often need to be strengthened in order to pro-
mote the formalization and implementation of land rights and safeguards 
with regards to local communities, and gender aspects need to be  established 
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in accordance with the Committee on World Food Security Voluntary Guide-
lines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security.
 Lastly, special attention is needed for women who often suffer dispro-
portionally from structural disadvantages concerning their access to land. In 
general, landless people often benefit less from alternative development pro-
jects that aim at facilitating this transition. Lack of access to land can be 
further exacerbated by fragile institutions and land tenure insecurity stem-
ming from conflict and migration that can either be a cause or consequence 
of the illicit drug economy. These findings are even more important in the 
light of the special session of the General Assembly on the world drug 
 problem, held in 2016, which confirmed the relevance of land issues for 
alternative development
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ABSTRACT
The present article evaluates farmer and community characteristics that promote 
resilience to opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. In general, resilience-building 
can be associated with measures to manage changes in contexts of long-lasting or 
recurring crisis, as opposed to measures aimed at controlling changes in stable systems. 
Afghanistan is a country in a state of constant, protracted crisis. As expected, the 
evidence gathered in the field suggests that farmers need sources of income that are not 
only profitable but also sustainable over time in order to keep them from cultivating 
opium poppy. The evidence also suggests that improvements in public services and 
governability are needed to turn opium poppy-growing communities into opium 
poppy-free communities and to keep communities free from opium poppy for longer 
periods of time. Other important factors that increase resilience include improvements 
in the adaptive capabilities of farmers, such as performing a large number of income-
generating activities, cultivating a large number of crops and receiving awareness-
raising information aimed at reducing opium poppy cultivation. Conversely, focusing 
on one-sided solutions, such as the sole provision of wheat as a crop substitute for 
opium poppy, or off-farm jobs, decreases resilience to opium poppy cultivation. There-
fore, designers of evidence-based interventions need to invest time in understanding 
local conditions before designing such interventions, and fully consider and integrate 
farmer livelihood strategies, vulnerabilities and uncertainty with broad-based rural 
development in order to achieve sustainable reductions in opium poppy cultivation. 
The price of not doing so is high, as poorly designed interventions generate perverse 
incentives that are likely to lead to overall increases in opium poppy cultivation. 
Keywords: farmer resilience, adaptive capability, illicit crop cultivation, 
drug-control policy, Afghanistan.
Introduction
Afghanistan dominates the world market for opiates, with an estimated 
201,000 hectares of cultivated opium poppy and an estimated potential 
opium production of 4,800 metric tons in 2016 [1]. Opiates contribute 
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substantially to the Afghan economy and continue to be Afghanistan’s 
largest export [2]. However, opium poppy cultivation represents an 
 unsustainable livelihood strategy. It fuels corruption, undermines the rule 
of law, provides financial support to insurgents and places people outside 
the legal system, making them vulnerable to violence and intimidation by 
non-State actors [2, 3].
 Despite the great importance of the debate on opium poppy cultivation, 
its polemic nature has served to undermine efforts to present a more com-
prehensive understanding of those involved in opium poppy cultivation in 
Afghanistan and to develop drug control policies that better reflect the real-
ity in the field [4]. To some extent, distance from and lack of exposure to the 
realities of the farmers involved in opium poppy cultivation have allowed 
policies to be built on articles of faith rather than on evidence from the field. 
Furthermore, the debate is often led by individuals with strong ideological 
or institutional positions and interests [4]. 
 Therefore, the challenge still facing policymakers, strategists and the 
international community is, first, to be able to objectively identify the deter-
minants of opium poppy cultivation, and then to design alternative develop-
ment interventions that can structurally change the conditions that lead 
farmers to grow opium poppy [2]. At its special session on the world drug 
problem, the General Assembly clearly pointed out the need to “promote 
research by States, including through cooperation with the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime and other relevant United Nations entities and 
international and regional organizations, academic institutions and civil 
society, to better understand factors contributing to illicit crop cultivation, 
taking into account local and regional specificities” [5]. 
 Local and international organizations need greater support in develop-
ing a better understanding of the diverse circumstances and motives that 
influence illicit crop cultivation [6]. Such cultivation has been linked primar-
ily with poverty issues; nevertheless, farmers’ motivations for cultivating 
illicit crops are diverse and many poppy growers are not actually poor [7]. It 
is unclear whether many non-poor poppy growers are motivated only by 
greed or whether vulnerability to poverty is also a factor motivating them to 
cultivate poppy to reduce their overall economic risk, as markets for the crop 
are relatively stable. In addition, recent research has shown that, although 
most poppy-growing farmers cultivate poppy every year, many do so only 
every other year [7]. Under such circumstances, it is important to analyse 
which conditions influence farmer and community resilience to opium 
poppy cultivation. Broadly speaking, such resilience refers to the capacity of 
farmers and communities to withstand stresses and shocks, or to their ability 
to endure in an uncertain world, without resorting to poppy cultivation. This 
definition also suggests that resilience is a dynamic concept.
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 The dynamic aspect of resilience has been generally overlooked in the 
context of alternative development interventions. The short-term invest-
ments often associated with alternative development do little to build farm-
ers’ confidence that the necessary support required for the permanent 
transition from opium poppy cultivation to more diverse livelihoods will be 
available over the long term. The present article argues that alternative devel-
opment interventions need to be framed as resilience-based interventions 
that are suitable under protracted crisis conditions; and Afghanistan can be 
regarded as a country in a state of constant, protracted crisis to which many 
farmers have showed limited capacity to respond without resorting to opium 
poppy cultivation. The adoption of resilience as a criterion for alternative 
development policy design shifts the focus of policies away from the aspira-
tion to control change in systems assumed to be stable towards managing 
the capacity of socioeconomic systems to cope with, adapt to and shape 
change. The objective of resilience analysis is to improve the capacity of 
households and communities to respond to shocks and stress factors in a 
constructive and adaptive way.
 Correspondingly, the present article aims to identify the major causes 
of resilience to opium poppy cultivation, categorizing such resilience in 
three ways:
• Resilience of farmers and communities to initiating poppy cultivation
• Resilience to increases in the scale of opium poppy cultivation, 
 measured in terms of the size of individual farmers’ poppy-growing 
areas and the number of poppy farmers within a given community
• Resilience to opium poppy-growing recidivism 
Specifically, the present article addresses the following questions:
• What conditions are likely to promote resilience of farmers and 
 communities to initiating opium poppy cultivation? 
• What conditions help to constrain the scale of opium poppy cultiva-
tion (i.e., the size of individual farmers’ poppy-growing areas and the 
number of poppy growers within given communities)?
• Given that many poppy farmers and poppy-growing communities 
are transient (taking up and abandoning poppy growing periodi-
cally), what conditions are associated with longer periods of time in 
which individual farmers and communities overall do not  cultivate 
poppy? 
 The present article seeks to provide evidence of the drivers of opium 
poppy cultivation in order to help local policymakers and practitioners and 
the international community design and implement more effective alterna-
tive development interventions that are based on evidence.
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Vulnerability and resilience to opium poppy cultivation
With respect to opium poppy cultivation, vulnerability is defined in terms of 
the following three critical dimensions:
 (a) Vulnerability to an outcome (e.g., poppy cultivation);
 (b) Vulnerability resulting from a variety of risk and stress factors;
 (c) Vulnerability resulting from an inability to manage those risks 
in any other way.
 Therefore, vulnerability to opium poppy cultivation could be defined as the 
inability of some households and communities to cope with internal and exter-
nal shocks and stresses to which they are exposed without resorting to opium 
poppy cultivation. The phrase “living on the edge” provides a good description 
of what it means to be vulnerable in such contexts; it metaphorically conveys 
the idea that even a small push can be enough to send farmers “over the brink”. 
Vulnerability increases when farmers are pushed closer to “the edge” by factors 
that are mostly outside their control. Vulnerability, uncertainty and resilience 
are closely related, as the measurement of vulnerability seeks to identify and 
quantify the susceptibility of people to damage due to adverse events with a 
frequently unknown likelihood of occurrence, and the measurement of resil-
ience—the capacity of farmers and communities to withstand stress factors and 
shocks—looks at the root causes of household vulnerability. 
 Resilience-oriented approaches to alternative development intervention 
focus on identifying the strategies adopted by households to earn a living 
and on understanding how those livelihood strategies could withstand future 
risks and stresses and adapt in order to retain essentially the same function 
and identity. In the end, the ability to withstand and adapt in this context 
depends on the available livelihood options and on how well households are 
able to handle risks. 
Factors influencing resilience to opium poppy cultivation and research 
hypotheses pertaining to them
The factors influencing resilience to opium poppy cultivation at any given time 
are not directly observable. Therefore, they need to be estimated on the basis 
of other observable variables. The quantitative techniques available at present 
are based on the idea that the resilience of a farmer or community at a given 
point in time depends primarily on the options available to them, such as: 
• Adaptive capacity
• Access to assets
• The institutional context
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• Basic services
• Safety nets
 These five elements and the research hypotheses corresponding to them 
are detailed below.
Adaptive capacity linked to diversity of income sources and awareness
Diversification of income sources is often regarded as a strategy for reducing 
risk. Diversification usually leads to a more regular income over a given year, 
and therefore to income smoothing. For example, combining high-value 
cash crops with on-farm and off-farm labour opportunities not only has the 
potential to generate a higher return for farmers but can also offer greater 
security than simply cultivating opium poppy. In addition, adaptive capacity 
is enhanced if farmers have knowledge of the negative effects of poppy cul-
tivation, as well as an understanding of the potentially available alternative 
sources of income. As such, the adaptive capacity of farmers is also influ-
enced by exposure to awareness-raising campaigns. In particular, low expo-
sure to awareness-raising campaigns has been associated with high levels of 
opium poppy cultivation [7]. Therefore, in the present article it is hypothe-
sized that resilience to opium poppy cultivation is characteristic of farmers 
who perform a large number of income-generating activities and cultivate a 
large number of crops, as well as of communities with access to off-farm 
employment opportunities, awareness-raising campaigns and high daily 
wages for licit crop farming (e.g., wheat harvesting).
Access to land and food
Households with smaller than average areas of cultivated land tend to culti-
vate relatively large areas of opium poppy [8]. Nevertheless, a substantial 
share of opium poppy in Afghanistan is also grown on medium- to large-
scale landholdings [2]. In addition, farmers adopt a balanced farming 
 system, with staple crops such as wheat to meet their food requirements and 
crops such as poppy to meet their cash needs [9]. Therefore, wheat remains 
an important crop even in those regions where opium poppy dominates [3]. 
Despite relatively high opium prices, households will favour wheat cultiva-
tion if they fear they will not be able to purchase wheat on the open market 
[10]. Importantly, wheat and opium poppy cultivation compete for the same 
agricultural land, and the area dedicated to one of these crops cannot be 
increased indefinitely without reducing the area dedicated to the other crop. 
That being the case, it is hypothesized that there is a correlation between the 
size of agricultural areas, wheat cultivation and resilience to opium poppy 
cultivation (although the direction of influence is unknown). 
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Institutional context related to governability and security issues, such 
as the presence of other illicit crops or insurgents
While there is considerable debate in the academic literature about the 
causal relationship between poor governance and opium poppy cultivation, 
there is little disagreement regarding the high level of coincidence between 
these factors in Afghanistan [11]. Legal livelihoods can be sustained only 
under conditions of good governance and security that allow the develop-
ment of licit markets, the accumulation of assets and the growth of normal 
economic activities and relations [12]. The presence of other illicit crops 
such as cannabis constrain the development of legal livelihoods. Cannabis 
and opiate markets are closely interrelated, and many farmers who cultivate 
opium poppy also cultivate cannabis as a complement to it. Additionally, 
some farmers refrain from opium poppy cultivation for a period of years and 
cultivate cannabis instead, only to resume opium poppy cultivation after 
conditions constraining its cultivation have changed [1]. The hypothesis of 
this research is that the communities governed by insurgents, rather than by 
the State, and the presence of other illicit crops, such as cannabis, are associ-
ated with lower resilience to opium poppy cultivation.
Basic services such as boys’ schools, girls’ schools and public electricity
Evidence from around the world shows that an absence of basic infrastruc-
ture creates conditions enabling the drug trade to flourish. For example, one 
of the major causes of opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar is the limited 
amount of infrastructure and services available in opium poppy-growing vil-
lages, which seems in many cases to perpetuate poverty and the need to rely 
on opium poppy income to make a living [13]. In addition, drug-related 
criminal organizations typically concentrate operations in remote regions 
where there is a lack of services. Therefore, it is hypothesized that communi-
ties with access to boys’ schools, girls’ schools and public electricity are more 
resilient to opium poppy cultivation than communities that do not have 
access to such services.
Safety nets such as agricultural assistance and access to credit and loans
Some factors that may influence resilience to opium poppy cultivation relate 
to safety nets, such as access to agricultural assistance,1 credit and loans. In 
general, agricultural assistance should be aimed at providing support to 
1 The term “agricultural assistance” includes previous alternative development projects 
 implemented in the same region, as farmers do not distinguish between development projects and 
drug control-oriented (alternative development) projects. However, farmers tend to  underreport 
assistance because they fear that being recognized as having received aid would constrain their 
opportunities to receive support in the future.
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farmers in need; the provision of agricultural assistance may have played a 
role in the decision of farmers to discontinue opium poppy cultivation in 
2015 [7]. Farmers who do not have access to credit may find it easier to 
cultivate poppy than legal crops, as traffickers in narcotics usually provide 
advance money to encourage opium poppy cultivation. The hypothesis put 
forth in the present article is that safety nets (availability of agricultural 
 assistance, credit and loans) increase resilience to poppy cultivation.
Methodologies2
The data supporting the present article were collected by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Country Office in Afghanistan in 
2015, as part of its annual socioeconomic monitoring survey, and represent 
4,197 farmers and 1,399 communities. These two sources of data are com-
plementary and allow the study of not only individual farmer needs, but also 
overall community priorities. The data collection methodology is described 
in the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015—Socio-economic Analysis.3 The data 
were analysed for the present article using different regression models, 
depending on the particular type of question under evaluation. In general, 
regressions are used to quantify the relationship between one variable (e.g., 
resilience to poppy cultivation) and another variable that is thought to influ-
ence it (e.g., access to credit and loans), while holding the other variables 
constant (ceteris paribus).4 
Resilience to initiating opium poppy cultivation: the logit model
Logit regression is used to model a dichotomous outcome variable, for 
example, a farmer’s decision whether or not to grow poppy, or the presence 
or absence of opium poppy within a community. 
Resilience to increases in the size of opium poppy-growing areas 
among farmers: the Tobit model
The Tobit model is applicable when the dependent variable of an otherwise 
linear regression (e.g., the size of an individual opium poppy-growing area) 
2 For simplification purposes, the explanations of the models included in the present article 
are intuitive. For statistical/econometric explanations, see William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis, 
5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2003).
3 https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_sur-
vey_2015_socioeconomic.pdf.
4 In all the models, the explanatory variables are the potential factors that could influence 
resilience to poppy cultivation, as indicated in the previous section.
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is observed only over a given interval of its full support (e.g., where all values 
equal to or above zero account for the significant proportion of non-poppy 
farmers with, by definition, no poppy areas and poppy growers with a posi-
tive size of opium poppy-growing areas. In this case, negative values would 
not make sense and would not be allowed by the model) [14]. Under the 
Tobit model, the same set of variables with the same coefficients explain 
both the decision to grow poppy or not and the size of opium poppy-growing 
areas of those who cultivate poppy. 
Resilience to increases in the number of opium poppy-growing 
 households within the community: the (zero-inflated) Poisson model
The Poisson model helps to identify significant factors that influence count 
variables, such as the number of poppy growers within a particular commu-
nity. An extension of the Poisson model, the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) 
model is applicable when there is a large number of zero-outcome responses 
(in this case, communities without poppy growers). The ZIP model assumes 
that there are two different processes: (a) If there is no poppy cultivation in 
the community, then the only outcome possible for the number of poppy-
growing households is zero; and (b) If there is poppy cultivation, then the 
number of poppy farmers is a positive integer. The two parts of the zero-
inflated model are therefore: (a) a binary model associated with an outcome 
of zero; and (b) a count model, in this case, a Poisson model, to represent the 
counting process. 
Resilience to opium poppy-growing recidivism: the Cox proportional 
hazard model
Because of various factors and motivations, many opium poppy farmers do 
not grow poppy every year, but stop for a period of time, only to resume later 
on. The Cox proportional hazard model is relevant when trying to quantify 
variables influencing a periodic pattern of events, such as poppy cultivation 
(in particular, variables influencing the time between successive events, or 
gap time). This type of model is used to assess the relationship of relevant 
variables to the rate at which the events occur, allowing for multiple events 
per farmer. 
Overall results 
As expected, the overall evidence suggests that resilience to opium poppy 
cultivation (avoiding the initiation of poppy cultivation, decreasing the size 
of opium poppy-growing areas and the number of opium poppy farmers 
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within communities, and increasing the time between relapses into opium 
poppy cultivation) increases in a statistically significant way when the adap-
tive capabilities of farmers are also increased; such adaptive capabilities 
include performing a large number of income-generating activities, cultivat-
ing a large number of crops and receiving information through awareness-
raising campaigns aimed at reducing opium poppy cultivation.
 The evidence also indicates that the institutional context plays a role in 
opium poppy cultivation. For example, the presence of other illicit crops 
such as cannabis within a village and being governed by insurgents reduces 
resilience to opium poppy cultivation in a statistically significant way. Con-
versely, the availability of basic services such as boys’ schools and public 
electricity increases resilience to opium poppy cultivation in a statistically 
significant manner. However, the availability of girls’ schools does not per se 
influence resilience to opium poppy cultivation in a statistically significant 
way, as their presence or absence seem to be mostly associated with specific 
cultural issues and imposed prohibitions. 
 Possessing relevant assets, such as a large tract of agricultural land, 
results in a statistically significant increase in some types of resilience to 
opium poppy cultivation (e.g., avoiding the initiation of opium poppy culti-
vation and increasing the time between relapses into such cultivation), but 
does not seem to play a role in the overall scale of opium poppy cultivation 
(the total size of opium poppy-growing areas). This is in line with findings 
suggesting that, despite the fact that opium sales may generate over 90 per 
cent of on-farm cash income, opium poppy seems to always occupy, on aver-
age, a small proportion of the total cultivable land [3].
 Safety nets, measured in terms of having accessed credit in the form of 
a loan, increase resilience to opium poppy cultivation in a statistically 
 significant way. However, other safety nets, such as agricultural assistance, 
do not seem to influence resilience (for example, resilience to initiating 
opium poppy cultivation or to increasing the size of opium poppy-growing 
areas) in a statistically significant way, after controlling for the other explan-
atory variables (i.e., keeping them constant). Such findings may require a 
more detailed analysis in future studies. Given the low percentage of farmers 
indicating that they had received assistance, it could be that farmers pro-
vided strategic responses. Those who had actually received assistance may 
have indicated that they had not in the belief that they would be otherwise 
disqualified from receiving further assistance in the future.
 Interestingly, cultivating wheat, which is related to farmers’ access to 
food, as well as the availability of other sources of income such as off-farm 
employment opportunities, decreases resilience to opium poppy cultiva-
tion in a statistically significant way, rather than increasing it, while the 
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daily wage for wheat harvesting does not have a statistically significant 
influence on resilience to opium poppy cultivation. One reason why culti-
vating wheat seems to decrease resilience to opium poppy cultivation may 
be related to food security needs. In some cases, poppy growers may try 
to focus on being self-sufficient, in comparison with non-poppy growers, 
owing to their high poverty level or long distance from markets. The evi-
dence suggests that wheat was not used by farmers as a replacement for 
poppy cultivation, but rather to complement it, during the 2014-2015 
growing season.
 With regard to the availability of off-farm employment, farmers may not 
be secure in their ability to maintain such employment over the long term. 
Therefore, many farmers may have decided to complement their off-farm 
income with income from an activity with a secure market, such as opium 
poppy cultivation. Conversely, wages alone (after controlling for other vari-
ables) do not influence resilience to poppy cultivation, which is in line with 
findings suggesting that agricultural wages might need to more than quad-
ruple to engender a shift from opium poppy to wheat cultivation [2]. 
Detailed results and analysis
The particular conditions that influence the types of resilience to opium 
poppy cultivation covered in the present study are presented in detail below, 
first as descriptive statistics, and then as statistical/econometric results.
What particular conditions are likely to promote resilience of farmers 
and communities to initiating opium poppy cultivation? 
It does not seem to be widely acknowledged that within opium poppy- growing 
regions, poppy-growing and non-poppy-growing households coexist. In this 
respect, there is still a lot to learn about non-poppy-growing households 
located in those particular regions. Fully understanding what additional 
resources and opportunities non-poppy-growing households may have and 
what strategies they employ could help in formulating incentives for poppy 
growers to reproduce successful non-poppy-growing strategies. 
Descriptive statistical results
Conditions that were different between non-poppy growers and poppy 
growers included the following:
• Non-poppy growers had, on average, larger total agricultural areas 
(2.3 ha) than poppy growers (2.0 ha). 
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• Non-poppy growers were engaged in more income-generating activi-
ties, excluding poppy growing (4.2 activities, in comparison with 
4.0 activities by poppy farmers).
• A higher percentage of non-poppy growers had outstanding loans in 
comparison with poppy growers (45 per cent versus 42 per cent), which 
may reflect more access to credit on the part of non-poppy growers.
• A higher percentage of non-poppy growers than poppy growers 
 indicated that they had received agricultural assistance (14 per cent 
versus 8 per cent).
• A higher percentage of non-poppy growers than poppy growers indi-
cated that they had received information through awareness-raising 
campaigns (60 per cent versus 46 per cent). 
 Both groups cultivated the same total number of cash crops (3 crops), 
and the same percentage of poppy and non-poppy growers cultivated wheat 
(more than 94 per cent of all farmers).
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics comparing opium poppy growers with  
non-opium poppy growers
Opium poppy 
growers
Non-opium poppy 
growers
Size of opium poppy-growing area, in hectares 
(self-reported by the farmer)a
0.59 
(0.35)
0.0 
(0.0)
Has outstanding loana  
(1 = farmer has outstanding loans, 0 otherwise)
0.42 
(0.49)
0.45 
(0.50)
Received agricultural assistancea  
(1 = farmer has received agricultural assistance, 
0 otherwise)
0.08 
(0.28)
0.14 
(0.35)
Exposure to awareness-raising campaignsa  
(1 = farmer has received awareness-raising 
information on opium poppy cultivation, 
0 otherwise)
0.46 
(0.50)
0.60 
(0.49)
Number of income-generating activitiesa 4.51 
(1.05)
4.24 
(0.98)
Number of income-generating activities, 
excluding poppy cultivationa
4.00 
(1.05)
4.24 
(0.98)
Number of crops cultivated 2.62 
(1.20)
2.77 
(1.46)
Number of crops cultivated, excluding poppya 2.11 
(1.37)
2.77 
(1.46)
Total crop area, in hectaresa 2.04 
(2.55)
2.30 
(2.95)
Total crop area, excluding poppy crop area, in 
hectaresa
1.74 
(2.50)
2.30 
(2.95)
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Opium poppy 
growers
Non-opium poppy 
growers
Cultivated wheat 
(1 = farmer cultivated wheat, 0 otherwise)
0.94 
(0.24)
0.95 
(0.21)
Number of observations 1 185 3 012
 Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
 a The means between poppy and non-poppy farmers are statistically different at the 0.05 level (t-test).
 At the community level, non-poppy-growing communities were consid-
erably better off than poppy-growing communities. For example, in terms of 
access to educational services, a significantly larger number of non-poppy-
growing communities had boys’ schools and girls’ schools (93 per cent and 
68 per cent, respectively) than non-poppy-growing communities (73 per 
cent and 33 per cent, respectively). 
 A similar situation was observed in relation to access to public grid elec-
tricity. About 13 per cent of non-poppy-growing communities indicated that 
they had access to public electricity, in comparison with only 2 per cent of 
poppy-growing communities. Also, non-poppy-growing and poppy-growing 
communities differed significantly in the amount of daily wages received by 
farmers for wheat harvesting ($5.8 and $5.2, respectively), exposure to 
awareness-raising campaigns within the community (23 per cent and 7 per 
cent of communities, respectively), being governed by insurgents (7 per cent 
and 14 per cent of communities, respectively), and the presence of other 
illicit crops within the community, such as cannabis (10 per cent and 45 per 
cent, respectively).
 However, a lower percentage of non-poppy-growing communities than 
poppy-growing communities reported the availability of off-farm employ-
ment opportunities (30 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively).
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics comparing opium poppy-growing communities 
with non-opium poppy-growing communities
Opium poppy-
growing 
 communities 
Non-opium 
poppy-growing 
communities
Number of opium poppy-growing families 
within the community (reported by the 
community leader)a
28.29 
(0.48)
0.0 
(0.0)
Boys’ school in the communitya 
(1 = the community has a boys’ school, 
0 otherwise)
0.73  
(0.44)
0.93 
(0.25)
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics comparing opium poppy growers with  
non-opium poppy growers (continued)
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Girls’ school in the communitya 
(1 = the community has a girls’ school,  
0 otherwise)
0.33 
(0.47)
0.68 
(0.47)
Availability of public electricitya 
(1 = the community has public electricity,  
0 otherwise)
0.02 
(0.15)
0.13 
(0.34)
Off-farm employment opportunitiesa 
(1 = availability of off-farm employment within 
the community, 0 otherwise) 
0.56 
(0.50)
0.30 
(0.46)
Daily wage for wheat harvesting, in US$a 5.20 
(1.31)
5.77 
(1.64)
Exposure to awareness-raising campaignsa 
(1 = presence of awareness-raising campaigns 
on opium poppy cultivation within the 
 community, 0 otherwise)
0.07  
(0.26)
0.23 
(0.42)
Governed by insurgentsa 
(1 = community governed by insurgents,  
0 otherwise)
0.14 
(0.34)
0.07 
(0.26)
Cannabis cultivationa 
(1 = cannabis cultivation within the community, 
0 otherwise)
0.45  
(0.50)
0.10 
(0.30)
Number of observations 514 885
 Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
 a The means between poppy-growing and non-poppy-growing communities are statistically differ-
ent at the 0.05 level (t-test).
Regression model results
The results of the regression (logit) model to evaluate individual farmers’ 
probability of growing poppy indicated that, on average, farmers:
• With outstanding loans were 4 per cent less likely to cultivate poppy 
than farmers without such loans
• Who received information from awareness-raising campaigns were 
3 per cent less likely to cultivate poppy than farmers who did not
• Were 2 per cent less likely to cultivate poppy with each additional 
income-generating activity that they performed
• Were 7 per cent less likely to cultivate poppy with each additional 
crop that they cultivated
• Were 1 per cent less likely to cultivate poppy with each additional 
hectare of land that they owned
• Who did not cultivate wheat were 4 per cent less likely to cultivate 
opium poppy than farmers who cultivated wheat
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Table 3.  Factors influencing a farmer’s decision to grow opium poppy in 
Afghanistan
Marginal 
effect
Robust 
standard 
error
Confidence interval 
(95 per cent)
Minimum Maximum
Has an outstanding loana −0.0358 0.0060 −0.0476 −0.0240
Received agricultural assistance −0.0226 0.0088 −0.0399 −0.0053
Exposure to awareness-raising 
campaignsa
−0.0325 0.0072 −0.0466 −0.0184
Number of non-poppy-growing 
activitiesa
−0.0152 0.0034 −0.0218 −0.0086
Number of non-poppy cropsa −0.0745 0.0042 −0.0828 −0.0662
Total cultivated area, excluding 
poppya
−0.0101 0.0025 −0.0149 −0.0053
Cultivated wheata 0.0363 0.0055 0.0256 0.0470
 Note: Derived using the logit model; dependent variable = farmer cultivates poppy (1 = farmer 
cultivates poppy, 0 otherwise); pseudo R squared = 0.24. The marginal effect indicates the shift in the 
probability of growing poppy when the variable changes by one unit (for continuous variables) or 
when the variable changes from present to absent (for non-continuous or discrete variables). The 
confidence interval indicates the range of values with 95 per cent probability that the value of the 
variable lies within it.
 a Significant at the 0.01 level.
 The results of applying the logit model to evaluate the probability of poppy 
cultivation in the communities studied indicated that, on average, communi-
ties with a lesser probability of having poppy growers were those with:
• A boys’ school (communities with boys’ schools were 29 per cent less 
likely to have poppy growers than those without such schools)
• Access to public electricity (21 per cent less likely)
• Exposure to awareness-raising campaigns aimed at reducing opium 
poppy cultivation (17 per cent less likely)
and those that did not have:
• Governance by insurgents (communities not governed by insurgents 
were 18 per cent less likely to have poppy growers than those gov-
erned by insurgents)
• Cannabis cultivation within the community (34 per cent less likely)
 However, communities with availability of off-farm employment opportu-
nities were on average 14 per cent more likely to have poppy growers within 
them. In relation to this result, it could be the case that off-farm employment 
opportunities were not stable enough and were therefore complemented with 
other less risky activities such as opium poppy cultivation, thus increasing 
such cultivation.
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 Factors such as farm wages for wheat harvesting and the availability of a 
girls’ school did not seem to influence the presence of opium poppy growers 
within the community, after controlling for the other explanatory variables. 
Table 4.  Factors influencing the presence of opium poppy growers within 
communities in Afghanistan
Marginal 
effect
Robust 
standard 
error
Confidence interval 
(95 per cent)
Minimum Maximum
Boys’ school in the  communitya −0.2934 0.0492 −0.3898 −0.1969
Girls’ school in the community −0.0706 0.0359 −0.1423 −0.0012
Availability of public  electricitya −0.2105 0.0442 −0.2972 −0.1238
Off-farm employment 
 opportunitiesa
0.1364 0.0344 0.0690 0.2038
Daily wage for wheat harvesting, 
in US$
−0.0236 0.0103 −0.0439 −0.0034
Exposure to awareness-raising 
campaignsa
−0.1697 0.0357 −0.2397 −0.1000
Governed by insurgentsa 0.1819 0.0544 0.0753 0.2884
Cannabis cultivation within the 
communitya
0.3364 0.0413 0.2556 0.4172
 Note: Derived using the logit model; dependent variable = poppy cultivation within the village 
(1 = presence of poppy cultivation within the village, 0 otherwise); pseudo R squared = 0.22. The 
marginal effect indicates the shift in the probability of growing poppy when the variable changes by 
one unit (for continuous variables) or when the variable changes from present to absent (for non-
continuous or discrete variables). The confidence interval indicates the range of values with 95 per cent 
probability that the value of the variable lies within it.
 a Significant at the 0.01 level.
What particular conditions help to constrain the size of an individual 
farmer’s opium poppy-growing area and the number of opium poppy 
growers within a given community?5 
The results of applying the Tobit model suggest that, on average:
• Poppy growers with outstanding loans had 0.05 fewer hectares of 
opium poppy than those without such loans.6
• Poppy growers who had received information through awareness-
raising campaigns had 0.05 fewer hectares of poppy than poppy 
growers who had not. 
5 The descriptive statistics addressing this question are not presented here; the descriptive 
statistics presented in table 4 also apply to this question.
6 The value 0.05 hectares represents 8 per cent of the average size of opium poppy-growing 
areas per individual farmer (0.59 ha). 
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• Each additional activity performed by poppy growers decreased the 
size of their poppy-growing area by 0.02 hectares.
• Each additional crop cultivated by poppy growers decreased the size 
of their opium poppy-growing area by 0.09 hectares.
 On the other hand, farmers who cultivated wheat had on average 0.05 
hectares more of opium poppy than their counterparts, which seems to 
reflect the complementary nature of wheat and poppy cultivation (farmers 
did not substitute poppy with wheat during the year under evaluation, 2015), 
as explained in a previous section. In addition, receiving assistance did not 
influence the size of individual poppy-growing areas in a statistically signifi-
cant manner.
 In general, the conditions that influenced the size of opium poppy- 
growing areas were similar to the conditions that influenced individual 
 farmers’ decisions to grow poppy or not, with the exception of the farmers’ 
total agricultural areas, which did not significantly influence the size of their 
opium poppy-growing areas (although it did influence the farmers’ decisions 
to grow poppy or not).
Table 5.  Factors influencing the size of an individual farmer’s opium poppy-
growing area in Afghanistan
Partial 
conditional 
effect on 
opium poppy 
cultivation
Robust 
standard 
error
Confidence interval 
(95 per cent)
Minimum Maximum
Has an outstanding loana −0.0472 0.0087 −0.0642 −0.0301
Received agricultural assistance −0.0249 0.0150 −0.0542 0.0045 
Exposure to awareness-raising 
campaignsa
−0.0528 0.0100 −0.0724 −0.0332
Number of non-poppy-growing 
activitiesa
−0.0239 0.0046 −0.0329 −0.0149
Number of non-poppy cropsa −0.0921 0.0065 −0.1048 −0.0794
Total cultivated area, excluding 
poppy
−0.0047 0.0023 −0.0092 −0.0001
Cultivated wheata 0.0457 0.0148 0.0167 0.0747 
 Note: Derived using the Tobit model; pseudo R squared = 0.18; dependent variable = size of 
 individual farmer’s opium poppy-growing area in hectares. The Tobit model is preferred over the 
 truncated model (sigma is not significant, where p = 0.168, in the truncated model). The partial effect 
indicates the shift in the size in hectares of opium poppy-growing areas when the variable changes by 
one unit (for continuous variables) or when the variable changes from present to absent (for 
 non-continuous or discrete variables). The confidence interval indicates the range of values with 95 per 
cent probability that the value of the variable lies within it. 
 a Significant at the 0.01 level.
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 Conversely, the results of the zero-inflated Poisson regression model 
suggest that conditions influencing the presence or absence of poppy grow-
ers (table 4) and their number in the community (table 6 below) were differ-
ent. The only characteristic negatively influencing the number of poppy 
growers in the community was the presence of awareness-raising campaigns, 
which on average seemed to reduce by 39 per cent the number of poppy 
growers, in comparison with communities without such campaigns.7 This 
seems to corroborate related findings on the correspondence of awareness-
raising campaigns with opium poppy cultivation. In particular, in 2015 
about 60 per cent of farmers who ceased poppy cultivation had been exposed 
to awareness-raising campaigns, in contrast to 40 per cent of active poppy 
farmers [7].
Table 6.  Factors influencing the number of opium poppy growers within 
communities in Afghanistan
Incidence 
rate ratio 
(IRR)
Robust 
standard 
error
Confidence interval  
(95 per cent)
Minimum Maximum
Boys’ school in the community 1.3195 0.2030 0.6279 1.2070
Girls’ school in the community 1.3275 0.2386 0.7517 1.6849
Availability of public electricity 1.0447 0.7008 0.0921 1.5684
Off-farm employment 
 opportunities
0.8110 0.1756 0.7204 1.7377
Daily wage for wheat 
 harvesting, in US$
1.0540 0.0533 0.8686 1.0719
Exposure to awareness-raising 
campaignsa
0.6078 0.1341 0.2127 0.5697
Governed by insurgents 1.3908 0.3343 1.5368 3.6092
Cannabis cultivation within the 
community
0.8271 0.1499 0.9998 2.4021
 Note: Derived using the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression model; dependent variable = num-
ber of households cultivating opium poppy within the community; prob > chi2 = 0.0000. The Poisson 
model is preferred to negative binomial (lnalpha not significant, where z = −1.17, prob = 0.243). The 
zero-inflated Poisson model was preferred to the standard Poisson model, where z = 15.98, prob = 
0.0000 (Vuong test of ZIP versus standard Poisson). Here, 1-IRR indicates the percentage change in the 
number of poppy growers when the variable changes by one unit (for continuous variables) or with 
the presence of the variable in comparison to the absence of the variable (for non-continuous or 
discrete variables). The confidence interval indicates the range of values with 95 per cent probability 
that the value of the variable lies within it.
 a Significant at the 0.01 level.
7 However, this particular result needs further evaluation, as the assumption here is that 
awareness-raising campaigns are carried out in all communities with the same probability, and 
not mainly in non-opium poppy-growing communities. Nevertheless, no public data are currently 
available to corroborate this assumption.
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What particular conditions promote farmers’ and communities’ 
 resilience to opium poppy-growing recidivism?
One of the major implications of vulnerability and resilience is that farmers 
and communities overall may decide to refrain from poppy cultivation for 
different periods of time, only to resume later, depending on internal and 
external factors. The evidence suggests that farmers who avoided opium 
poppy cultivation for the longest periods of time (for more than one growing 
season during the period 2011-2015) were less vulnerable than farmers who 
grew poppy continuously or those who refrained from growing it for only 
one growing season. 
Descriptive statistics
There were statistically significant differences between farmers, depending 
on the length of time for which they had decided to cultivate opium poppy. 
For example, farmers who had refrained from poppy cultivation for more 
than a year indicated that they:
• Had received agricultural assistance (11 per cent, versus 6-7 per cent 
of their counterparts, that is, farmers who did not cease poppy 
 cultivation or farmers who refrained from such cultivation for only 
one year)
• Had received information through awareness-raising campaigns 
(52 per cent, versus 40-51 per cent of their counterparts)
• Had outstanding loans (43 per cent, versus 31-42 per cent of their 
counterparts), which may have been related to the availability of 
credit
In addition, opium poppy farmers who refrained from opium poppy cultiva-
tion for more than one year:
• Had cultivated a relatively small opium poppy-growing area (0.3 ha, 
versus 0.6 ha by their counterparts)
• Had performed a relatively high number of income-generating activ-
ities, excluding poppy growing (4.2 activities, versus 3.7-4.1 activi-
ties by their counterparts)
• Had cultivated a relatively large number of crops, excluding poppy 
(2.8 crops, versus 1.4-2.4 crops by their counterparts)
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Table 7.  Descriptive statistics on different types of farmers, according to the 
number of years for which they refrained from opium poppy 
cultivation during the period 2011-2015
Opium poppy 
farmers who 
did not cease 
opium poppy 
cultivation
Opium poppy 
farmers who 
refrained from opium 
poppy cultivation for 
one year
Opium poppy 
farmers who 
refrained from 
opium poppy 
cultivation for more 
than one year
Size of opium poppy-growing 
area, in hectares  
(self-reported by the farmer)a
0.59 
(0.51)
0.64 
(0.82)
0.31 
(0.07)
Has an outstanding loan 
(1 = farmer has outstanding 
loans, 0 otherwise)
0.42 
(0.49)
0.31 
(0.47)
0.43  
(0.50)
Received agricultural assistancea 
(1 = farmer has received 
agricultural assistance, 0 
otherwise)
0.07 
(0.25)
0.06 
(0.23)
0.11  
(0.31)
Exposure to awareness-raising 
campaignsa 
(1 = farmer received awareness-
raising information on poppy 
cultivation, 0 otherwise)
0.40 
(0.49)
0.51 
(0.50)
0.52  
(0.50)
Number of income-generating 
activitiesa
4.69 
(1.05)
4.72 
(1.08)
4.28  
(0.93)
Number of income-generating 
activities, excluding poppy 
cultivationa
3.70 
(1.06)
4.12 
(0.90)
4.23 
(0.92)
Number of crops cultivated by 
the farmera
2.40 
(0.77)
2.72 
(1.37)
2.84  
(1.47)
Number of crops, excluding 
poppy
1.40 
(0.77)
2.43 
(1.44)
2.81  
(1.49)
Total crop area, in hectaresa 1.91 
(2.58)
2.91 
(2.49)
2.39  
(2.52)
Total crop area, excluding 
poppy area, in hectaresa
1.32 
(2.42)
2.27 
(2.41)
2.08  
(2.53)
Cultivated wheata 
(1 = farmer cultivated wheat,  
0 otherwise)
0.90 
(0.30)
0.97 
(0.18)
0.97  
(0.16)
Number of observations 561 121 503
 Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
 a The means between different types of farmers are statistically different at the 0.05 level (ANOVA-
test).
 Conversely, the only significant differences between communities with 
continuous poppy cultivation and those with intermittent poppy cultivation 
during the period 2011-2015 were in the percentage of poppy growers in 
those communities (38 per cent versus 14 per cent, respectively) and in the 
percentage of those communities that were governed by insurgents (15 per 
cent and 0 per cent, respectively).
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Table 8.  Descriptive statistics on different types of communities, according to 
the number of years without opium poppy cultivation during the 
period 2011-2015
Communities that 
cultivated opium 
poppy continuously
Communities that 
cultivated opium 
poppy intermittently
Number of poppy-growing households 
within the community  
(self-reported by the community leaders)a
29.51 
(51.67)
12.34 
(17.37)
Total number of households within the 
community
78.55 
(131.59)
91.03 
(259.16)
Boys’ school in the community 
(1 = the community has a boys’ school,  
0 otherwise)
0.73 
(0.45)
0.75 
(0.44)
Girls’ school in the community 
(1 = the community has a girls’ school,  
0 otherwise)
0.33 
(0.47)
0.25 
(0.44)
Availability of public electricity 
(1 = the community has public electricity, 
0 otherwise)
0.02 
(0.15)
0.03 
(0.18)
Off-farm employment opportunities 
(1 = availability off-farm jobs within the 
community, 0 otherwise) 
0.56 
(0.50)
0.53 
(0.51)
Daily wage for wheat harvesting, in US$ 5.21 
(1.45)
5.09 
(0.15)
Exposure to awareness-raising campaigns 
(1 = presence of awareness-raising 
campaigns on poppy growing within the 
community, 0 otherwise)
0.07 
(0.26)
0.06 
(0.25)
Governed by insurgents 
(1 = community governed by insurgents,  
0 otherwise)a
0.15 
(0.36)
0.00 
(0.00)
Cannabis cultivation 
(1 = presence of cannabis cultivation 
within the community, 0 otherwise)
0.46 
(0.50)
0.44 
(0.50)
Number of observations 478 32
 Note: Communities that cultivated opium poppy continuously = communities with the presence 
of poppy cultivation every year during the period 2011-2015. Communities that cultivated opium  poppy 
intermittently = communities without the presence of poppy cultivation for at least one year during 
the period 2011-2015.
 Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
 a The means between communities that cultivated poppy continuously and those that did so 
 intermittently are statistically different at the 0.05 level (t-test).
Regression model results
The results of the stratified Cox proportional hazards model suggest that the 
factors associated with an increased length of time without opium poppy 
cultivation were:
• The receipt of agricultural assistance (with an average increase of 25 per 
cent, in comparison to farmers who did not receive such assistance)
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• The holding of an outstanding loan (26 per cent)
• The receipt of information from awareness-raising campaigns (31 per 
cent)
• That each additional activity performed by a farmer increased by 
15 per cent the length of time without poppy cultivation
• That each additional crop cultivated by a farmer increased by 35 per 
cent the length of time without poppy cultivation
• That each additional hectare of total agricultural area increased by 
9 per cent the length of time without poppy cultivation
 The cultivation of wheat seems to have had the opposite effect, in that it 
reduced the amount of time between relapses into opium poppy cultivation 
(on average by 73 per cent, in comparison with the time between relapses 
observed among farmers who did not cultivate wheat). 
Table 9.  Factors influencing the duration of opium poppy cultivation among 
farmers in Afghanistan 
Hazard 
ratio
Robust 
standard 
error
Confidence interval 
(95 per cent)
Minimum Maximum
Has an outstanding loana 0.7378 0.0381 0.6667 0.8163 
Received agricultural assistancea 0.7486 0.0809 0.6057 0.9254
Exposure to awareness-raising campaignsa 0.6882 0.0362 0.6207 0.7630
Number of non-poppy-growing activitiesa 0.8493 0.0245 0.8025 0.8987
Number of non-poppy cropsa 0.6517 0.0202 0.6132 0.6926
Total cultivated area, excluding poppya 0.9109 0.0167 0.8788 0.9441
Cultivated wheata 1.7257 0.1760 1.4131 2.1076
 Note: Derived using the stratified Cox proportional hazards model, and the Breslow methods for 
ties; dependent variable = time until individual farmer (re-)starts growing poppy, based on recall data 
from the period 2011-2015; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; robust estimations are clustered by individual  farmer; 
number of observations: 20,805. Number of individual farmers: 4,161. Here, 1-Hazard Ratio indicates 
the percentage of change in length of time without poppy cultivation when the variable changes by 
one unit (for continuous variables) or with the presence of the variable in comparison with the absence 
of the variable (for non-continuous or discrete variables). The confidence interval indicates the range 
of values with 95 per cent probability that the value of the variable lies within it.
 a Significant at the 0.01 level.
In addition, the results of the stratified Cox proportional hazards model 
 suggest that community characteristics that increased the period of time 
without poppy cultivation were:
• The presence of a boys’ school (with an average increase in duration 
of 34 per cent in comparison with communities without one) 
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• The presence of a girls’ school (27 per cent)
• The availability of public electricity (60 per cent)
• Exposure to awareness-raising campaigns (32 per cent)
On the contrary, factors associated with a decrease in the period of time 
without opium poppy cultivation within communities were:
• Being governed by insurgents (with a decrease of 47 per cent in 
 comparison with communities not governed by insurgents)
• The cultivation of other illicit crops, such as cannabis (68 per cent) 
• The availability of off-farm jobs (43 per cent)
 The amount of daily agricultural wages (for wheat harvesting) did seem 
to influence opium poppy-growing recidivism.
Table 10.  Factors influencing the duration of opium-poppy cultivation within 
communities in Afghanistan
Hazard 
ratio 
Robust 
standard 
error
Confidence interval 
(95 per cent)
Minimum Maximum
Boys’ school in the communitya 0.6479 0.0429 0.5691 0.7376 
Girls’ school in the communitya 0.7342 0.0675 0.6131 0.8793
Availability of public electricitya 0.399 0.1123 0.2300 0.6929
Off-farm employment 
 opportunitiesa
1.4308 0.1141 1.2238 1.6729
Daily wage for wheat  harvesting, 
in US$
0.9382 0.0273 0.8861 0.9933
Exposure to awareness-raising 
campaignsa
0.6752 0.0976 0.5086 0.8964
Governed by insurgentsa 1.4659 0.1359 1.2222 1.7580
Cannabis cultivated within the 
communitya
1.6778 0.1278 1.4451 1.9481
 Note: Derived using the stratified Cox proportional hazards model, and the Breslow methods for 
ties; dependent variable = time until there is a (re-)start in poppy growing inside the community, based 
on recall data of annual poppy cultivation within the community during the period 2011-2015, as 
 reported by the community leaders; robust estimations are clustered by individual community; Prob > 
chi2 = 0.0000; number of observations: 6,725; number of individual communities: 1,345. Here, 1-Hazard 
Ratio indicates the percentage of change in length of time without poppy cultivation when the variable 
changes by one unit (for continuous variables) or with the presence of the variable in comparison with 
the absence of the variable (for non-continuous or discrete variables). The confidence interval indicates 
the range of values with 95 per cent probability that the value of the variable lies within it.
 a Significant at the 0.01 level.
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Main limitation of the research
It was not possible to cover all the explanatory variables using only one 
model; they were therefore divided into two types of model, farmer-level 
models and community-level models. To be able to define the influence of 
one variable, after controlling for all the other variables, all the explanatory 
variables would need to be included in a single model. Furthermore, prob-
lems related to the potential presence of endogeneity and reverse causality 
could have been addressed using time series data from the same communi-
ties and farmers, but those data were not available at the time the present 
study was being conducted. However, the approach taken for the present 
research has nonetheless produced interesting findings that merit future 
refinements in similar research.
Conclusions 
The quantitative (statistical/econometric) results partially support previous 
qualitative findings8 [2, 3] and other quantitative findings related to the 
determinants of illicit crop cultivation [15, 16]. All types of resilience to 
opium poppy cultivation are strengthened in a statistically significant way if 
the adaptive capacity, governability and access to basic services of farmers 
and communities are also strengthened. However, an issue mostly over-
looked in the past is the fact that some types of alternative development 
intervention (for example, those targeting aspects that have been wrongly 
identified as motivations for opium poppy cultivation) would have the oppo-
site effect: they would likely increase opium poppy cultivation.
 For example, the evidence suggests that alternative development inter-
ventions targeting only the availability of off-farm employment opportunities 
or the cultivation of wheat as an alternative crop would have increased poppy 
cultivation during the period 2014-2015 in a statistically significant way. This 
serves as quantitative evidence that “quick fixes” in Afghanistan could even-
tually increase farmers’ vulnerability, which in turn could lead to opium 
poppy cultivation; however, evidence from other countries suggests that inte-
grated rural development interventions are usually resilience-enhancing . In 
that regard, it is of foremost importance to avoid reductionist (overly simplis-
tic) approaches, as they may fail to address the underlying causes and thereby 
contribute to the perpetuation of opium poppy cultivation. 
8 Data can be collected for similar indicators using quantitative or qualitative methods. Quali-
tative data often has more explanatory power, allowing the focus to be on identifying causal 
relationships, and is particularly useful in planning at the local level. Quantitative data is generally 
cheaper to collect on a large scale and allows for the evaluation of statistical significance and 
thus for drawing general conclusions on more overarching questions.
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 Mostly on the basis of qualitative data, Mansfield (2016) has made a 
similar statement [6]: 
In Afghanistan, it has not been unusual to hear the argument that any 
support to legal on-farm, off-farm and non-farm income will lead to a 
contraction of the illegal economy or at least provide an increased port-
folio of legal options that farmers can pursue. In practice, both illicit 
drug crop cultivation and the legal economy can grow in parallel and it 
is not uncommon for investments in physical infrastructure, such as irri-
gation, and agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers, [to be] used to increase 
the amount of land under opium cultivation and its yields.
 Opium production in Afghanistan is not a well-defined and well- structured 
problem with a specific solution that can be readily identified. It is evolving, 
and our understanding of it needs to evolve too [17]. There is still a need to 
conduct further research with a specific focus on risk and vulnerability assess-
ments, which can provide an estimation of the most important shocks and 
hazards by location or farmer group in Afghanistan. This means that time 
needs to be invested in understanding local conditions before designing and 
implementing alternative development interventions, and results need to be 
continually monitored in order to adapt strategies. Nevertheless, the identifi-
cation of appropriate indicators for measuring and monitoring uncertain, 
complex events, such as illicit crop cultivation, remains highly challenging. At 
a minimum, the following indicators need to be  considered when designing 
and implementing alternative development  interventions:
• Livelihood and community status indicators
• Indicators of the degree of exposure to risks
• Indicators of the ability to manage risks at different levels
 It is essential to use reliable statistical data in order to make informed 
decisions that enable the design of efficient alternative development inter-
ventions, but such data is often unavailable. Therefore, there is also a need 
for more comprehensive time-series data in order to develop a deeper under-
standing of different types of resilience as well as the transition from illegal 
to legal livelihoods, and what tools are most likely to lead to sustained reduc-
tions in opium poppy cultivation. In that regard, the value of monitoring 
should be understood as part of a broader scientific learning enterprise in 
which evidence is gathered over time and across different contexts, thereby 
forming the basis for better policymaking and programme design [18].
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ABSTRACT
The innovative “coca yes, cocaine no” policy of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
in place since 2006, provides valuable insight into the benefits of a sustainable livelihood 
approach to supply-side drug crop control without prior forced eradication. While the 
policy has inevitable limitations, its focus on the social welfare, human rights and 
 economic stability of coca-farming families has proven effective and sustainable in 
diversifying the economy and fostering political and economic stability. The direct par-
ticipation of communities and grass-roots organizations, such as the coca grower unions, 
in finding more effective and sustainable approaches to drug control have been crucial 
elements in its success. The elements of the policy’s key programme also correspond with 
the Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by the United Nations in 2015.
Keywords: forced eradication, alternative development, community coca 
control, Plurinational State of Bolivia, drugs control.
Introduction
For over 20 years, the foundation of the strategy of the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia1 to counter drugs consisted of a conditioned crop-substitution 
 programme of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and forced coca eradication.2 Beginning in 2004, the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia broke with that model and, with the help of the European 
1 Since 31 March 2009, “Plurinational State of Bolivia” has replaced “Bolivia” as the short 
name used in the United Nations.
2 Crop “substitution” and “alternative development” were terms often used to mask forced 
eradication and make it more palatable.
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Union, shifted its policy priorities from forced eradication of coca crops by the 
police and military to an alternative livelihood strategy based on  community 
involvement in coca control. 
 That policy, known as “coca yes, cocaine no”, draws on the distinction 
of coca growers between coca, a plant consumed by Andeans for millenni-
ums, and cocaine, a substance manufactured from coca leaf. Building on an 
agreement reached in 2004, registered farmers in areas previously slated for 
crop eradication can now grow a limited amount of coca, covering an area of 
land known as a cato,3 in order to ensure basic subsistence income. 
 Farmer unions work as partners alongside government agencies to verify 
that individual farmers are respecting the agreement. The initiative prior-
itizes full social inclusion and citizenship of coca growers as a long-term 
strategy to diversify family economies and reduce diversion of coca to the 
illicit market. The policy has been most thoroughly implemented in the 
 Chapare region east of Cochabamba, where forced eradication began in the 
mid-1990s, accompanied by alternative development programmes funded 
by the United States of America. 
 Limited and monitored coca cultivation, combined with participatory 
and technologically sophisticated oversight, economic development pro-
grammes and minimal coercion, better equip farmers to diversify their 
 production and reduce reliance on an illicit harvest. The experience of the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia provides elements for a road map for crop 
control and development policy that can, in turn, contribute to achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals. 
 Ethnographic fieldwork and interview data from the period 2000-2015 
support the hypothesis that that programmatic emphasis produces better 
results than the previous policy. Collectively, over five decades of field 
research in the Chapare coca-growing region—including hundreds of inter-
views with coca growers, union leaders and government officials, as well as 
policymakers and non-governmental organization staff from the Plurina-
tional State of Bolivia, the United States and the European Union—have 
provided crucial insights for the present article.
Coca in the Plurinational State of Bolivia
The hardy coca bush (Erythroxylum coca) has grown in the Andes for at 
least 4,000 years. An estimated 237,000 peasant families rely on this low-
3 A cato is 1600 square meters in the Chapare and 2500 square meters in the Yungas de La 
Paz, the two principal coca-growing regions in the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
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input/high-yield crop for cash income.4 While coca has myriad traditional 
uses in indigenous Andean culture,5 it is also the raw material used to 
manufacture cocaine.
 In late 2004, in an effort to end violent conflict and human rights viola-
tions in coca-growing regions, President Carlos Mesa acquiesced to a long-
standing coca-grower demand, permitting one subsistence plot of coca leaf 
(known as a cato) per family in the Chapare [2].6 Conflict in the region, 
which had been the principal coca-growing region of the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia since the mid-1980s, abated almost immediately [4, 5].7
 When Evo Morales became President in 2006, he continued the cato 
policy as the centerpiece of his innovative supply-side, harm-reduction coca-
control initiative [6].8 That approach simultaneously fulfils the international 
commitments of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to restrict coca cultivation 
and control drug trafficking, positing that that country can attempt to con-
tain drug production, but will never destroy it entirely, since it is driven by 
external demand [8].
 The United States, the world’s largest cocaine-consuming country [9, 
p. 7], launched a source-country policy directed at the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia in the 1980s, predominantly focusing on security force operations, 
but also incorporating economic-assistance programmes administered by 
USAID [10, pp. 1-22]. In 1988, the Plurinational State of Bolivia adopted 
its Law No. 1008, a piece of anti-drug legislation, which allows 12,000 hec-
tares (ha) of coca to be legally cultivated in “traditional growing zones”9 to 
supply the licit domestic market. The law slated coca cultivation in all other 
regions for eventual eradication [11].
 The priority given to the use of police and military force failed to reduce 
the flow of cocaine northward. That policy generated social  conflict, includ-
ing protests and road blocks, and led to recurring violations of human rights. 
4 There are an estimated 75,000 coca farmers in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, up to 
121,000 in Peru and a further 67,000 in Colombia [1].
5 Coca’s mild stimulant qualities dull hunger and fatigue, aid digestion, reduce altitude sick-
ness, and provide protein, vitamins and minerals. It is present in every Andean ritual from birth 
to death.
6 Carlos Mesa, a journalist and historian, came to power in 2003 after he refused to sanction 
police and military violence against country-wide protestors, including coca growers. The 2004 
agreement with growers vowed that coca reduction would be conducted peacefully [3]. 
7 The present article focuses on the Chapare region rather than the Yungas de La Paz, the 
traditional coca-growing region of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, as the dynamics are signifi-
cantly different there.
8 Harm-reduction policies endeavour to minimize the adverse health, social and economic 
consequences of licit and illicit psychoactive drugs [7, p. 15].
9 Law No. 1008 identifies the Yungas de La Paz, as well as the smaller Yungas de Vandiola 
in the Trópico de Cochabamba, as traditional zones.
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The security forces responsible for the eradication missions were denounced 
for rape, theft, beatings, arbitrary detentions and  extrajudicial killings [12]. 
A total of 57 coca farmers were killed between 1997 and 2003, and over 500 
others were seriously wounded by the  security forces. Those uses of force 
prompted reprisals that left scores of police dead and injured [12]. 
 Forced eradication centred in the Chapare, where about 45,000 families 
migrated beginning in the mid-1960s as part of a government colonization 
policy. Their numbers swelled after severe drought in the 1980s combined 
with a neoliberal structural-adjustment programme that devastated small-
scale highland agriculture and closed down State-owned mines, causing 
mass unemployment. Some farmers also worked sporadically in rudimen-
tary operations to manufacture cocaine paste—the first step in refining pure 
cocaine—when traffickers from Colombia appeared in the late 1980s seek-
ing raw material [13, pp. 164-166].
 The farmers belong to over 1,000 tightly knit unions, with parallel 
 women’s organizations. State presence was historically weak in tropical 
 colonization zones, including the Chapare. Coca-grower unions filled that 
vacuum, as self-governing entities to settle disputes, control land tenure and 
coordinate community public works, including the construction of roads or 
schools [14]. Those participatory grass-roots organizations employ indige-
nous decision-making practices mixed with union traditions inherited from 
the ex-miners. Although women exercise substantial influence, leadership 
tends to be concentrated in the hands of men [15].
 Coca provides small farmers several comparative advantages. It grows 
like a weed on steep slopes, it reaches maturity after a year and it can be 
harvested once every three to four months. Coca offers a high value-to-
weight ratio, which is particularly important for farmers who are far from the 
nearest road and must carry the leaves over long distances. While coca prices 
fluctuate considerably, the leaf consistently has a guaranteed internal market 
[16, pp. 47-51]. Coca complements subsistence farming and provides largely 
impoverished farmers with a steady cash income [17]. 
 The central role of coca in the peasant economy led farmers’ unions to 
resist crop eradication efforts. They skilfully linked coca eradication to national 
sovereignty and indigenous rights, thereby becoming the primary opposition to 
the Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia during the late 1990s [18]. 
Development conditioned on eradication in the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia
We planted peppers, banana, and palm hearts, but they rotted, because there 
are no bridges or roads. That’s why we plant coca, to support our families and 
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children; it’s better than dying. For us the “new” development has meant bullets 
and death.
—Martín Clemente [19]
 Alternative development has been promoted as the “carrot” in a supply 
reduction strategy since the 1980s. The focus of such programmes has 
shifted from an initial emphasis on direct crop substitution to broader inte-
grated rural development, which came to be known as alternative develop-
ment. While frameworks have changed, the stated aim of those programmes 
is essentially the same: to provide farmers with economic alternatives to the 
cultivation of illicit crops [1, pp. 77-118], [20].
 Buxton [21] argues that the major limitation with alternative develop-
ment is that while programmes now have an increased emphasis on human 
development goals, they still tend to emphasize achieving externally set drug 
control objectives—for example, targets for reductions of illicit drug crop 
cultivation—rather than the welfare of farmers. That imbalance can, for 
example, be seen in past programmes led by the United States in the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia. The Clinton administration channelled alter-
native development funding and decision-making through the Bureau of 
 International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and gave the Bureau 
oversight over USAID. The shift led to acute inter-agency conflict [22, 12-28]; 
[23], and forced eradication quotas were given priority over viable develop-
ment initiatives. For example, a 2005 report for the Congress of the United 
States stated that “USAID … maintains that alternative development is 
essential because it can foster political support for eradication programmes 
and provide incentives that, coupled with the eradication disincentive, ensure 
the permanent eradication of illicit crops” [24, p. 21]. 
 In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the United States unilaterally set 
development goals and assigned project implementation to predetermined 
private contractors who were often based in the United States, in violation 
of the international guidelines for development assistance as defined in the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness10 of 2005 and the Accra Agenda for 
Action of 2008 [25]. The Government Accounting Office of the United 
States [26, p. 6] estimates that USAID disbursed $229 million (€202 mil-
lion) on alternative development in the Plurinational State of Bolivia from 
the late 1980s to 2001, and all programmes terminated in 2009. The most 
significant contribution USAID programmes made was to improve local 
road infrastructure [27].
10 The Plurinational State of Bolivia was the first country in South America to ratify the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Alignment, Harmonization, Results and Mutual 
Accountability. 
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 Between 1983 and 1992, the Chapare Regional Development Project 
spent over half of its budget, with little success, on curbing migration from 
the high Cochabamba valleys [28]. Beginning in 1994, the programme 
shifted almost entirely to promoting five “star crops”: bananas, pineapple, 
passion fruit, palm hearts and black pepper.
 Until 2004, USAID projects refused to work with the coca grower 
unions, or with the municipalities that had been run by the coca farmer rep-
resentatives since 1995. Instead they set up parallel organizations starting in 
1998, requiring farmers to cut their ties with the coca unions, join one of the 
USAID-backed producer associations, and commit to eradicating all their 
coca before receiving development assistance.11
 The USAID approach led to uneven development processes, rewarding 
compliant communities with basic infrastructure projects, such as bridges, 
water towers, public toilets or health posts, while marginalizing others [29]. 
The practice provoked division and conflict within and among communities 
of coca growers. With the union at the centre of their lives and representing 
their interests, few were willing to abandon their organizations. Without via-
ble alternative income sources, farmers saw little choice but to replant coca 
[30, 31, 32]. Union leader Rimer Ágreda explained in 2002 that the minister 
of the Plurinational State of Bolivia “speaks of 12,000 people who are in the 
USAID alternative development association. I’m sure that I’m on that list, 
but I have coca … Up to now, the market for alternative development crops 
hasn’t materialized …” [19].
 The USAID approach first attempted to compensate farmers for eradi-
cating coca, but payments ranging from $1,500 to $2,500 (€1,320-€2,205) 
per hectare proved insufficient to replace steady income from coca. Grower 
Aniceto Zurita noted that growers “received compensation, but that money 
hasn’t produced anything. We planted oranges but, because of the canchrosis 
disease, they made us burn our fields ... I wonder if that is alternative devel-
opment? Necessity forces us to plant coca ...” [19]. USAID acknowledged 
that poor coordination of eradication efforts and its alternative development 
programme between 1998 and 1999 “created assistance gaps in Bolivia—the 
eradication outpaced the assistance, leaving peasant farmers with bare fields 
and no immediate source of income” [26, p. 6]. 
 Alternative crops promoted by USAID were unsuitable: bananas, for 
example, require considerable initial investment, fertilizers and large 
expanses of land to be profitable, and depend on highly competitive export 
markets. According to a 1990 testimony to the United States House of 
11 The USAID strategy mirrored attempts by the Government of the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia to control peasant organizations between the 1950s and 1970s [12, p. 175]. 
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 Representatives Agriculture Committee: “Although AID and others have 
identified a number of crops that can be grown in the Chapare, they have not 
figured out which of these can be profitably grown and exported, and where. 
Moreover it will probably take several years or longer to develop alternative 
crops in the Chapare for production and export” [33, pp. 7 and 8]. Never-
theless, some wealthier families, selected as “model farmers”, and with larger 
extensions of land along major roads, did reap some benefits from those 
programmes [17, pp. 221-262]; [24, pp. 20-23]. 
 The absence of market research and development hindered implementa-
tion. The domestic market for citrus fruit and other tropical crops was satu-
rated, and the international market is inaccessible to small-scale producers 
without considerable support [17]. USAID encouraged farmers to borrow for 
new crops, and when markets failed to materialize, many were driven further 
into debt. Farmers either replanted coca or went hungry [29, 30].
 Bertho Bautista one of the earliest participants in USAID programmes 
explained: “In 1988, I invested the compensation of $2,500 (€2,205) in 
macadamia from Costa Rica, pepper, and palm-heart. It made me even 
poorer ... I almost lost my house and I was almost separated from my family. 
I continue to have macadamia, and coconut as well, but I continue to plant 
coca in the middle of my crops. As someone who promoted alternative devel-
opment, I feel that I deceived many of my neighbors” [19]. According to a 
USAID evaluation, 65 per cent of the communities participating in volun-
tary eradication programmes in the Chapare broke their agreements and 
“were disqualified from receiving assistance” [26, p. 6]. 
 An assessment from 2003 of USAID programmes in the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia acknowledges systematic flaws in its development model 
including: “marketing problems, lack of development of off-farm income 
opportunities, lack of participation and attention to the effects of the social 
and institutional issues” [34, p. iii]. The same report questions conditioning 
development assistance on prior eradication of coca and notes that  subsidizing 
unprofitable crops is unsustainable [34, p. 6]. 
 Finally, it is important to note that USAID development programmes 
were inextricably linked to forced eradication. Such a conflictive context 
made development programmes impossible: peasant families did not differ-
entiate between law enforcement actions and development programmes, 
both funded by the United States, either at the individual or community 
level. There was very little trust in the State or non-governmental organiza-
tions operating in the region. 
 Given the failures and the widespread perception that USAID aimed to 
undermine their unions, grower organizations announced in June 2008 that 
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they would not sign new agreements with USAID, forcing its development 
programmes to end within six months [31]. The unions allowed the USAID-
funded human rights office to continue functioning; however, the United 
States cut its funding in 2010. 
Rethinking coca policy
Two initiatives diminished the influence of United States policy and  presaged 
the changes of the 2000s. The 1994 Law of Popular Participation transferred 
20 per cent of national tax revenues to newly established municipal govern-
ments and legally acknowledged over 15,000 local grass-roots organizations 
nationwide [35]. Coca union candidates swept the 1995 municipal elections 
in the Chapare, where they implemented their own forms of decision- making 
practices in local government and invested a significant percentage of 
 budgets in impoverished rural areas, both strengthening the municipalities 
and making them more accountable [15, 36].
 In 1998, the development support programme known as PRAEDAC, 
funded by the European Union, was established. The approach followed the 
recommendations made at an international conference in January 2002 by 
hundreds of development experts, namely to include local stakeholders in 
the design and implementation of development strategies [37]. According to 
Nicolaus Hansmann, former attaché to the cooperation section of the 
 European Union in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, it was not until 2010 
that UNODC explicitly recognized the shortcomings of conditioned crop 
substitution, marking an important convergence in alternative development 
frameworks [38, p. 239]. 
 The initiative of the European Union functioned on the premise that 
poverty reduction (through the provision of basic services), engaging coca 
grower organizations, land titling and strengthening local governments can 
contribute to breaking farmer reliance on coca [30, p. 191]. Karl Hoffman, 
former Director of Municipal Programming for PRAEDAC, described the 
strategy: “Our vision is to help farmers improve their lives first, so that then 
they will abandon drug-producing crops. Our philosophy supports popular 
participation through the municipalities, which the government has made 
very clear is the principal planning unit in the country. USAID carries out 
projects that the municipality doesn’t know anything about, which makes a 
genuine planning process absolutely impossible.” [30, p. 192].
 The municipal strengthening plan, funded by the European Union, 
directed $5.86 million (€5.17 m)—equal, on average, to 30 per cent of 
municipal funds—to the municipalities in the Chapare, without requiring 
prior coca eradication [30, p. 191]. Those local governments initially 
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 contracted PRAEDAC to execute projects from their municipal develop-
ment plans—most commonly the construction of a school, health post or 
town hall. At the same time, PRAEDAC trained the municipalities and the 
Chapare Mancomunidad (regional grouping of municipalities) in public 
administration, including consolidating community-based oversight com-
mittees. By 2004, PRAEDAC determined that Chapare municipalities could 
execute infrastructure projects independently [30]. Felipe Cáceres, former 
Villa Tunari mayor, said in 2004: “In eight years, with one fourth of the 
money, the municipalities have achieved ten times what USAID has accom-
plished in twenty [years]” [30, p. 193].
 His successor, Feliciano Mamani, explained: “Before, alternative devel-
opment was conditioned on coca eradication. In contrast, PRAEDAC has 
supported the municipalities unconditionally and has been open to partici-
pation and [community] control. This means that PRAEDAC respects the 
population and our local leaders” [39]. PRAEDAC’s concrete achievements 
include building 107 schools, reforesting 1,500 ha, providing 892 soft loans, 
granting land titles to 11,607 families, and providing 3,783 people with 
national identity cards [39]. 
 According to Hansmann, PRAEDAC changed the image of alternative 
development in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, built trust in government 
and legitimated the State in the Chapare, creating a credible foundation for 
what was to come, namely community coca control.12 An independent eval-
uation found that European Union cooperation in the Chapare “… has ena-
bled government institutions to shift the dynamics of their relation with civil 
society organizations” [40, p. 5]. 
 Hansmann further notes: “The experience of alternative development 
programs (USAID and UNODC) in Bolivia significantly influenced the 
evolution of the conception of alternative development at the European and 
international levels.” Hansmann explains that the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia challenged very early on the underlying political precept of alterna-
tive development, namely the criminalization of coca growers [38, p. 245].
Coca yes, cocaine no
Law No. 1008 set the original licit cultivation limit at 12,000 ha, based on a 
rough estimate of local traditional demand for coca leaf. In 2006, President 
Morales raised that limit to 20,000 ha nationally, in order to guarantee sub-
sistence income for farmers in regions overlooked by the previous legislation 
[41, p. 76]. The Government arrived at the 20,000 ha figure by taking the 
12 Email communication Nicolaus Hansmann, European Union, 11 November 2014.
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coca production already permitted under Law No. 1008 and adding both 
the catos of the growers in the Chapare and an additional amount for regis-
tered growers in the expansion zones of the Yungas de La Paz (areas that 
border the Yungas de La Paz “traditional zone”). 
 The policy required growers to register their coca fields and then title 
their land, a process completed in the Chapare by 2010, and in parts of the 
Yungas de La Paz by 2011. The cato programme excludes the Yungas de La 
Paz traditional zone and only covers farmers who are union members culti-
vating coca in established regions. Coca grown outside those areas and in 
national parks is considered illegal and is targeted for forced eradication. 
 Although Law No. 1008 recognized limited coca production for 
 traditional consumption, the 2009 Constitution identifies coca as a social, 
cultural and natural resource of the Plurinational State of Bolivia for the 
first time, to be protected and promoted through national regulations [42]. 
Leonardo Loza, General Secretary of the Six Federations of Chapare coca 
producers explains the importance of the constitutional recognition of 
coca: “First we began with the Constitution ... we included our coca leaf so 
that it is constitutionally respected, so that no neoliberals or political party 
can reverse it or talk about zero coca in the Cochabamba Tropics or in 
Bolivia” [43]. 
 In June 2011, the Congress of the Plurinational State of Bolivia voted to 
withdraw from the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, which 
prohibits growing coca leaf, except for medical and scientific purposes. It 
successfully re-acceded in January 2013 with a reservation that legally per-
mits the growing of coca and its licit use within its borders. A study on local 
coca consumption, funded by the European Union and published in Novem-
ber 2013, found that one third of the population of the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia habitually consumes coca leaf, which is the equivalent of 14,705 ha 
directed to traditional and non-narcotic uses [44].
 As of March 2017, two laws—one for coca and one for controlled sub-
stances—replaced Law No. 1008. The new Penal Code of the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, which categorizes criminal sentencing, including for drug-
related crimes, is awaiting approval. The new coca law established a 
national limit of 22,000 ha, 14,300 for the Yungas de La Paz and 7,700 for 
the Chapare.13
13 A privileged and entitled group of growers from the designated Yungas de La Paz traditional 
zone resisted efforts to limit or regulate the amount of coca they cultivate. The formation of that 
group of growers was a direct, if unintended, consequence of Law No. 1008, which exempted 
them from production limits. 
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Community coca control
Based on the achievements of PRAEDAC in the Chapare, including 
 municipal strengthening, conflict reduction and successful public works 
projects, the current programme integrates development into a similar and 
more efficient, overarching community-controlled approach [45]. Its central 
pillars are:
• Development assistance without coca eradication as a prerequisite
• Investment first in public works and social services, and then in 
 economic/agricultural development
• Development initiatives designed with active local participation in 
order to address unique regional needs, incorporating local knowl-
edge, and gender and generational awareness
• Institutional strengthening
• Coordination with representative local organizations
• Environmental sustainability fostered through increasing organic coca 
and coffee production, forest species diversification and reforestation
 The Programme to Support Community Coca Leaf Control (PACS), 
funded by the European Union, began in January 2009 with five years fund-
ing of $13 million (€9.5 million) and reached approximately 40 per cent of 
Chapare unions. PACS employed local coca growers to work closely with the 
Chapare federations, holding hundreds of community meetings to educate 
farmers as to why they should respect the cato agreement [40, pp. 23 and 
24]. Specific programming included [46]: 
• Land titling for coca-growing families with catos, totalling 175,000 ha 
in the Chapare
• Biometric registry of authorized coca growers, including fingerprint-
ing and photographs
• Registration and periodic remeasurement of each cato by the State 
monitoring organization, namely the economic and social develop-
ment unit (UDESTRO) in the Chapare
• The SYSCOCA database, which assists in monitoring cultivation, 
transport and sales
• Integrated development projects to complement coca income
• Community self-policing to ensure the one cato limit is respected, 
including training for union representatives on database use,  monitoring 
and ways to restrict coca planting
• Industrialization of coca leaf-based products, including coca flour, 
tea bags, shampoo, Christmas cakes, liquor and skin creams
142 Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. LXI, 2017
 UDESTRO measures registered catos using Global Positioning System 
(GPS) technology and electronically uploads the data for State and UNODC 
access. The SYSCOCA satellite monitoring system, in operation since 2012, 
synchronizes data from the biometric registry, the joint land-use manage-
ment and monitoring system of UNODC and the Government of the Pluri-
national State of Bolivia (BOLF57), and land-titling registry (INRA) of that 
country. The result is a sophisticated cross-referenced coca monitoring sys-
tem, providing multiple years of coca-planting data, including unauthorized 
coca grown by individual producers. The database identifies the diversion of 
coca to the illicit market [47].
 The database provides a valuable resource for DIGCOIN, the agency 
that licenses over 5,000 coca-leaf merchants. Those merchants sell three 
quarters of all licit coca (with growers able to legally sell the remainder 
directly to consumers). While the ability of DIGCOIN to track coca has 
improved, planned Internet connections at all DIGCOIN checkpoints are 
not yet installed. The 2017 coca law mandates the biometric registry of 
coca merchants, increases State-supervised checkpoints and regulates the 
quantity of coca leaf circulated from production centres to authorized 
markets [48, p. 7].
 Coca control encompasses the whole community. Every base level union 
organizes regular examinations of coca fields through commissions compris-
ing local members and often including neighbouring communities. If excess 
coca is found, the community eradicates the entire crop and forbids the 
farmer to replant for a year. When one takes into account the maturation 
time, that effectively results in two years without coca income. For more 
than one violation, the union levies a lifetime ban on growing coca. The 
union’s efforts are backed by a government monitoring body—UDESTRO 
in the Chapare and UDESY in the Yungas de La Paz—that is staffed by the 
growers themselves. By July 2014 more than 800 Chapare growers had lost 
their cato for violating the agreement [49].
 A 35 per cent net reduction in coca cultivation has contributed to a 
92 per cent increase in coca prices between 2009 and 2015 [16], and of the 
three coca-producing countries, coca from the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
is the most expensive (for comparison, see [50, 51]). Many registered farm-
ers believe that, despite limiting the size of their coca plots, the cato generates 
reliable subsistence income. As one farmer put it: “We work less, but make 
more money.” They recognize that if they cannot make the strategy work, 
they risk a return to forced eradication. As a result, farmers take the cato 
accord very seriously and repeatedly express that the new system is more 
onerous than the previous “zero coca” policy financed by the United States 
[52]. In the words of one farmer: “Before, when we planted the coca and 
they (security forces) ripped it up, we would replant and they would rip it up 
Integrated development with coca in the Plurinational State of Bolivia 143
again.” However, he said that today it is really harsh: “… everyone knows 
how much coca you have and they will denounce anyone who plants more 
than a cato” [53, p. 11].
 Inevitably, difficulties arise. Some farmers respond to the constraints by 
increasing fertilizer and pesticide use to increase production yields—with 
negative environmental consequences.14 Others have illegally obtained more 
than one cato by subdividing existing plots, often among family members, or 
by registering newly purchased land under another name. Those farmers 
have earned substantially more than their neighbours, contributing to 
increasing levels of inequality. The unions have made concerted attempts 
over the past five years to eliminate those “ghost catos”. In 2016, the Govern-
ment of the Plurinational State of Bolivia completed a thorough audit to 
identify and eliminate such plots, before issuing long-term biometric registry 
cards to growers.15
 A small minority of farmers refuse to comply with the policy. In such 
cases, UDESTRO workers first negotiate with community leaders and, if 
that fails, they arrange for the coca to be forcibly eradicated. In contrast to 
the past, eradication is no longer accompanied by violent resistance. One 
middle-aged female grower said: “These days we don’t rebel when the coca 
cutters enter our plots; we just show them where the coca is and let them get 
on with their work.” Others pointed out that the security forces no longer see 
them as enemies but as colleagues, partly because UDESTRO is staffed by 
representatives of the coca union [53, p. 12]. Law enforcement authorities 
support that hypothesis. Gonzalo Quezada, commander of the FELCN anti-
drug police from 2010-2013, affirmed: “The growers themselves have 
assumed a degree of responsibility to prevent trafficking. They will denounce 
traffickers, something they never did before. We appreciate working with 
community control because it provides important support from the popula-
tion.” The former commander of the UMOPAR anti-drug police in the 
 Chapare, Colonel Rene Salazar Ballesteros, also highlighted the practical 
benefits of improved community relations: “People don’t want their com-
munity to be implicated in drug trafficking, so social control is contributing 
to better counterdrug efforts … they never prevent us from going into areas 
where coca maceration pits are detected” [55, p. 2]. 
 In support of that finding, an evaluation by the European Union of 
cooperation with the Plurinational State of Bolivia states: “Possibly, the 
most successful and visible example of productive and efficient work 
14 Heavy chemical use, introduced during USAID programmes in the Chapare, has contrib-
uted to the spread of the fungus Fusarium oxysporum [54].
15 Author interview with the audit supervisor of the Government of the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia. La Paz, April 27, 2016.
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between authorities and grass-roots organizations/civil society, showing 
political will, joint effective work and achievements beyond expectations, is 
the social control work related to the problematic of coca leaf production, 
drug trafficking control and alternative development” [40, p. 60]. The same 
report suggests that the Plurinational State of Bolivia and the European 
Union should continue to promote the participation of civil society organi-
zations in the design and implementation of development programmes with 
coca and the fight against drug trafficking [40, p. 73]. Likewise, the Lancet 
Commission on Public Health and International Drug Policy, convened by 
the Lancet and Johns Hopkins University, concludes that the example of 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia “is a rare case of meaningful participation 
of drug crop farmers in planning and implementing programmes meant to 
benefit them” [56, p. 1467].
 The relative success of community control does not mean it is uncon-
tested. During extended fieldwork in the region in 2013 and 2014, farmers 
complained to the authors that they could not support their families solely 
on income from one cato [52, p. 161]. At union meetings, government agents 
countered that they should not expect to, but need to develop other sources 
of income through crop diversification [57]. 
 Debates about enforcing the cato happen at every local union meeting 
and can last as long as three hours [53, p. 11]. In some places, union 
leadership tries to gain an advantage. “It’s not that we never had abuse of 
power in unions before or their use for personal enrichment, but this new 
generation of coca grower leadership sometimes uses the historic mis-
trust of the State to disparage the newly created institutions. At times this 
can lead to manipulation of social control norms for their own personal 
benefit,” explains Godofredo Reinicke, director of Puente Investigación y 
Enlace.16 
 Despite the need for constant negotiations, the benefits of community 
control far outweigh its limitations. An evaluation by the European Union 
concluded that “support to social control has resulted in a reduction of con-
flict levels and the stabilization of coca crops and furthermore, an increased 
pace in the reduction of coca crops” [40, p. 48]. The area under coca cultiva-
tion in the Plurinational State of Bolivia has decreased steadily since 2010. 
In a one-year period during 2013 and 2014, net coca production dropped 
from 23,000 to 20,400 ha, the lowest level since UNODC began monitoring 
in 2003 [16].
16 Author interview, Cochabamba, 20 April, 2012. 
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Integrated development with coca
The “integrated development with coca” policy of the Government of the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia does not condition development assistance on 
coca eradication. By stabilizing the security situation in the Chapare, work-
ing directly with the coca unions instead of against them and recognizing 
coca as a critical source of family income, the Government has placed 
 farmers in a better position to experiment with alternative crops. 
 The revenue from the cato—about $200 (€176) a month, which is a lit-
tle less than the current minimum wage—ensures a guaranteed income, 
reducing the risk of experimenting with alternative crops or livestock. Coca 
farmers interviewed claim that government funding for mechanized tools—
including rice-husking machines, temperature-controlled supply chains for 
dairy produce, and plants for the processing of fruit, honey and fish—has 
expanded the market for local produce. According to one evaluation: “Alter-
native agricultural production has increased substantially and a number of 
promising productive chains have been created” [40, p. 50]. An investment 
of $1.8 million in a pineapple production project in the Chapare resulted in 
1,006.2 ha of pineapples cultivated for the national market. Another project 
supported 9,870.9 ha of bananas for the national market, and 6,091.9 ha 
for export [58].
 In 2004, European Union funds revitalized FONADAL, the State alter-
native development fund. FONADAL has successfully administered €60 
million from the European Union, with over €30 million additional local 
government funding—much larger than that required by the agreements 
with the European Union [40, p. 50].
 The revamped entity, under the Vice Ministry of Coca and Integrated 
Development, works to diversify income and production, improve living 
conditions and promote grass-roots and institutional capacity-building for 
communities and institutions. FONADAL has built 100 new bridges, 
expanded the electricity grid in the region and increased social services [59]. 
The 2017 coca law also created a national council on revaluing, producing, 
marketing and industrializing coca (CONCOCA) in order to elaborate and 
execute national coca policies [48, p. 9]. CONCOCA is under the leadership 
of the Ministry of Rural Development and Land, and is composed of the 
ministers of foreign affairs, productive development, health, tourism and 
Government, as well as a representative of coca-producing organizations.
 Giovanni Terrazas, head of the UDESTRO development office, which 
works closely with FONADAL, described how his agency has led livestock 
vaccination campaigns, regular check-ups and provided vitamins and hor-
mones. Terrazas was also enthusiastic about a 2013 fish farming project, 
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which initially set up 12 model ponds. The ponds were such a success that a 
year later, over 80 copycat ponds were in operation. One woman explained 
that her fishpond provided twice the income of a cato, and said that she was 
considering abandoning coca altogether [52, p. 161]. Families can earn up 
to $7,250 annually from fish farming [60],17 which is significant in a country 
where GDP per capita is just over $3,000 [61].
 Many farmers now describe coca as a savings account or a safety net, 
rather than their main source of income. Terrazas stressed: “It is incredible 
to see whole families no longer fearful but happy because they can imagine 
better days ahead” [32]. Empirical research supports those claims. For 
example, bananas, citrus fruit and hearts of palm now cover more cultivated 
land than coca in the Chapare, a result that the United Nations attributes to 
sustained and integrated development efforts [52, p. 161]. According to 
European Union evaluations, the volume of bananas, hearts of palm, coffee, 
cacao, pineapples and honey produced in the Yungas de La Paz increased by 
8 per cent in 2014, and in the Chapare by 5 per cent, owing to strategic 
investments [62, p. 43]. 
 The Chapare, and to a lesser extent, spillover zones in the Yungas de 
La Paz,18 have been transformed since the 2004 cato agreement. The aver-
age growth in the Chapare is higher than the national average, and that is, 
in part, the result of the increased stability. New cars, motorcycles and 
home improvements can be seen everywhere. Residents report that more 
jobs exist in non-agricultural work, that government scholarships allow 
their children to study at university,19 and that low-interest government 
loans mean they can start their own businesses. Farmers interviewed 
attributed the improved economic climate to the demilitarization of the 
zone and their right to grow a cato. The UNODC representative in the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia argues that the “innovative approach is not 
only about making money off a crop through substituting an illicit crop for 
a licit one. It’s about a more comprehensive approach that includes access 
to essential services like schools, hospitals, and roads in areas that tradi-
tionally have been hard to reach” [63].
 A State housing programme has replaced many wooden shacks with 
brick and mortar houses. As a result of government infrastructure pro-
grammes that have prioritized female heads of families, basic services are now 
available to low-income households, except for the most remote ones [64]. 
17 Production costs account for approximately 20 per cent of this figure. 
18 This refers to areas where coca production has extended beyond the traditional zone. 
Residents of the traditional zone semantically distinguish themselves from such places, which 
they do not consider to be the Yungas de La Paz. 
19 A Government-funded indigenous university opened in the Chapare town of Chimore in 
2008, offering careers in forestry, agronomy, fisheries and food industrialization.
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People are less likely to migrate: many young people, some of whom had firm 
job offers in either Spain or the United States, said that they had decided to 
stay in the Chapare.20
 However, those Government-backed development projects have mostly 
benefited families who live close to a road. Farmers in hilly, isolated regions 
face particular difficulties, since most cash crops fail because of steep slopes 
and excessively sandy soil. Roads and bridges are often impeded for weeks, 
particularly during the rainy season. 
 The unions regularly discuss industrialization and have encouraged their 
rank-and-file members to cultivate organic coca for use in licit products for 
the export market. The Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
funded the establishment of a coca-processing plant (EBOCOCA) that 
opened in the Chapare in 2011 to produce coca food products, such as flours 
and drinks. However, those alternative coca-based products, have struggled 
because international prohibition of coca exports continues to limit the mar-
ket [65]. Community control expert Karl Hoffman expressed his concerns: 
“There just isn’t the local demand for alternate coca products, and without 
international legalization, there won’t be a big enough market.”21 
 Grass-roots farmers continue to hope to export products made using 
coca leaf. “Imagine how many people would buy coca tea in China!” 
exclaimed one leader. In early 2015, the Government announced a project 
to remove the cocaine alkaloid from coca in an effort to expand legal exports 
[66]. In 2016, coca plant administrators travelled to China to explore future 
potential markets for de-cocainized coca. “If we could export legally, coca 
farmers’ incomes would improve,” explained Ricardo Hegedus, manager of 
Windsor Tea, the largest tea producer in the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
He added: “It wouldn’t eliminate drug trafficking but it would make it harder 
and more expensive for traffickers to get coca” [67]. 
 The new coca law mandates research on the properties of coca and the 
industrialization of derived products. The Government recognizes that, 
based on the 2013 study funded by the European Union, 14,705 ha are 
needed to meet the local demand for coca consumption. Consequently, the 
State plans to absorb the remaining 7,000 ha permitted under the 22,000 ha 
legal limit through industrialization efforts. DIGCOIN, the institution 
charged with coca industrialization and commercialization projects, plans to 
expand activities by certifying and supporting both private and public indus-
trialization companies, investing in research and development, and promot-
ing export agreements with other countries [68]. 
20 Author interview with coca growers November 2013.
21 Author interview, 13 May 2016.
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Sustainable Development Goals 
Drug control policies have had a negative impact on human development, 
exacerbating the poverty, marginalization and exclusion that fuels drug-crop 
production in the first place [21]. The United Nations Development 
 Programme (UNDP) and UNODC recognize that contradiction and 
emphasize that drug policy should advance the Sustainable Development 
Goals, including eradication of poverty and hunger, and achieving sustained 
economic growth [69]; [70]; [71, pp. 63-107]. Against that backdrop, the 
case of the Plurinational State of Bolivia offers several important lessons.
 The Chapare has made significant improvements towards achieving the 
key Sustainable Development Goals. According to UNDP [69, 70], experi-
ences like that of the Plurinational State of Bolivia contribute to meeting the 
objectives of the Goals. UNDP notes that addressing the root causes that 
sustain the cultivation of illicit crops is critical to achieving Sustainable 
Development Goals 1 (no poverty), 2 (zero hunger) and 8 (decent work and 
economic growth) [70, pp. 11-14]. 
 Extreme poverty in the municipality of Villa Tunari in the Chapare stood 
at 74 per cent in 2001 but dropped to 44.3 per cent by 2010 [72, p. 164]. 
Unsatisfied basic needs22 in 2001 impacted 87.2 per cent of the population, 
but by 2010 had decreased to 65.4 per cent [72, p. 151]. Similar results were 
registered in other Chapare municipalities, with the gains in each case being 
higher than the national average [73, p. 39]. 
 Sustainable Development Goal 3 promotes good health and well-being. 
The percentage of people who have access to tap water increased by 40 per 
cent between 2001 and 2010. A total of 90 per cent now have access to a bath-
room or a latrine [72, pp. 98-100], contributing to a significant decrease in 
cases of severe diarrhoea in children aged up to 5 years [72, p. 77]. 
 Sustainable Development Goal 4 calls for quality education. In the 
 Chapare, the literacy rate improved by 13.5 per cent and school attendance 
went up by 14 per cent in the period 2001-2010, compared with a nationwide 
increase of only 4 per cent [72, pp. 80-87]. Finally, the community control 
programme of the Plurinational State of Bolivia brought peace, justice and 
strong institutions to zones in the Chapare that had previously suffered from 
conflict, in line with Sustainable Development Goal 16 (peace, justice and 
strong institutions). As union leader Leonardo Loza stated: “We monitor our-
selves without deaths, injuries, persecutions, orphans, or widows. Today the 
cato of coca is respected in peace” [43].
22 This measurement refers to housing, education and health indicators.
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 The experience of the Plurinational State of Bolivia shows that any suc-
cessful development programme must be rooted in trust and the extension 
of citizenship rights. The legal recognition of a restricted quantity of coca 
combined with land titling, can create the framework necessary for positive 
engagement between citizens and the State, and the defence of citizen rights. 
Policymakers need to adopt new benchmarks for success, reducing the 
emphasis on crop eradication figures while putting greater focus on metrics 
based on human welfare and development. 
Conclusion
Data pertaining to coca cultivation demonstrate a decline in coca crops in the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia from 31,000 ha in 2010 to 20,200 ha in 2015. 
The Plurinational State of Bolivia achieved that 35 per cent net reduction while 
showing respect for human rights, extending citizenship to farmers, empower-
ing local communities and promoting economic alternatives [32, 74].
 Field research, interviews, and the analysis of census and survey data 
suggest that the socioeconomic situation in the Trópico de Cochabamba has 
improved. Many families have risen above the poverty line, there has been an 
increase in labour opportunities outside of farm work, and access to 
 services—including education, health and water—has expanded.23 As the 
German Development Agency (GIZ) states, the Chapare is “now a space of 
economic opportunities … and improved living conditions” [73, p. 39].
 The socioeconomic gains in the Chapare are not the result of the coca 
policy alone. And yet, dramatic declines in both inequality and poverty in 
regions participating in community coca control significantly outpace 
national improvements as a whole.24
 Multilateral organizations have recognized the achievements of the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia. A report published in 2016 by UNDP 
described community control as an innovative approach that demonstrated 
that respecting growers and local organizations, and ensuring their meaning-
ful participation in the design and implementation of coca-control efforts, 
could contribute to reducing poverty and hunger, and sustaining coca reduc-
tion [70, p. 13]. The Organization of American States has also made positive 
assessments of the coca-control model of the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
[9, p. 6]; [32, p. 58].
23 Email communication, Nicolaus Hansmann, European Union, 21 February 2014.
24 Inequality and poverty reduction in the Plurinational State of Bolivia has been attributed 
to sustained economic growth, the commodity boom after the year 2000, conditional transfer 
schemes, remittances, and labour income growth at the bottom end [75]. 
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 An evaluation by the European Union states that “abandoning the per-
secution and punishment approach and favouring social control, in joint 
work between authorities and grass-roots organizations, a reduction of the 
surface area for coca leaf production was achieved, which is considerable, 
much more successful than the achievements made with the previous model 
(“the drug war”). This fact has been internationally recognized and certified 
by … UNODC” [40, p. 60]. 
 Further, Henriette Geiger, Chief of the Unit for Latin America and the 
Caribbean of the Directorate General for Development and Cooperation of 
the European Commission, affirmed: “The collaboration we’ve received in 
these programmes is really exemplary. I’ve travelled to many countries as 
Latin America/Caribbean Chief and I’ve rarely found such a committed 
 government … I think there is long-term sustainability” [62, p. 114]. 
 Although the community coca-control strategy is designed to fit the 
unique social, economic and political conditions in the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, adapted versions of that model have potential for other regions. In 
February 2017, a delegation of coca growers from Colombia visited the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia in order to exchange experiences with their 
counterparts in State institutions, social organizations and civil society. 
Diana Puello of the delegation from Colombia commented: “Forced eradi-
cation is all we know. Here we are seeing alternatives, maybe our alternative 
won’t be exactly like Bolivia’s because we have our own particular condi-
tions, but we can see what we’d like to bring back to our country.”25
 Basic programme elements, including grass-roots control, lack of condi-
tionality on assistance and a focus on human development, are building 
blocks that could be implemented in other contexts. Even in areas where 
crops are only destined for the illicit market, supporting instead of repressing 
farmers will place those farmers in a better position to curtail their depend-
ence on an illicit crop. 
 Strong social organizations provide the backbone for the strategy. 
Strengthening local groups, particularly in places without strong grass-roots 
representation, must therefore be the first step, combined with reinforcing 
the capacity and budgets of local government so that town halls can respond 
to local demands. The PRAEDAC municipal strengthening programme in 
the Chapare, an initiative of the European Union, provides lessons on how 
that might be achieved. 
25 Author interview with Diana Puello, member of the coca farmer delegation from Colombia. 
La Paz: 24 February 2017.
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 Finally, proper sequencing is essential for sustainable reductions in coca 
crop cultivation. Front-loading development assistance without calling on 
farmers to first reduce crops is therefore necessary. However, the Plurina-
tional State of Bolivia goes one step further by permitting subsistence coca 
as an explicit support to crop diversification over time. As a result, farmers 
have a guaranteed safety net and are therefore more willing to experiment 
with new and untested crops [53]. 
 Ultimately, successful diversification of livelihoods and a simultaneous 
decrease in reliance on illicit crops can only happen if farmer welfare is prior-
itized over drug control objectives. That includes framing and evaluating 
 policies based on their relationship to the Sustainable Development Goals.
 Respect for human rights, social and economic development, and 
increasing State presence in remote rural areas places the approach of the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia at the forefront of alternative drug control 
models. While more quantitative research is needed on the impacts of social 
control in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the experience to date demon-
strates the value of adapting development models and strategies to lessons 
learned and local contexts and dynamics.
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